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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
WAGING MORAL WAR: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MOTIVATION ALIGNMENT  
AND CONSTRAINING DOCTRINE ON MORAL U.S. TARGETING DECISIONS 
 
Should U.S. political decision-makers decide to wage a moral war, it is not as 
easy a merely saying “go do it.”  To ensure moral targeting decisions, American national 
political leaders must suffer the costs of monitoring in terms of time and money, and 
provide not only detailed direction, but also constant oversight to ensure objectives are 
clear and subordinates carry out directions.  Military officers must ensure that their 
motivations align with those of their principals, and they must ensure that constraining 
doctrine for planning and executing combat operations is followed.  Having satisfied 
these variables, moral targeting decisions, wherein proportionality of non-combatant 
casualties is weighed against target necessity, should then be easily attainable. 
The process of aligning motivations with respect to desired outcomes, and the 
process of planning strategies according to doctrine together lead to moral targeting 
decisions.  By following the processes of getting war plans approved according to 
published U.S. doctrine, a deliberate dialogue is followed with direction and feedback 
through several steps of planning and approval that result in multiple people working on a 
product that results in a sort of corporate “buy- in”.  I posit that it is difficult to follow this 
process and end up with targeting decisions that do not weigh harm to non-combatants 
against the necessity of individual targets, especially when principals and agents come 
 4 
together to deliberately ensure they align their motivations with respect to objectives.  
This theory is applicable to U.S. involvement in war, but is not necessarily generalizable 
to other countries. 
Through case studies of American involvement in Desert Storm (the first Gulf 
War), Operation Allied Force (NATO’s air war over Serbia), and the U.S. War on Terror 
(campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq), I find that only in the War on Terror were moral 
targeting decisions consistently made by US national leaders.  Furthermore, that was the 
only case study wherein both constraining doctrine was present and principal-agent 
motivations were aligned with respect to objectives.  The other two cases showed that the 
variables were not followed and proportionality-necessity decisions were not made. 
 
KEYWORDS:  Morality in War, Ethics in International Affairs, Just War, Military 
Bureaucracy, Military Doctrine 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
_____________________________________
 
WAGING MORAL WAR: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MOTIVATION ALIGNMENT  
AND CONSTRAINING DOCTRINE ON MORAL U.S. TARGETING DECISIONS 
 
 
By 
 
Tomislav Z. Ruby, Lt. Col., USAF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
Director Of Dissertation 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
Director of Graduate Studies 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tomislav Z. Ruby 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Graduate School 
 
University of Kentucky 
 
2004
WAGING MORAL WAR: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MOTIVATION ALIGNMENT  
AND CONSTRAINING DOCTRINE ON MORAL U.S. TARGETING DECISIONS 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
DISSERTATION 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
College of Arts and Sciences 
At the University of Kentucky 
 
 
By 
Tomislav Z. Ruby 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
Director: Dr. Karen A. Mingst, Professor of Political Science 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
2004 
 
Copyright © Tomislav Z. Ruby 2004 
 
 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The following dissertation, while an individual work, was only made possible through the 
insights, mentoring, and care given me by many people.  First, I wish to thank my Chair, Dr. 
Karen Mingst, who from the very beginning of this project saw the end state better than I did.  
She gently guided me through mine fields of research and coordination.  Without her 
leadership, this dissertation would not have been possible.  The rest of my committee, Dr. 
Michael Desch, Dr. Stuart Kaufman, Dr. Richard Waterman, and Dr. George Herring, also 
provided me with specific and key insights into a topic I thought I knew, but realized how 
much I still had to learn.  I also wish to thank my outside reader, Dr. Daniel Frank for his 
time and insights. 
 
In addition to my committee, I want to thank Dr. Matt Gabel for his mentorship and 
friendship.  With his assistance, I plumbed the waters of methodology and critical thinking 
only to learn how much I lack in that area.  I now have another colleague to learn from.  I 
also with to thank my leadership at Air University in Montgomery, Alabama, especially 
Colonel (Dr.) Jim Forsyth and Dr. Lew Ware, for their constant support and assistance during 
this process.  Furthermore, without the tireless and cheerful assistance of Diana Simpson, the 
best research librarian in the country, I could never have built up the supporting evidence and 
documentation necessary to make this research credible. 
 
Finally, I must thank my family for their patience and assistance during these wonderful 
three years.  They gave me the time, moral support and prayers that buoyed me through this 
process.
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
  Page      
 
 
Acknowledgments         iii 
 
List of Tables          vi 
 
List of Figures          vii 
 
List of Files          viii 
 
Disclaimer          ix 
 
Chapter One: Introduction        1 
 
Chapter Two: Just War, Civil-Military Relations, and Bureaucratic Politics 10 
 Classical Just war Theory       12 
 Civil-Military Relations and Moral Conduct in War    25 
 Bureaucratic Politics and Its Affect on Moral Targeting Decisions   41 
 
Chapter Three: Making Moral Targeting Decisions In War    52 
 Theory and Presentation of Model      52 
 Operationalization of Variables      65 
 Research Design        82 
 Conclusion         88 
 
Chapter Four: Controlling The Environment      92 
 Influencing Bureaucratic Motivations      92 
 Control Through Doctrinal Processes     98 
 
Chapter Five: Desert Storm Case Study      106 
 Introduction         106 
 State of US Military Doctrine Prior to Desert Strom    109 
 Principal-Agent Motivations in Desert Storm    119 
 Moral Intent Versus Moral Decisions      137 
 Conclusion         144 
 
Chapter Six: Operation Allied Force Case Study     149 
 Introduction         149 
 State of U.S. Military Doctrine for Allied Force    151 
 Principal-Agent Motivations and Allied Force    174 
 Conclusions          194 
 
 
 v 
 
 
Chapter Seven: War On Terror Case Study      198 
 Introduction          198 
 State of U.S. Military Doctrine of the War of Terror    202 
 Principal-Agent Motivations for the GWOT     218 
 Conclusion         227  
 
Chapter 8: Morality In War – Conclusions And Implications    232 
 Summary of Findings        232 
 Alternative Explanations of Findings      242 
 Implications and Avenues for Further Research    249 
 Concluding Thoughts        258 
 
Appendix: List of Acronyms        261 
 
References          263 
 
Vita           275
 vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 3.1, Case Study Matrix        86 
Table 5.1 Warden’s Model of Targeting Systems      133 
 
 
 vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 3.1, Process to Achieve and Variables Affecting 
Targeting Decisions in War       55 
Figure 3.2, This is Policy        62 
Figure 3.3, This is Strategy        62 
Figure 3.4, This is Doctrine        63 
Figure 7.1, Destroyed Tank in Baghdad      215
 viii 
LIST OF FILES 
 
Tom Ruby .......................................................................................................800 kb
 ix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not 
reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government or the 
Department of Defense. 
 1 
Chapter One 
 
Introduction  
 
 
Soldiers have many faults, but they have one redeeming merit; they are 
never worshippers of force. Soldiers more than any other men are taught 
severely and systematically that might is not right. The fact is obvious. 
The might is in the hundred men who obey. The right (or what is held to 
be right) is in the one man who commands them. – G.K. Chesterton1 
 
 
It is the seventh day of the war.  The highly touted five-day air campaign has not 
brought the enemy’s leadership to the negotiating table as planned.  The air war has not 
gone well and the emboldened enemy has decided to test U.S. ground forces.   
The officers sitting in the Joint Targeting Coordination Board morning briefing 
can feel the tension. Charging into the room, the Joint Force Commander is visibly 
frustrated as he takes the seat at the head of the table.  After a long pause, he calmly but 
forcefully delivers the following, “I want you to open up the target list.  The gloves are 
coming off.  By next week, I don’t want a single person in that country to have 
electricity, to be able to drive to the store, to send their kids to school, or to be able to get 
water out of their faucets.  If their leadership is going to force this war on us, then I want 
every person in their country to feel the effects of their decision!  Get to work!”2 
Is there a difference between a moral and lawful order, and if so, how do the 
planners and executors in the military chain of command below that Joint Force 
Commander ensure that his direction is carried out within those moral and legal bounds?  
Military members are required by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to obey 
                                                 
1 G.K. Chesterton, “Thoughts Around Koepenick,” All Things Considered (1908), obtained from The 
American Chesterton Society online at www.chesterton.org.  
2 Scenario developed by Major Gerald Swift in “The Teaching of Morality in Warfighting in Today’s 
Officer Corps,” Air Command and Staff College, Montgomery, Alabama, research paper, 10 April 2001, 
https://research.au.af.mil/papers/student/ay2001/acsc/01-208.pdf.  
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the lawful orders of their superiors.  But those officers also know that they are 
accountable for their actions and cannot later make the excuse that they were merely 
following orders if those orders were illegal.  They must consider the ramifications of 
carrying out any directive, given their discretion within the military bureaucracy. 
The United States finds itself today in the position of being able to attack a wide 
variety of targets throughout the world with precision undreamed of even 20 years ago.  
This precision engagement capability, a core competency of the U.S. Air Force, leads to a 
serious debate about the ability of the U.S. to project power at any place and at any time 
with a precision that will minimize the threat to non-combatants.  However, despite the 
promise of precision engagement, we have only recently seen it brought to fruition, and 
still there are questions of excessive collateral damage.   
Although precision weapons capability has continued to improve, we found 
during Desert Storm (the first Gulf War) and Allied Force (NATO’s Air War Over 
Serbia) that the U.S. still inflicts politically and morally unpalatable levels of civilian and 
non-combatant casualties due to poor planning, poor execution and poor decision-
making.  We also find it generally accepted that we need to inflict various levels of pain 
upon the enemy population to bend them to our will.  To this end, there is increasing 
concern that states are letting slide long-held moral norms such as Just War tradition.  
I believe that there is a moral way to wage war, whether in the air, on the sea, or 
on the ground.  This dissertation contends that the U.S. military in general, and the Air 
Force particularly, should maintain a high level of morality in the conduct of air 
operations.  In doing so, the U.S. can help save the lives of its airmen as well as innocents 
on the ground.  Doing so will not only achieve national interest, but can remove a point 
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of contention after the conflict that takes away attention from the objectives that were 
achieved.  There must be a balance between the actions that are necessary to achieve 
American national objectives and the proportionality of harm done to non-combatants to 
achieve those objectives. 
I am cautious, however, of the notion that what is moral should be viewed as a 
question of what is legal.  Who would be the ultimate arbiter of legality?  Either there is 
an international standard for conduct in war or each state follows its own rules as it sees 
its own national interest.  If the U.S. accedes to a new movement in international law that 
David Rivken and Lee Casey describe, then U.S. national interests will cease to matter. 
This "new" international law purports to govern the 
relationship of citizens to their governments, affecting such domestic 
issues as environmental protection and the rights of children. Among 
other things, it would: nearly eliminate the unilateral use of military 
force; create the unattainable requirement of avoiding all civilian 
casualties in combat; promote the criminal prosecution of individual 
state officials by the courts of other states and international tribunals; 
and permit-or even require--international "humanitarian" 
intervention in a state's internal affairs. Recast as such, international 
law constitutes a real and immediate threat to U.S. national 
interests.3 
 
Charles Dunlap further posits that many of the most influential non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), some of whom style themselves as speaking for those without a 
voice, are actually pushing a political agenda that specifically counters the U.S.  He says 
these groups that attempt to broaden and use international law against the U.S. are “no 
more than self-selected, idiosyncratic interest groups who are not accountable to any 
                                                 
3 David B. Rivkin, Jr., and Lee A. Casey, “The Rocky Shoals of International Law,” The National Interest, 
(No. 62, Winter 2000/2001), pg. 35. 
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ballot box.”4  If that is the case, then the U.S. needs to be very wary of trends in 
international law and what some consider morality. 
In this debate, morality and law cross on issues and in depths of argument.  
Should we require our policy-makers and service members to follow what some consider 
international law, even if the U.S. did not ratify that law?  Some might argue that the U.S. 
cannot further the national interest by being beholden to vague international law.  I argue 
that following a moral standard is not incompatible with warfare and is actually in the 
national interest.  Doing so may in some cases result in more U.S. combatant casualties 
than if we disregarded moral norms.  However, in the long run, such action will further 
the national interest.  Although this is not the main issue in this dissertation, it provides a 
possible answer to the question of why the U.S. should follow Just War norms.  That 
leads to the question of what makes it more likely that the U.S. will conduct war in 
accordance with these norms. 
Although there are many reasons why states may choose to fight a moral conflict 
– expression of national values, desire to follow international law, expression of military 
values, reduce post-war reconstruction costs, avoid domestic opposition to the war, 
because precision weapons technology makes it easier to do so, or to make postwar 
settlements easier to reach – in the end, I believe it is in the state’s national interest to do 
so.  Following moral norms could engender trust within the international community, 
benefit our servicemen if they are captured by setting a standard for others to follow, and 
could lead to a better peace after conflict simply because there is one less issue of ill will 
to deal with after conflict termination.  Removing a key stumbling block that is often 
                                                 
4 Charles Dunlap, “Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century 
Conflicts,” Paper presented to the Humanitarian Challenges in Military Interventions Conference, Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, Washington, D.C., 29 November, 2001, pg. 3. 
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difficult to overcome after cessation of hostilities, namely determining how to dole out 
justice for immoral conduct in war, might allow negotiators to focus on peace after wars. 
I do not posit that international law is somehow a threat to U.S. interests or 
stability.  The U.S. has, after all, supported or sponsored much of the law governing 
international regimes in all areas from trade to movement of peoples.  Much regime 
theory literature tells us that international laws can actually strengthen norms over time.  I 
would say that there truly is an accepted norm that non-combatants are deserving of 
immunity from harm.  But the potential for laws to codify a moral calculus for targeting 
will fail to take into account the possibility that what would be considered proportional 
for the side that is losing would be considered disproportionate and immoral for the side 
that is winning.  So international law has its place, but could be opposed if it restrains a 
country from doing what it feels it must to secure its own interests. 
I contend that a culture of acceptance of moral norms, such as exists in the U.S. 
military and will be explained in Chapter 4, is more important than following specifically 
coded international law.  Furthermore, morality, while coded in the several Geneva and 
Hague conventions, leaves specifics circumstances either open for debate or for the states 
to decide on their own as to what constitutes necessity.  It is therefore necessary to go 
beyond coded international law and follow a model for achieving moral targeting 
decisions.  How does following moral norms play out internationally? Two ways in 
particular follow.   
First, several prominent historical figures have told us that the type of war fought 
will determine the type of peace achieved.5  No empirical studies have been conducted to 
                                                 
5 Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart observed in his book Strategy, “If you concentrate exclusively on 
victory…the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.” That admonition echoes Fred 
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show whether moral decisions during war make a difference after the war.  However, a 
strong normative case for that argument can be made that if we want to avoid answering 
questions of moral conduct after a war, we should conduct military operations in a 
morally sound manner during the war.  This could be a purely utilitarian reason to follow 
moral norms -- to attain wartime objectives without moving the public focus of 
operations to international law.  Dunlap says that “the predominance of lawyers in U.S. 
military interventions is as much a concession to the verities of modern war as it is an 
altruistic commitment to human rights.”6 
Before we can decide to follow a set of moral norms, we need to know what 
moral norms are and how they have become accepted.  Then we need to implement them.  
But is it as easy to do as it is to say?  The bureaucratic nature of the U.S. government and 
military presents opportunities for various individual and organizational motivations and 
processes to prevent or derail moral decisions.  
Although many have written about morality in warfare, I have yet to find a model 
for making moral decisions in military operations.  It is an important topic for political 
scientists to study because of the potential implications for the U.S. after conflicts are 
concluded.  The greater research program under which this dissertation falls is why moral 
norms should be followed at all.  While such a research program would contain multiple 
avenues of research, I focus on developing a model to ensure moral decisions are made in 
U.S. combat operations.  Those moral decisions will aid in attaining national interests.  
They may or may not actually lead to a better state of peace, but without achieving the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Charles Iklé’s concern in Every War Must End, “It is the way in which a war is brought to an end that has 
the most decisive long-term impact.”  In fact, a Presidential Decision Directive, PDD 56, published by the 
Clinton Administration in 1997, provides a good start by outlining policy guidelines for developing an 
interagency operational political-military plan to achieve such a vision for a better state of peace.   
6 Dunlap, pg. 6. 
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national interest through moral ends, we will never know whether they can measurably 
affect that peace. 
Moral and ethical norms have been historically, and are today, widely debated and 
studied.  Many aspects of what constitutes morality in warfare and the implications for 
not following moral norms are written about widely.  However, little has been said about 
how to ensure moral outcomes in operations rather than dealing with non-combatant 
casualties after the fact.  In the following chapter, I will review three bodies of literature: 
Just War tradition, civil-military relations, and finally bureaucratic politics literature.   
The first literature, traditional Just War Doctrine, lays the foundation for the study 
of morality and warfare and for this dissertation.  This literature is vital because it shows 
that throughout history, there were accepted moral norms in combat.  The literature 
discusses what classic authors say norms should be in warfare.  I will, however, show that 
none of these authors have actually presented a model of how to achieve moral ends 
rather than merely stating what is and is not moral.   
The second literature I review is the civil-military relations.  This literature 
explores how civilians and their military subordinates interact and is key to the discussion 
of determining and refining national objectives and military strategies to attain them.  
This literature is important because of the discussions of the interaction between policy, 
strategy and doctrine, as well as the issue of the civil-military relations gap.  These issues 
affect the process of making moral targeting decisions.   
Finally, I review the bureaucratic politics literature, specifically that dealing with 
political control of bureaucracies.  I will show the effect that bureaucratic politics and 
principal-agent interactions have on decisions made prior to and during the conduct of 
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military operations.  This literature is important in that it forms the foundation of the 
model I will present for making moral decisions in war.  The principal-agent literature 
affords us a framework for understanding the relationships between senior decision-
makers and general officers, and between generals and their subordinate planners and 
combat forces.  However, I will show that the bureaucratic politics literature does not 
help us understand specifically when principals and agents are in accord and how that 
affects moral decisions in operations. 
In the third chapter, I define what constitutes moral decision by key American 
national leaders in military operations, namely balancing the proportionality of 
acceptable non-combatant casualties against the necessity of achieving certain objectives 
or attacking specific targets.  I then propose a theory and model of making moral 
decisions in American military conflicts.  That model posits two particular variables as 
key to making moral decisions: alignment of principal-agent motivations within the war 
planning and war making bureaucracy, and constraining military doctrine.   
After discussing my research design, I explain in Chapter 4 the established 
planning and execution process for the military from which we can measure variance in 
operations.  This chapter also shows efforts of the military to include morality in the 
planning process.  I then present three comparative case studies in which I test my model 
and hypotheses.  The cases are Operation Desert Storm (the First Gulf War), Operation 
Allied Force (the Air War Over Serbia), and the ongoing Global War On Terrorism, to 
include operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Understanding that the present conflicts are 
ongoing, and incomplete, it would not be responsible to consider these operations since 
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there was limited, but sufficient evidence to consider with respect to the model presented 
herein. 
Applying the model presented in this dissertation to past conflicts might show us 
that what we considered tremendous victories did not pass the definition of morality as 
outlined in chapter three of this project.  That did not necessarily make those conflicts 
immoral, even though many in hindsight would consider them so.  Perhaps the subject 
was not at the forefront of discussions in that time or age.  Perhaps the morality of the 
decisions would have been different, but we cannot say definitively whether or not the 
outcomes of those conflicts would have changed.   
National interests were surely gained by winning WWII despite the fire-bombings 
at Dresden and Tokyo, but did those actions materially support the effort and were they 
necessary?  Most would argue that they were not.  Would a model to make moral 
decisions have made a difference?  Would it have mattered if a model was present?  To 
answer that question, I will develop a model and test it against two past U.S. wars and 
one that is presently ongoing.  If this model is followed by American leaders in the 
future, they should not only attain national objectives in war, but avoid situations such as 
trials in international courts, poor relations with allies and foes alike, and conflicts over 
justice after the war termination. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Just War, Civil-Military Relations, and Bureaucratic Po litics: 
Understanding the Moral Issues Facing Modern War Fighters and Planners  
 
 
John Ford, writing during World War II, asked “Do the majority of civilians in a 
modern nation at war enjoy a natural- law right of immunity from violent repression?  The 
answer is an emphatic affirmative.” 1  The violent repression by one warring state against 
another that Ford wrote about can bring about long-term consequences that may not seem 
pressing at the time, but will have to be dealt with at some future point. That may mean 
international condemnation or it may mean leaders standing trial in an international court.  
The main point is that consequences exist and must be considered by national leaders. 
There has to be some reason to follow ethical norms or standards in military 
conflicts.  Doing so must further some interest or else it is an illogical strategy.  So what 
can the interest be in following moral norms in war?  The notion that ethical norms exist 
and should be followed for utilitarian reasons is grounded in historical and modern 
literature as well as in the recurring education and training of military officers in the 
subject.  However, these norms, while consistently accepted in principle by American 
political and military leaders, are not consistently followed in practice, as will be shown 
in the case studies.   
                                                 
1 John Ford, “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” In War and Morality, Richard A. Wasserstrom, Ed., 
Belmont, Ca: Wadsworth Press, 1970, pg.23. 
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Failure to follow these norms has led to several protracted conflicts, whose 
anticipated peace does not materialize even after military hostilities cease.  Many recent 
conflicts, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Liberia not only have not ended, but also have 
resulted in open-ended peace-keeping deployments in the face of recurring animosities.  
Were ethical norms to be followed by decision-makers and military leaders, many 
perceptions, feelings of mistrust towards the U.S., and post-conflict troubles may be 
overcome, or perhaps even prevented.   
Moral conduct in war is often discussed during times of peace, but often forgotten 
during times of conflict.  When the time comes to commit the full range of a nation’s 
power options in a conflict -- be it economic assistance to sanctions, or humanitarian 
support to war -- positive ethical norms are often either not considered, or are considered 
and dropped because of a perception that following said norms would restrain leaders 
from achieving objectives.  Furthermore some observers would argue that there is a 
political constraint that values American military lives over the lives of enemy non-
combatants.  In other cases, those within the interagency process who are responsible for 
developing an end state vision might argue that ethics play no part in warfare, or that by 
too closely following ethical norms constrains leaders from achieving a decisive victory.     
In this chapter, I first review the classical Just War literature as the overarching 
context for this dissertation.  The reason the U.S. should follow Just War norms is not 
only to achieve national objectives, but also to achieve them justly to facilitate attainment 
of the national interest.  I follow the Just War literature with a review of the relevant 
writings on civil-military relations to determine the extent to which that literature helps 
us understand the interaction between the civilian leadership and the military in setting 
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positive ethical norms from the outset of a conflict.  However, merely stating that a 
military force will act morally does not necessarily make it so.  Bureaucratic factors can 
derail even the best plans and intentions.  Therefore, I finish this chapter with a review of 
the bureaucratic politics literature.  Since the planning and execution of military 
operations is a bureaucratic process, it should be subject to the same forces that apply to 
other areas of government.  If bureaucratic politics describe the decisions made during 
combat operations, then the U.S. can develop a model of how to achieve positive moral 
decisions in war.   
Mark Amstutz, in his book International Ethics, says, “moral values are essential 
in developing a sound foreign policy and creating norms and structures that are 
conducive to a more peaceful and just global society.”2  That viewpoint, however, has not 
been shared by political scientists, commentators, or national leaders throughout history 
or in present times.  From Machiavelli to Dean Acheson, leaders have seen morality and 
ethics as restraints, rather than norms worthy of consistently following.  Thomas Hobbes 
said that where there are no assurances of any state guaranteeing the compliance of moral 
norms, states will follow those norms when their interests require it, and will not when 
their interests conflict with said norms.3  Yet this pragmatic, or realist view of the world 
has not thwarted the development of positive moral norms that govern war. 
 
Classical Just War Theory 
The great body of literature on Just War tradition, from the Greeks and Romans to 
Augustine and through Aquinas, from Grotius and de Vittoria, to Walzer and Hehir, holds 
                                                 
2 Mark Amstutz, International Ethics, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999, pg. 198. 
3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan , Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1981, pg. 166. 
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that there is an ethical norm that not only is understood and discussed, but should be 
followed for the common good.  Over the centuries, a common understanding of what is 
just and unjust has slowly formed and been modified and generally accepted almost 
universally.  The common understanding, however, has always been after the fact and 
abstract in nature.  Given the constructs of just decisions and conduct in war, one might 
think that there is a clear guide to follow.  In fact that is not at all the case.   
The reader of Just War Doctrine will see that, contrary to early Christian 
injunctions against violence, in the end, the decision as to what is and is not just is 
determined by the necessity of each individual situation.  We are left with a realization 
that what may be grossly immoral for one side in the conflict might be acceptable for the 
other party.  Today, morality and ut ility are reconciled.  However, without a model to 
follow, a model which does not exist today, future researchers and writers will have 
fertile soil to till and determine, only after the fact, what was and was not moral. 
The justification for a country to engage in war, or jus ad bellum, includes six 
elements: just cause; declaration by competent authority; right intention; limited 
objectives; last resort; and reasonable hope of success.  Jus in bello, or just conduct in 
war, consists of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, and 
proportionality of violence to achieve ends.4  The jus in bello principles, which are the 
basis for this study, rest on the firm foundation of individual responsibility for decisions.  
This responsibility will form a key element of my definition of a moral targeting 
decision.  These Just War principles, if followed, can be powerful guides for states in 
                                                 
4 For detailed explanations of each principle, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, New York: Basic 
Books, 1977; Mark Amstutz, International Ethics; and Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion, Moral 
Constraints on War, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002. 
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achieving just ends in conflict.  If shunned, they result in problems that eventually must 
be dealt with at some later date.   
In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides firmly lays the foundation 
for all future writers who posit that moral restraint in war takes a back seat to necessity, 
especially when those restraints clash with interests.  In the Mytilenian Debate, the 
question of reprisals against Mytilene is debated after Athens put down a revolt from the 
island city-state.  Cleon and Dioditus of Athens debate whether or not non-combatant 
prisoners from Mytilene, in addition to the combatants, should be put to death in reprisal 
for the revolt.  While Thucydides himself calls it a “distasteful mission” and writes of the 
issue as though there was a norm accepting protection of non-combatants, the debaters 
themselves speak in terms of interests rather than moral norms.  Dioditus, arguing against 
the reprisal said that the Mytilenians may be “the most guilty people in the world, but it 
does not follow that I shall propose the death penalty, unless it is in your interests; I 
might argue that they deserve to be forgiven, but should not recommend forgiveness 
unless that seemed to me the best thing for the state.”  So the issue was not whether the 
reprisal killings were moral or not, but whether it was in the national interest.5 
In the Melian Dialogue, Thucydides chronicles the discussions between the 
Athenian delegation, which demanded Melos’s surrender and inclusion in the Athenian 
empire.  The Melians, in refusing, point out that they “trust that the gods will give us 
fortune as good as yours, because we are standing for what is right against what is 
wrong.”  To which the Athenians counter, “Our aims and our actions are perfectly 
consistent with the beliefs men hold about the gods and with the principles which govern 
their own conduct.”  Thucydides himself writes of the murder of innocents as repugnant 
                                                 
5 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., pp. 212-223. 
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to him, and we can assume to other people in general, because Athens was turning aside 
the Greek norm of immunity for non-combatants or proscription from aggression against 
them.  The result was that after the Melian refusal and Athenian siege, the Athenians “put 
to death all the men of military age they took and sold the women and children as 
slaves.”6 
Still, the greatest Greek philosophers spoke of the ideal states that respected non-
combatants.  Socrates, in Plato’s Republic, lays down the norms of granting immunity 
from harm to non-combatants.  Furthermore, Alexander the Great forbade reprisals 
against non-combatants.7  So we see from the days of antiquity, there was a dichotomy 
between the exhortations to follow certain norms and the practices of the states. 
Likewise, Roman history shows examples of this dichotomy.  Julius Caesar says 
“there is nothing further from my nature than cruelty,” when describing his release of 
defeated enemies.8  Yet, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul gives us an example of the Roman 
acceptance of not protecting non-combatants.  After defeating a Germanic force, the 
Romans were sent out to round up the fleeing women and children.  They were “hunted 
down by the cavalry which Caesar sent out for that purpose.”  The Romans then 
massacred those caught and captured in battle who had not thrown themselves into the 
Rhine to perish. 9  For the Romans, despite Caesar’s personal propensity to mercy, if there 
was a general acceptance of a standard of immunity from harm held by non-combatants, 
the Romans felt no need to follow it.   
                                                 
6 Thucydides, pp. 400-408. 
7 Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace, Upper Saddle River (New Jersey): Prentice Hall, 1999, 
pp. 10-11. 
8 Christopher, pg. 11.  
9 Julius Caesar, The Conquest of Gaul, Middlesex: Penguin Classics, 1951, pg. 94.   
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Paul Christopher says that Ambrose, former Roman governor of northern Italy, 
and later Bishop of Milan, laid the foundation for the Christian tradition of Just War by 
implying two principles found in the modern doctrine.  First is that soldiers have a duty to 
protect the innocent and second is that guilt for initiating wars, even unjust wars, does not 
extend to the soldiers fighting the war.  That is, the soldiers conducting combat should be 
judged only on their actions in combat and not for the political considerations their 
leaders made in deciding to go to war.10  These considerations of distinguishing the guilty 
from the innocent lay the foundation for other church and secular writers and even be 
codified in canon law. 11 
St. Augustine took Ambrose’s writings a step farther.  He was very concerned 
with the justifications and intentions of leaders entering wars and of just conduct of the 
soldiers following these leaders.  Augustine said tha t the “man must be blameless who 
carries on the war on the authority of God, of whom every one who serves Him knows 
that He can never require what is wrong.”12  Langdan writes about Augustine’s support 
for punitive war to right a wrong and restore a moral order.  He quotes Augustine as 
saying “He whose freedom to do wrong is taken away suffers a useful form of restraint, 
since nothing is more unfortunate than the good fortune of sinners, who grow bold by not 
being punished.”13  This statement shows that Augus tine was concerned with the 
salvatory welfare of the offender, a natural concern for a bishop of the Church.  Yet this 
concern eventually became a norm of international relations.  Thus Ambrose and 
                                                 
10 Christopher, pg. 25. 
11 Christopher, pg. 26. 
12 John Langdan, “Elements of St. Augustine’s Just War Theory,” Journal of Religious Ethics, (Vol. 12, 
No. 1, Spring 1984), pg. 24. 
13 Langdan, pg. 25. 
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Augustine, while leaving few positive rules for the conduct of war, offered a strong 
concept that served as a baseline for future scholars. 
The most notable of these scholars was arguably the greatest philosopher and 
Christian theologian of the past two millennia.  Thomas Aquinas, who lived in the middle 
of the 13 century, detailed three necessary conditions for a war to be considered just: 
right authority; just cause; and just intent. 
In the first place, the authority of the prince, by whose order the war 
is undertaken…it is to them that it belongs to bear the sword in combats 
for the defense of the State against external enemies. 
In the second place, there must be a just cause; that is to say, those 
attacked must, by fault, deserve to be attacked. 
In the third place, it is necessary that the intention of those who fight 
should be right; that is to say, that they propose to themselves a good to be 
effected or an evil to be avoided…those who wage wars justly have peace 
as the object of their intention. 14 
 
Telford Taylor points out that St. Thomas stressed the importance of pure 
motives.  A prince could not use a just grievance to go beyond the cause of the war and 
exact gratification or blood lust.15  While Aquinas defined the criterion by which states 
could justly enter into wars, he did not specifically expand on what constitutes standards 
of conduct for those within wars. His definition of the doctrine of double effect (to be 
examined in later pages), used today to limit actions within wars (jus in bello), was 
developed to justify wars of self-defense.  Discussion of justice in war was left to 
succeeding generations of scholars, both religious and secular. 
Vittoria, de Vatel, Suarez, and Grotius all added to and refined Thomistic writings 
on Just War.  Vittoria (1480-1546) separated proscriptions for jus ad bellum from jus in 
                                                 
14 Telford Taylor, “Just and Unjust Wars,” in Malham Wakin, Ed., War, Morality, and the Military 
Profession, Boulder: Westview Pess, 1986, pg. 228. 
15 Taylor, pg. 229. 
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bello.  He argues against the deliberate slaughter of innocents, and names as innocents 
“women, children, farmers, foreign travelers, clerics and religious persons, and the rest of 
the peaceable populations.”16  Vittoria expanded St. Thomas’s doctrine of double effect 
and applied it to actions taken in war.  In doing so, he espoused the need for specific 
military necessity to override protection for what we would today recognize as collateral 
damage: 
Great attention must be paid…to see that the greater evils do not 
arise out of the war than the war would avert…In sum, it is never right to 
slay the guiltless, even as an indirect and unintended result, except when 
there is no other means of carrying on the operations of a just war.17 
 
Grotius built upon Vittoria’s work.  A secular legalist often regarded as the 
founder of international law, he abhorred war and what it did to societies.  Since there 
was no positive law or tribunal to handle what he saw as unjust actions in war, Grotius 
called on people to depend on human reason and international custom as the authority for 
what was and was not acceptable.18  He refined the jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
strictures of Aquinas and Vittoria by providing specific examples for each requirement.   
Perhaps Grotius’s most important legacy was his discussion of innocents and the 
doctrine of double effect.  He posits that certain actions may result in indirect 
consequences that endanger innocents, and that such actions are morally acceptable if 
these actions do not result in intentional or foreseeable death of innocents.  Yet this 
admonition was not always hard and fast.  He says that the extent of the risk to innocents 
must be left to prudent judgment.19  Therefore he leaves open the possibility that what 
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17 Christopher, pg. 56. 
18 Christopher, pg. 87. 
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some people would consider excessive would be acceptable if it is decided by a 
competent authority, whom he declines to define. 
These medieval and early modern Christian and secular proponents of Just War 
doctrine were critical to the foundational understanding of moral norms and international 
relations, but they did not necessarily carry the day.  Telford Taylor tells us that as the 
Reformation took hold in Europe and the Pope’s temporal power waned, fewer scholars 
wrote of and argued for moral norms in war.  International justice, once decided by 
princes of the Church, became settled by the wars the church once sought to limit.20 
Even Thomas More, beheaded by Henry VIII for his defense of the Catholic 
Church and Papacy, and later named a saint, wrote against the teachings of the very 
Church fathers he so defended.  In his seminal 1516 book, Utopia, More argues for 
justice in a utopian world.  He posits that Utopians only go to war in “self-defence, to 
repel invaders from friendly territory, or to liberate the victims of dictatorships…but also 
to make reprisals for acts of aggression.”  On the other hand, he then tells of how 
Utopians will declare war on any country that kills or injures a Utopian, and will accept 
nothing short of surrender of the guilty, which results in death or slavery.  Finally, More 
proposes that war’s aim is to get what they failed to gain peacefully, and to “punish 
offenders so severely that nobody will ever dare do such a thing again.”21  We see in 
More a seeming clash between the realist tenets of self interest and normative tenets of 
Just War as expounded by the very Church fathers More so defended. 
Niccolo Machiavelli took a very pragmatic, or realist, vision of war, one not 
constrained by moral norms.  Machiavelli, in The Prince and Discorsi, sees the world in 
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terms of power and self-preservation.  He posits that states must expand and conquer or 
else be ruled themselves.  War was inherently brutal, and severe rule by the prince is 
necessary to hold the state together.22  Machiavelli was credited with bringing the concept 
of rationality to warfare.  He contended that it was rational to expect the enemy to do all 
it could to win, and thus to act under restraint was to invite defeat.23 
Taylor points out that when the nationalistic wars and consolidation of states 
raged across Europe for several centuries thereafter, the concept of Just War was 
“scorned as sentimental rubbish, hopelessly vague in content and impossible to enforce 
for lack of tribunal to pass competent judgment.”24  War became the method of choice, in 
fact the only true method, by which states could exert their power and guarantee their 
sovereignty. 
States, however, grew weary of the devastation of war and tried to limit its horrors 
through treaties and international law.  The Hague and Geneva Conventions of the late 
1800s and early 1900s attempted to codify the laws of land warfare and treatment of 
prisoners of war.25  The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris, attempted to outlaw 
war altogether.26  Yet such a pact did not prevent German or Japanese aggression in 
World War II, the Cold War, or regional conflicts since.  Kellogg-Briand was berated as 
naïve, as was Wilson’s League of Nations, an argument later used against the UN.  
On the other hand, Charles Beitz, in his book Political Theory and International 
Relations, disagrees with the notion that reality forces states to act pragmatically and 
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disdain moral norms.  He posits that states have an interest in following ethical norms, 
and circumstances exist in which it is rational not only for states to act ethically, but also 
for them to expect other states to act ethically as well. 27  Michael Walzer follows Beitz’s 
normative line in Just and Unjust Wars.  He argues that if we truly lived in a realist 
world, countries would simply tell other countries what they intended to do and then do 
it.  In truth, he says, states mostly want to act, or to seem to act, morally.28  Walzer 
provides a detailed study of all facets of Just War, both ad bellum, and in bello.   
 Walzer delves deeply into the historical underpinnings of Just War doctrine, and 
applies it to issues of the day.  He describes certain hard and fast rules, positing that 
excessive harm, which arises by violating Just War standards, must be prohibited.  To 
achieve victory, a state must do what is necessary to win to avoid excessive loss of life, 
but not more than is necessary.  This point is a serious one and a point that seems today to 
be overshadowed by the desire to limit all non-combatant casualties.   
Walzer posits that proportionality demands any evil or injury done to the interests 
of mankind, must be weighed against the contribution said act makes towards victory. 29  
The most serious problem with these hard and fast rules on proportionality and necessity 
is that they defy rigorous empirical measurement.  How does one define excessive harm?  
How does one deal with necessity in an empirical sense? 
Gingras and Ruby argue in Joint Forces Quarterly that leaders of modern states 
must use superior intelligence-gathering capabilities, precision weapons, and information 
technology to ensure against certain acts during war that are clearly disproportionately 
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harmful to the necessity those acts require.  For example, bombing the water supply of 
military installations can have a positive effect on a war effort.  But if that water supply 
also feeds a large non-combatant population, and subsequently cholera breaks out among 
the innocents, that act is clearly not proportional to the necessity of that military act.30 
As this is such an important decision in international affairs, Gingras and Ruby 
posit that no person below the rank of a Joint Forces Component Commander (normally a 
3-Star General in the U.S. armed forces) be allowed to make the decision as to how much 
non-combatant risk is proportionate to the necessity of a given objective.31  And in many 
cases, that decision should be made by a senior civilian, if not the President himself, for 
the importance of such decisions is far-reaching to all Americans, not just servicemen.   
Michael Carlino, in “The Moral Limits of Strategic Attack,” argues that the U.S. 
must shift its perception of the importance of force protection to take into account the 
importance of non-combatant immunity.  Carlino, a U.S. Army officer, argues against the 
notion that the lives of American servicemen are more important than the lives of 
innocents in an opposing state.  He argues that in the quest to protect American 
servicemen’s lives for political purposes, the U.S. accepts higher levels of non-
combatants casualties if they are “unintended.”  Carlino, however, argues for an 
expansion of the doctrine of double effect in modern aerial warfare.   
Carlino forcefully argues that there is a difference between unintended and 
unforeseen.  If noncombatant casualties are foreseeable, he says they must be avoided.   
It follows that it is contradictory to then cause harm to the very 
people whose right to life the military is obligated to protect…They are 
not the threat and cannot be considered legitimate targets…Unintended 
                                                 
30 See Jeffrey L. Gingras and Tomislav Z. Ruby, “Morality in Modern Aerial Warfare,” Joint Forces 
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implies accidental, not simply unfortunate. If a casualty is foreseen as a 
result of an action, it is difficult to consider that casualty unintended.32 
 
Thus, a student of the history of war and morality readily sees a progressive 
development of thought and practice limiting what people ought to do against each other 
in war.  What was once a hard and fast proscription against harming non-combatants has 
changed over time.  Just War thinking to this point has moved from the notion of the 
irreconcilability of ethics and utility to its reconcilability.  Whether that present norm of 
necessity is followed is another matter, but it can impact the future beyond the present 
battle or conflict and present a ruler or state with consequences far beyond the battlefield. 
But determining normatively whether wars achieve moral ends is difficult across 
states and cultures, despite moral claims by any national leadership.  Coppieters and 
Fotion posit that discussions on ethics and war are strongly constrained within national 
borders – writers from one state are rarely known in other states – yet the subject is 
discussed in many and varied cultures.  They maintain that Just War is not merely a 
theory.  Just War, they argue, has roots in transcultural experiences, concepts and 
principles.33   
Yet in their case studies of Belgian, Chinese, Russian, and American 
understanding of Just War, Coppieters and Fotion mention that the contributors to their 
cases do not share the same opinion as to the legitimacy of force, or how to interpret Just 
War principles.  “In our case it was not so much the importance of the various principles 
that was an issue in the sometimes heated discussions we had in preparing this book, but 
rather their concrete meaning in a particular context and whether particular conflicts had 
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been correctly described and analyzed.”34 This seems to violate the principle upon which 
the book is founded.  They say that there is a recognized moral norm around the world. 
However, that disagreement between the authors due to their perspectives given a 
particular context shows that Just War doctrine is essentially malleable.  If one considers 
and accepts national interests, then such a contextual understanding is entirely 
appropriate.  What is unjust to one side in the conflict may be justified to the other due to 
their necessity and threat to existence.  Therefore it is appropriate to question how 
standards or accepted norms can exist.  
Neta Crawford touches on this very issue in her article “Just War Theory and The 
U.S. Counterterror War.”  Her contribution is an argument for a positive use of Just War 
doctrine in conjunction with national interests.  By reconciling moral norms to utilitarian 
logic, she discusses how U.S. national leaders use the doctrine of double effect to argue 
that unintended casualties were not disproportionate to the intended target’s necessity.  
Crawford’s important omission, and one this dissertation should rectify, is that these 
statements of unintended casualties are always made after the fact.  She does not discuss 
any efforts by the Administration to make proportionality-necessity decisions before 
targets are attacked or how such a decision would be made.35 
The classical just war thinkers and the modern authors who add to and clarify the 
doctrine lay a strong foundation for leaders and warriors alike to contemplate what is 
acceptable in war.  However, the literature discusses morality in only general terms and 
then after the fact.  It is easy to look back on individual situations such as My Lai and 
determine that moral norms were broken.  The literature provides guides to follow but 
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does not give us a model to achieve those moral ends.  I will provide a model that builds 
in part on the foundations laid over the centuries by these Just War theorists.  
One issue that Just War writers agree upon is the requirement for competent 
authority – national civilian leadership in our modern context – to make certain critical 
decisions dealing with war and morality.  These issues provide a natural bridge to a short 
review of a literature that helps us understand the dynamics of these decisions.  Civil-
military relations are a broad sub-field of security studies, and one that can help frame the 
issue of moral ends to military operations. 
 
Civil-Military Relations and Moral Conduct in War 
The study of civilian control of the military and how soldiers and statesmen 
interact is too broad to cover in detail here.  However, certain key issues in the literature 
aid us in understanding the relationship between civilians and the military and how that 
relationship can affect moral decisions in war.  This literature is important because of its 
discussion of the interaction between policy, strategy and doctrine, as well as the issue of 
the civil-military relations gap.  These issues are important to review because they affect 
the process of making moral targeting decisions.   
What is absent from these discussions, however, is an agreed-upon delineation 
between policy, doctrine and strategy, a discussion of moral actions with respect to 
civilian control of the military, and the possibility that in the “gap” we might find an 
explanation of how morality comes into play.  As much of this literature crosses lines 
with the bureaucratic politics literature, I will avoid discussing motivations and processes 
here.  These will be reviewed in the following section on bureaucratic politics.   
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I will primarily review the importance of military advice to the civilian 
government and how that process may lead to the perception of a gap in relations.  
Furthermore, the importance of defining national objectives and military doctrine and 
then selecting appropriate strategies to achieve those objectives is an important aspect of 
this literature.  In that line of the literature, I am confident that my model strongly 
supports Huntington’s assertions of the officers’ responsibility to the state and society. 
 Samuel Huntington, in his seminal work, The Soldier and the State, delves into 
the relationship between the officer and the state, and argues that professional officers are 
vital to the security of the state.  Huntington describes the difference between the 
American professional soldier, who is conservative in nature, and the American civilian 
leader, who tends towards liberal policies.  But in his strongest statement, Huntington 
says  “Civilian control exists when there is proper subordination of an autonomous 
profession [the officer corps] to the ends of policy.”36   
Few would argue this point.  But merely disagreeing with policy should not mean 
that civil-military relations are bad as long as the officers follow lawful orders.  
Huntington states that officers (and here he means the senior military leadership) must 
first keep the national civilian leadership informed as to the security requirements of the 
state.  Second, they must analyze and advise the civilian leadership as to the potential 
impact of alternative courses of action from the military positions (one codified in joint 
doctrine today).  Finally, Huntington posits that the military officer must execute the 
national civilian leaders’ decision no matter how “violently” they run counter to his own 
judgment.37  That admonition is exactly what other contemporary researchers suggest is 
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the problem with military advice, namely that such concerns with policy decisions can 
lead to the military prevailing over civilian authority. 
Michael Desch, in Civilian Control of the Military, writes about the deterioration 
of civil-military relations in the U.S. since the end of the Cold War and posits that the key 
indicator of civilian control is who prevails when the military disagrees with the civilian 
leadership.38  While Desch admits that military coups are extremely unlikely in the U.S., 
he discusses instances of the U.S. military prevailing over civilian leaders when there is 
disagreement on policies, such as women in combat roles in the Army, or the Air Force 
convincing its civilian Secretary to not honorably discharge an officer discharged for 
adultery.  But he also cites several instances of civilians exercising their proper control by 
prevailing over the military in issues such as strategy during the Gulf War.  The tone of 
the discussion leaves the reader to wonder whether military reservations and concerns 
about policy are an example of poor relations.39   
For example if the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagrees with the 
President on the need to deploy U.S. forces overseas, the nature of the disagreement can 
indeed show poor civil-military relations.  If the Chairman publicly disagrees with the 
President in the media and states that he and other senior officers will carry out those 
orders, albeit reluctantly, that would most certainly constitute poor civil-military relations 
because the top military officer is undermining the authority of the President.  On the 
other hand, if the Chairman privately meets with the President and conveys his concerns 
and the President changes his position on the deployment, I would not consider that to be 
an example of poor relations.  The President always has the option of removing his senior 
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military advisor, or any officer, who he feels is not supporting lawful orders.  And if the 
officers question those orders based on moral grounds, then either way the issue is 
resolved, be it a change in policy or the firing of the officers, there will be clear 
responsibility for those decisions. 
 Highlighting the experiences of four militaries that ruled their states, Desch 
explains that they lost cohesion and military effectiveness.  He uses the histories of 
Germany, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to argue that it is in the best interest of the 
military to remain subordinate to the civilian leadership.40  And indeed, as will be shown 
in greater detail in Chapter 4, the U.S. military desires civilian control, but it also takes 
seriously the advisory role of its senior leaders.  These two issues are not, however 
incompatible.  Should the military not have any opinion as to the best way to achieve 
national strategy?  The notion of withholding military advice could potentially raise 
moral problems, especially if the military advice concerning necessity is different from 
the civilian leaders’ desires. 
 Desch rightfully brings up this point of military subordination to the leadership.  
He thus follows in Huntington’s tradition of pointing out “a political officer corps, rent 
with faction, subordinated to ulterior ends, lacking in prestige but sensitive to the appeals 
of popularity, would endanger the security of the state.”  What he does not argue, though, 
is the next part of Huntington’s premise that the military that is strong and immune to 
politics is a “steadying wheel in the conduct of policy.”41  The unmeasurable aspect of 
this control is to know when, as in the cases of Germany, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 
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the officers are acting politically and endangering state security, or when they have 
important moral issues to raise that affects both state security and national interests.   
It is not such a fine line between political officers endangering security and 
officers questioning their guidance.  After all, Huntington’s says pointedly, “the military 
man has the right to expect guidance from the statesman.”42 But it is possible that this gap 
in what the officer seeks and the direction the civilian may be willing to offer holds the 
moral dimension of what will guide the officer and civilian in making moral targeting 
decisions in operations.   
If national civilian leaders directed their military to attain some objective that the 
military leaders felt was not in keeping with national interests or international law, then 
the military is bound by the Goldwater-Nichols Act to advise the President.  Furthermore, 
if the guidance is vague, or allows wide latitude, militaries could develop strategies that 
result in excessive noncombatant harm that can be the responsibility of not just the 
military, but the civilian leadership as well.  This is a critical issue because while 
international law holds national leaders responsible, it also hold those who execute 
national directives responsible as well.  Elected civilian leaders have the right to be 
wrong, thus they have the final say.  However, military officers have the right and indeed 
responsibility to raise moral issues.  And the civilian leaders hold the ultimate trump card 
with the power to remove military leaders who disagree with them and elevate others 
whom they believe will follow their orders. 
In that respect, as long as militaries carry out the orders they are given, I do not 
see a breakdown in civil-military relations if the military questions certain civilian 
directives.  If the military never raised to the national leadership issues that were 
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questionable to senior officers, it would not be difficult to envision military doctrines and 
strategies changing with every administration leading to great instability and less security 
for the country.  On the other hand, if they refused to carry out orders they did not prefer, 
that would be a breakdown. 
We should not underestimate the importance of the advisory role the military can 
play with national civilian leaders to help them decide between the multiple options 
mentioned above.  Peter Roman and David Tarr point out that senior military leaders 
claim that their expertise in the management of military operations has no civilian peer, 
thus they covet freedom of action in war.  The authors note that such a claim is merely an 
assumption that is often freely conceded by the national civilian leadership, yet should be 
questioned.  Merely practicing and training for many years while rising through the ranks 
does not necessarily mean that the senior military leaders will make the right choices in 
war.  While the authors do not mention moral questions and the consequences of military 
strategy decisions made without civilian oversight, they do later say that generals’ views 
can be fallible and thus political leaders should challenge or even overrule their military 
advisors.43  This point will be made clear in the case studies when we see senior political 
decision-makers allowing wide latitude to military leaders that can have serious national 
political implications as well as moral ones for innocents in war. 
 Roman and Tarr point out that in today’s international political environment, 
political leaders look to appoint senior military leaders that have the national security 
knowledge and experience to be good policy advisors, not merely war fighters.  They 
posit that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 has allowed this political 
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professionalization of the officer corps and a knowledge base “inherently valuable” to 
both military and civilian leaders.44   
But any objective understanding of advisorship requires an acknowledgement that 
not all advice will be in line with the predetermined desires of the national civilian 
leadership.  This point and the claims of Roman and Tarr seem to contradict the assertion 
that civil-military relations suffer when military desires prevail over those of civilian 
leadership.  I agree with Desch that if for some reason the military refuses to follow 
lawful orders or drags its feet in doing so, or even publicly debates the issues after 
presidential decisions are made, then civil-military relations suffer.  
But if the wishes of military advisors (who are asked for their advice) prevail over 
the wishes of a civilian such as the Secretary of State, that should not necessarily mean 
that civil-military relations are poor.  This is especially true if issues such as moral 
decisions are involved, in which military officers could be responsible for after a conflict.  
Furthermore, multiple advocacy from multiple statutory military advisors can also lead to 
conflicting desires and advice from senior military leaders in addition to civilian advisors 
showing that the military is not necessarily a unitary agent with a single desired course of 
action. 45  This makes it all the more important for clear guidance from which military 
officers can plan operations with clear moral ends rather than leaving it to the senior 
military commanders. 
Others call for the need to provide clear measures of effectiveness to aid officers 
in formulating strategies that lead to battlefield victory. Stephen Rosen, in discussing 
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innovation and the need to radically alter the manner in which we fight, mentions that 
when innovation is required in wartime, “it is because an inappropriate strategic goal is 
being pursued, or because the relationship between military operations and that goal is 
misunderstood.”46  This description of the need for measurable, attainable objectives is 
made necessary in today’s strategic environment where the line that once existed between 
the non-combatant realm and the military realm no longer exists.  The decision as to what 
constitutes an “appropriate” strategic goal, and thus an appropriate level of non-
combatant casualties must not be left to military servants, but should be made by national 
civilian leaders.  
Finally, Eliot Cohen counters the myth of the “normal” theory of civil-military 
relations.  This theory posits that once direction is given to the military leaders, the 
civilians should stay out of the way and allow the military to fight the war the best way 
they can.  Cohen points out that where militaries have had the freest hand, they produced 
the worst results.47  He points out that contrary to the conventional wisdom, civilians did 
not overly micro-manage the Vietnam War.  Rather a lack of oversight led to the failures 
in Southeast Asia.48  Likewise, he points out that despite intervention by political leaders 
in the Kosovo war, the objectives were ultimately met without a single U.S. casualty. 49  
Such oversight is now especially crucial given the intense focus on international law and 
morality in the international environment. 
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Cohen does touch on this issue of moral hazard and political objectives.  He 
points out the fact that it is “one of the greatest sources of frustration for soldiers” that 
political leaders are so often not able or willing to clearly articulate the desired end state 
to which the military must devise strategy and operational plans to achieve national 
objectives.  He concedes the necessity that the relationship between civilians and military 
be unequal.50  He echoes Huntington by positing that this unequal relationship also 
requires the civilian leadership to be as precise as the military officers want them to be. 
We often hear national leaders and members of Congress interviewed on 
television news shows saying that the civilian leaders should stay out of the way and let 
the military fight once the decision is made to go to war.  Yet, few would agree that the 
U.S. military, as opposed to the elected and appointed/confirmed senior civilian 
leadership, should decide U.S. objectives in a conflict.  Huntington chronicles the process 
by which the military took greater and greater responsibility for civilian functions during 
WWII, functioning in diplomatic and political roles.  He says, “The military floundered 
about without any clear notion as to the policy of the government.”51  He did not say that 
the military prevailed over the president, but only that the military had to assume greater 
responsibilities during the war that should have been the purview of civilian secretaries.  
While some may argue that the direction the military took was what the civilian 
leadership wanted, that point is immaterial and may be accidental.  Without clear 
direction and oversight of the military, delegation can become abdication. 
Related to the topic of civilian control is the discussion of what form that 
direction to the military should take.  Barry Posen, in The Sources of Military Doctrine 
                                                 
50 Cohen, pp. 448, 452. 
51 Huntington, pg. 323. 
 34 
discusses the important relationship between military doctrine and national security 
strategy and the stability that can result or be lost through this relationship.  Without 
using the term, he posits that military doctrine and national security strategy are 
endogenous, meaning they affect each other.  But he also points out that functional 
specialization between the diplomatic corps and military officer corps prevents effective 
political-military integration.  He says that political and diplomatic leaders lack a 
sufficient understanding of military doctrine to force the doctrine to come into line with 
desired political strategies.52  This lack of understanding can work against efficient and 
necessary oversight by national civilian leaders and could then lead to decisions that are 
not moral with respect to proportionality. 
One example of this observation is that the U.S. Army continues to hold to a 
doctrine relying on heavy armor and mechanized infantry regardless of the national 
security strategy.  The political and diplomatic corps put forth a national strategy that 
requires more mobile forces that are able to fight more unconventional wars. Yet the 
Army continues to maintain heavy forces that cannot rapidly deploy long distances.  As 
though foreseeing this situation, Posen wrote that militaries seek independence from 
civilian authority to reduce the uncertainties of military combat, thus producing doctrines 
that are not well integrated with national security strategy. 53  This may be the case today 
with the U.S. Army.  On the contrary, the U.S. Air Force has developed doctrine that 
focuses on rapidly achieving national objectives in a flexible manner without necessarily 
fighting through enemy forces to achieve those objectives.54 
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The German government was set to enter WWII with a war strategy that did not 
reflect its doctrine.  Yet Posen notes that the German strategy shifted early in the war to 
one that did reflect its new doctrine, but only through the urging of key senior officers 
and planners, and not the senior civilian leadership.55  The result was the rapid advance 
through France and the conquest of most of the European continent.  In the case of 
WWII, many would contend that military and national leaderships were less concerned 
with jus in bello principles the longer the war went on.   
In today’s geopolitical environment international law, and norms within the U.S. 
officer culture, make jus in bello considerations important in planning military 
operations.  If the tasked objectives and strategy are not consistent with doctrine, the 
military owes it to the leadership to raise the issue for consideration and resolution by the 
national civilian leadership.  Likewise today, military leaders owe it to civilian leaders to 
explain how discrepancies between strategy and doctrine can lead to moral problems with 
respect to targeting decisions that could deflect attention away from battlefield successes 
and on moral conduct in the war. 
Finally, Posen discusses the issue of collaborative or coalition warfare by positing 
that NATO’s peacetime collaboration would result in enhanced wartime performance.  
He argues that such collaboration would help overcome the friction of combat 
operations.56  In a strictly military sense, this is arguably true, but it is unlikely that Posen 
considered moral questions in formulating this hypothesis.  As the Allied Force Case 
Study will show, the U.S. military and civilian leadership differed on moral norms, as did 
the U.S. and other NATO allies both at the military and political levels.   
                                                 
55 Posen, pp. 87-88. 
56 Posen, Pg. 243. 
 36 
These disagreements show that moral questions add another dimension to Posen’s 
excellent research on doctrine and its relationship to national strategy.  The issues 
concerning strategy are issues that cut to the core of a proportionality-necessity decision 
in targeting.  If there is a significant disagreement over strategy, then there may arise 
legitimate issues over what is necessary to achieve objectives.  This is where moral 
questions arise and should be addressed by the military leaders and civilian decision-
makers alike. 
Whereas Posen studied the effects of doctrine no t matching national strategy 
during WWII, Benjamin Fordham discusses how those differences may come about.  He 
posits that the different policy emphases between the Republican and Democratic parties 
tend to divide the services against each other.  He says that Democratic support of large 
conventional forces and Republican support for nuclear deterrent and Air Forces led to 
different emphases by the services. 57  As Carlino pointed out, there are moral 
implications to this very truth about emphasis.  If the heavier ground forces are used, 
more American lives can be lost but there can potentially be fewer enemy non-
combatants lost as opposed to aerial bombardment which may cost fewer U.S.lives and 
put at risk more enemy non-combatants.  This is an issue that must be decided by the 
national political leadership, but the differences in emphasis and service strength are not 
necessarily bad if they give multiple options to the national political leadership. 
Having reviewed these critical writings on achieving national goals, I think it 
important to discuss terminology related to civil-military relations and moral conduct in 
war.  The key terms that must be defined here for understanding throughout this 
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dissertation are policy, strategy, and doctrine.  These terms form the foundation of many 
authors’ arguments about civil-military relations.  However, in the literature, there is not 
a consistent understanding or agreement on what these terms mean and how they are 
operationalized.  As such, there cannot be a consistent application of how they affect the 
morality of decision-making in military operations.  The military, on the other hand, 
definitively separates and defines these terms.  These terms must be understood and 
baselined for a consistent understanding in this research paper.  In the following chapter, 
I will define these terms and show how the differences affect moral decision-making.  
Besides the disagreement in terminology in the civil-military relations literature, 
there are issues surrounding the potential for the military not agreeing with directives 
from the civilian leadership.  But what happens when there is no direction at all?  When 
is delegation appropriate and when does it become abdication?  This is the second major 
omission in the literature.  The authors in this field do not address the possibility of 
abdication of civilian leadership with respect to clear guidance to the military.  All 
assume that the civilian leadership would naturally lead their militaries.  Yet, both 
Huntington and Cohen, while decrying such instances, discuss civilian leaders stepping 
aside once decisions are made and allowing the military latitude to conduct operations.  
This literature misses the implications of national leaders not providing guidance to the 
military.  As mentioned earlier, civilian leaders have the right to be wrong, and thus have 
the final say.  However, they should ensure they exercise that right and give clear 
direction. 
This is extremely important because as Carlino argues, if given the decision to 
make for themselves, military officers will protect their own at the expense of the enemy 
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populace.58 And when military leaders minimize the threat to their pilots by ordering 
them to fly above a particular altitude and thus limit the precision of their attacks, the 
civilian leadership can easily direct the military to accept a greater risk.  But in not doing 
so, do those civilian leaders also share in the responsibility for non-combatant casualties?  
This is a key question that could be answered if the civil-military relations literature 
discussed the concept of abdication of decision-making responsibility. 
There was an emerging literature in a different field of study that might have 
touched on this issue, but it dealt mainly with congress and agencies established to 
implement welfare policies.59  Matthew McCubbins, however, goes a step further and 
attempts to draw the line between delegation and abdication.  If the principals, in this 
case national civilian leaders, provide the military broad direction and trust those military 
officers to carry out their orders, that would be delegation.  He posits that leaders 
abdicate when their interests conflict with those of their delegated subordinates and when 
the subordinates have such a degree of knowledge over the superiors that effective checks 
are impossible.60  However, McCubbins does not add another possible element of 
abdication.   
Neither of McCubbins’s elements of abdication are necessarily present when 
national leaders fail to give detailed objectives to the military, such as what Huntington 
says military officers should expect.  I would contend that the leadership abdicates if it 
leaves to the military the responsibility to determine wartime objectives even if the 
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President and military are in agreement on the issues and the President can overrule the 
military’s decisions.  This would not necessarily be an instance of poor civil-military 
relations, but could lead to them if the military feels it has a responsibility dumped on it 
for which it will later be accountable.  It could also lead to poor civil-military relations if 
the civilian leadership leaves those decisions to the military and then attempts to regain 
control in the middle of the operation.  Without clearly delegated objectives, who is 
responsible to make the moral judgment of what is an acceptable level of harm to non-
combatants? 
One might counter that the issue of abdication is moot since Samuel Huntington 
and Peter Feaver both posit that oversight of the military by national civilian leaders is 
the way to get them to do what you want.61  Feaver asks the central question “How do 
civilians control the military?  How is it that civilian institutions are able to impose their 
will on the more powerful military agents?”62  These are key questions to the notion of 
just conduct in war, and although Feaver does not specifically discuss moral outcomes of 
military operations, his study does go straight to the heart of whether the military will 
“work” or “shirk” (defined as going against the will of the superior), given specific 
direction, in this case, to limit non-combatant casualties.   
However powerful oversight can be in ensuring military leaders perform as 
directed, the concept of oversight assumes involvement by civilian leaders.  Thus 
abdication is absent from the literature.  It is important to discuss, however for one 
fundamental reason.  Civilian control over the military is key because civilian leaders are 
elected and ultimately responsible for policy and strategy and thus for the morality of 
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national decisions.  While they should listen to the advice of their senior military 
advisors, civilian leaders are the elected ones and need to give direction to military 
officers to achieve national objectives.  If senior military advisors vehemently disagree 
with civilian direction, then either there is a serious potential moral problem on the 
horizon, or else they should be replaced by civilian leadership for someone who will 
carry out direction.  If the potential problem foreseen by the military surfaced, then the 
electorate would have the opportunity to remove those leaders at the ballot box. 
In summary, the civil-military relations literature provides us with an important 
understanding of what constitutes a proper relationship between the civilian leadership 
and the military.  That relationship is one in which the civilian leadership sets policies 
and determines national objectives with input and advice from the military, who then 
follows the lawful orders regardless whether or not that direction was what the military 
desires.  The literature outlines how civilians use the military to plan and execute combat 
operations to attain national objectives.  What the literature omits is the important 
discussion of moral actions as a result of that relationship.  Furthermore, while critical to 
the discussion, there are no clear definitions to the concepts of policy, strategy, and 
doctrine. 
Applying Just War principles to achieve lasting resolutions to conflict is not as 
easy, however, as merely having a national leader deciding that his forces will act justly.  
If there is to be justice to achieve peace, we need to know how to achieve that just and 
moral outcome.  In today’s age of global reach in combat operations, combat units larger 
than entire medieval armies, information technology that brings multiple decision-makers 
into play on every facet of combat operations requires an understanding that modern 
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militaries are bound by the forces of other large bureaucracies.  Therefore, it is not 
enough that senior leaders decide that their forces should act morally.  The bureaucratic 
organization must work with and against the forces that could derail such moral 
decisions.  The bureaucratic politics literature offers some insights to help us understand 
the forces involved with these moral civil-military decisions. 
 
Bureaucratic Politics and Its Affect on Moral Targeting Decisions  
I showed in the previous section that the civil-military relations literature was 
important to this study because it addresses the important relationships between civilians 
and their military subordinates, especially with respect to the definition of national 
interests and objectives and the military strategies required to attain them.  But that 
literature assumed that orders would be followed.  The bureaucratic politics literature, on 
the other hand, delves into the means of control and oversight, as well as the motivations 
principals and agents have to align their interests to get a job done.  This literature, I 
believe, is necessary to understand the moral component in civil-military relations and 
combat planning and execution. 
Graham Allison, noted author on bureaucracy and its impact on decisions, posits 
that the type of organization and the routines found therein constrain and shape behavior.  
He argues that organizational routines and standard operating procedures can determine 
outcomes regardless of the issue on the table.63  For example, during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the Air Force based its entire proposed strategy of a bombing campaign against 
Cuba on the assumption that the Soviet Missiles were mobile.  The missiles were in fact 
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fixed, but the identification of the missiles as mobile precipitated a planning process that 
took on a life of its own.  However, what Allison did not discuss was how individuals 
within these organizations can make decisions on their own that impact their organization 
and the country.  An example would be why individual pilots would decide not to bomb 
certain targets or target others against orders. Such decisions cannot be based sole ly on 
organizational routines or standard operating procedures.  There has to be some other 
reason. 
If the procedures in place tell someone to do something and yet he does 
something else, then there must be an element of will in the equation of decision-making.  
The bureaucratic politics literature, and especially the principal-agent model literature 
addresses this subject.   
The principal-agent model broadly claims that there is a relationship between 
principals, such as the President, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and their bureaucratic agents, in this case, the military planners and 
executors.  The theory claims that both principals and agents are rational utility 
maximizers whose interests often, and sometimes necessarily, diverge.  Principals, who 
are elected (or appointed and confirmed by those who are elected) monitor and control 
their agents in order to ensure outcomes in line with the public interest and to ensure 
political control over the unelected bureaucracy.64   
Such a model comes with normative assumptions that elected officials should be 
able to control unelected bureaucrats and that agents try to shirk attempts at political 
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control.  Furthermore, within the model there are assumptions of goal conflict between 
principals and agents as well as an information asymmetry in favor of the agents.65   
One serious problem with this model of bureaucratic politics is that in trying to 
simplify the model to these normative assumptions, you lose too much interaction and 
reality in complex relationships.  For example, Waterman, Rouse and Wright show that 
dyadic models of principal-agent interaction do not adequately capture dynamic 
interactions between bureaucrats and their bosses during complex operations.66  With 
respect to the military bureaucracy, this notion well explains the fact that planners and 
executors must respond not only to their own motivations, but to multiple principals, such 
as their commanders, the President, and even the International Criminal Court (who is not 
directly communicating with them).   
Thomas Barth furthers this notion of balancing motivations by positing that 
bureaucrats who take an oath to uphold and defend the constitution must balance 
Presidential interests against other constitutional considerations.67  For the military, this 
equates to the bottom line that every officer has the choice of following orders or 
resigning his commission if he believes the orders run contrary to his oath of office.  
Barth contends this tension produces a healthy inertia that prevents large swings in policy 
from one direction to another from administration to administration. 
Peter Feaver, in following the principal-agent model of bureaucratic politics, says 
that the military will decide whether or not to obey orders based on whether or not they 
feel they will be caught and punished.  Feaver posits that civilian principals will not 
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necessarily punish their military agents when caught disobeying.  Such a decision, 
according to Feaver, depends on a strategic interaction between civilians and the military, 
and on the external environment.68   
And when discussing punishment of the military, Feaver does so largely in group 
terms, such as punishing an entire service by cutting its budget, and the difficulties that 
arise with such decisions.69  He does not discuss how individual officers decide to obey 
or shirk, and what recourse the civilian and military principals have to enforce such 
obedience on individual actors or agents.  Those answers seem to come from authors who 
have studied not the military, but civilian bureaucrats.  I contend that their findings help 
us understand how to get military leaders to follow and not shirk.  
Others research obedience of subordinate bureaucrats and sabotage of their 
superiors.  John Brehm and Scott Gates did not discuss the military bureaucracy, but they 
did study police officers, who closely resemble the military in their duties and 
subordination to civil authority.  The authors found that officers who like their jobs are 
less likely to shirk, as are more professional officers.70  But these findings do not account 
for senior military officers who shirk and who had to pass through the strictest 
professional standards, and who must like their jobs in order to remain even after 
retirement was possible.  
Looking further at bureaucratic politics research, the literature is vast, both 
contradicting and sharpening the normative assumptions that principals want to provide 
oversight and that agents want to shirk.  Niskanen posited that bureaucrats were budget 
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maximizing due to their information monopoly on cost of service, and were thus hard to 
control. 71  However, Downs, Conybeare, and Bendor, Taylor and Van Gaalen, refute 
Niskanen by showing that not only are bureaucrats not monolithic, they are not budget 
maximizing.72  How does this discussion of budget maximization apply to moral norms in 
war?  Although none of these authors discusses the military bureaucracy, it would be 
easy to envision situations in which militaries skirted moral norms to achieve decisive 
outcomes beyond objectives set by national leadership in order to strengthen their 
positions and budgets.  But as the authors note, not all bureaucrats are budget maximizing 
and hence, not all military officers will skirt norms merely to strengthen their service’s 
position.  Such evidence will be seen in the case studies. 
Hedge, Menzel and Krause show that agents don’t merely shirk, but often try to 
influence their superiors by advocating their positions.73  One obvious application of this 
principle is to see how successful military officers could be in advocating restraint in 
military action to their superiors.  The nature of that advocacy is central to the issue of 
civil-military relations and thus to moral outcomes.  If military leaders publicly advocate 
a position counter to the administration (such as did Colin Powell in 1993 on the issue of 
involvement in Bosnia), then that could be seen as a clear case of insubordination or 
shirking.  On the other hand, strong advocacy out of the public eye could be seen by 
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some as just as insubordinate if opposite civilian directives, or it could be seen as good 
subordinate advocacy if it changes the mind of the civilian leader. 
Wood and Waterman showed that from agency to agency, there was political 
response in behavior to leadership changes.74  Regardless of the politics of the principals, 
agents changed their behavior to suit their bosses.  The question that springs from their 
research relating to my topic is whether or not subordinates would respond to morally 
motivated changes in leadership as they respond to politics.  If so, then we should be able 
to predict moral decision-making in war.  Finally, Stehr shows that agents want overhead 
direction, saying that they desire to comply with their bosses.75  This literature gave us a 
more precise way of understanding and sharpening the normative assumptions of 
subordinate behavior and under which conditions they will hold true. 
Calvert, and McCubbins and Weingast argue that the process of policy execution 
can be understood as a game among the principals (legislature and executive) and the 
agents (bureaucrats).76  Banks considers the cost to principals of monitoring agents to 
prevent shirking, and details the multiple asymmetries that come into play in each 
relationship.77  Banks’s study casts doubt on Huntington’s and Feaver’s assertion that 
oversight is the best path to take.  The time it takes to monitor agents, especially when the 
agents have information and knowledge asymmetries over their principals, keeps the 
principals from performing other functions that might be more profitable.  He argued for 
other forms of oversight instead of monitoring.  While these authors focused on the 
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President, Congress and government agency bureaucrats, their work can apply to the 
military.   
As can be seen, this body of literature spawned a more detailed study and 
evaluation of the methods of control of the bureaucracy.  While some authors discuss 
budgetary controls on bureaucracy, others discuss procedural constraints and structural 
design as the best methods of controlling the bureaucracy and preventing shirking. 78  
These procedures and structures discussed in the civilian bureaucracy equate to doctrine 
in the military.  Doctrinal procedures and structures are good examples of what the 
military does to ensure national objectives are achieved in military operations.  However, 
the multiple authors of these papers did not discuss variables that might result in agents 
not following direction (shirking) despite structural and procedural control. 
One other angle to the control issue comes in the form of professionalizing the 
bureaucracy.  Downs and Wilson, as well as Brehm and Gates, discuss the importance of 
motivations such as professional norms in limiting goal conflict between principals and 
agents and thus making easier the control of bureaucracy. 79  As these papers looked at the 
civilian bureaucracy, there was naturally no discussion of military professionalization or 
morality in these works.  However, that does not mean that notion is absent in literature.  
I will consider the subject of military professionalization and moral norms in Chapter 4. 
                                                 
78 See Jonathan Bendor, and Terry M. Moe, “An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics,” American 
Political Science Review (Vol. 79, No. 3, 1985) pp. 755-774; Mathew D. McCubbins, “Legislative Design 
of Regulatory Structure,” American Journal of Political Science (Vol. 29, 1985), pp. 721-48; Mathew 
McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative 
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,” Virginia Law Review (Vol. 75, 1989), pp. 431-482; 
Kathleen Bawn, “Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative 
Procedures,” American Political Science Review (Vol. 89, No. 1,1995), pp. 62-73; Andrew B. Whitford, 
“Bureaucratic Discretion, Agency Structure, and Democratic Responsiveness: The Case of the United 
States Attorneys.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2002), pp. 3-27. 
79 See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, New York: Basic Books, 1989; John Brehm, and Scott Gates, 
“Donut Shops and Speed Traps: Evaluating Models of Supervision of Police Behavior,” American Journal 
of Political Science (Vol. 27, No. 2, 1993), pp. 555-81. 
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As Anthony Downs points out, bureaucrats are not monolithic in their thinking.  
Military bureaucrats certainly demonstrate Downs’s main theoretical claims that 
bureaucrats (in this case planners and executors of military operations) have widely 
varying preferences, and that when that bureaucracy fails to accomplish its given 
missions, it is because of those varying preferences over outcomes and means to 
outcomes.80  Thus, it follows logically that there are doctrinal bureaucratic processes with 
respect to military war planning that can be followed to yield a moral conduct of 
operations.  Just as easily, though, the bureaucratic process (e.g. administrative design, 
procedures, hierarchy, etc) designed to ensure continuity within operations can be legally 
skirted to produce a strategy that would yield less moral results if the decision-makers 
believe the situation warrants a departure from established doctrine.   
The bureaucratic process and organizational dynamics make it difficult, if not 
impossible, for senior civilian and military leaders to put their arms around all the issues 
surrounding the attainment of security ends and the means to achieve those ends.  The 
higher in rank a person rises, the fewer things he is able to focus on in depth. 81  Senior 
leaders, operate on a macro, vice micro, level of issues.  They focus much more on the 
politics of a conflict than in the heart of the debate over what is a morally acceptable 
balance between acceptable non-combatant casualties and military necessity required to 
achieve national objectives.  Field grade (Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel ranks) 
planners and executors are in the thick of that micro- level of operations and think about 
                                                 
80 See Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, (New York: Little -Brown and Company, 1967). 
81 Downs, p. 58.  “Officials near the top of the hierarchy have a greater breadth of information about affairs 
in the bureau than officials near the bottom, but the latter have more detailed knowledge about activities in 
their particular portions of the bureau.  This implies that no one ever knows everything about what is going 
on in any large organization.” 
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that issue, and making policy recommendations to national leadership, even though it is 
not the field graders’ ultimate decision. 
It is easy to make parallels between those staff officers who disagree with a 
particular order to plan operations and bureaucrats opposed to an administration’s 
policies. On the other hand, there are some significant differences.  In the military, staff 
officers (the bureaucrats) as well as their directors (agency heads) are not in lifetime 
appointments with civil-service protection.  With few exceptions, staff officers and 
directors rotate through their respective jobs every 2-3 years, constantly renewing their 
organization with new goals, fresh perspectives and field experience, and motivations.82  
On the other hand, what remains consistent, if not constant, are doctrinal (procedural) 
guidelines, law, and a planning process that ensures some measure of bureaucratic 
continuity over time.   
For example, regardless of who the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), regional Commanders in Chief (CINC), 
and staff planners are, there is a formal doctrinal process for planning and conducting 
operations, that carries with it the weight of law.  All these aforementioned players must 
act within this formal process in order to plan and execute military operations.  The 
interesting aspect of this seemingly bureaucratic process of red tape for planning and 
executing war is that it almost never yields similar results from conflict to conflict.  
While it is almost certain that from operation to operation strategies and plans will be 
different, one would hope that moral decisions would be consistent.  The model presented 
                                                 
82 Data provided author from the Air Force Personnel Center on 1 October 2003 shows that intelligence 
officers in the rank of major and lieutenant colonel across all staffs spend an average of 2.9 and 2.7 years in 
their staff jobs respectively.  Data for intelligence officers closely mirrors other operational career fields on 
all staffs.  Thanks to the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC/DPAOO).  
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herein can help to ensure that moral decisions are consistently made in military 
operations.   
Whether overtly or by chance, military leaders and bureaucracies can undermine 
even the best efforts to achieve a just war and lasting peace.  Barry Posen notes that 
“Military organizations have a certain inherent power within states that stems from the 
function they serve, and they try to increase this power by mystifying their art.”83  He 
further adds that militaries will pursue offensive doctrines which increase the rewards 
those services can gain, especially in budgetarily constrained times.  This desire for the 
offensive could come into conflict with just war norms and potential long-term 
settlements, however, Posen does not discuss the issue in terms of its impact on the 
morality of operations.  After all, if limiting casualties and the targets open to attack in an 
opposing state limits the degree to which a military can act, those within that military 
may feel threatened and shirk oversight or direction from civilian leadership. 
This literature shows that sabotage and shirking are not necessary outcomes of 
bureaucracy.  Importantly for this dissertation, the bureaucratic politics literature lays a 
foundation for understanding how to achieve moral ends in war.  The principal-agent 
model forms the basis for the theoretic model presented in the following chapter.  
However, the literature does not address abdication in the detail needed to understand the 
issue in terms of wartime directives and implementation.  Furthermore, there is no 
consensus or definition to know when principals and agents are in accord with each other.  
Merely achieving the principal’s goal does not mean the agent was in accord.  I will 
address both abdication and whether principals and agents were in accord through 
detailed qualitative case study. 
                                                 
83 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1984, pg. 45. 
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The literatures reviewed in this chapter all discussed some decisions or decision-
making process.  Just War laid a foundation for moral decisions in war.  Civil-military 
relations discussed decisions made in the relationship between soldiers and civilians.  
Bureaucratic politics literature discussed how to ensure that agents carry out the decisions 
principals make.  If we strive for moral targeting decisions in military operations, we 
should be able to discern how to ensure those decisions are made.  The following chapter 
introduces a theory and model of how to ensure moral targeting decisions are made in 
military operations.  If that is accomplished, we can then use this knowledge to further 
national interests and to work on true resolution to conflicts involving military operations 
without having a wound left open to fester and overshadow resolution efforts. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Making Moral Targeting Decisions In War:  
The Importance Of Aligned Principal-Agent Motivations And Constraining 
Doctrine  
 
Presentation of Theory and Model 
In the previous chapter I placed my research topic in three seemingly diverse 
bodies of literature.  Classical Just War literature sets moral norms for men to follow in 
deciding whether to go to war and for what is acceptable once in war.  But there is no 
framework in the literature for what goes into making a moral decision.  Civil-military 
relations literature gives us an insight into the types of relationships that could potentially 
produce moral and immoral decisions in war.  However, this literature also assumes that 
civilian leaders will always provide direction to the military and that the military needs to 
do what the civilian leadership says.  That leaves open the possibility of military officers 
following direction and not making moral decisions. Finally, the bureaucratic politics 
literature offers us a framework of understanding how principals and agents can align 
their motivations, ensuring not only good civil-military relations, but more importantly 
for the purposes of this dissertation, that moral decisions in war are made.   
From these literatures and the aforementioned limitations and strengths follows 
my theory, which posits that constraining military doctrine and alignment of principal-
agent motivations impact whether or not moral targeting decisions are made in times of 
war.  Despite the strong evidence that shows the U.S. military wants to make the moral 
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decisions (see Chapter 4), merely wanting to do the right thing does not necessarily lead 
to moral decision being made.  If the U.S. military bureaucracy that is responsible for 
planning and executing combat operations can be understood using the framework of 
military doctrine and bureaucratic theory, then political and military leaders may be able 
to use bureaucratic politics literature to understand the forces that lead to variation in the 
planning development process and execution of operations.  More importantly, they can 
use that knowledge to limit the variation in moral decisions that can arise as a result, in 
order to ensure a moral conduct of operations.     
I contend that variations in bureaucratic principal-agent motivations and military 
doctrine (namely the administrative structures and processes the military uses to plan and 
conduct operations) lead to differences in the morality of decisions that arise from 
military plans and strategy, regardless of the objectives outlined by national civilian 
leadership.  Following a doctrine that constrains actors to plan to achieve specific 
national objectives and working within doctrinally established structures should 
theoretically yield more moral decisions in combat operations than not working within 
such structures or following such procedures.  However, another indicator of moral 
decisions in military operations may be the alignment of motivations of the planners and 
executors within the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) of the U.S. Armed 
Forces with those of senior principal decision makers.   
If there is goal-conflict, meaning a difference in what the military planners and 
executors think is right, and what they are ordered by national leaders to accomplish, then 
one of two things happens.  Officers will either try to influence the leadership, through 
feedback and position advocacy with the goal of altering directions to the military, or 
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they may try to achieve moral ends by affecting the planning and execution process to 
achieve an end that is in line with their own conception of morality. 
Neither doctrine nor aligned motivations can, by themselves, ensure morality in 
decision-making.  Both are necessary, yet insufficient in themselves.  However, the entire 
process of planning and conducting operations can lead to varying moral decisions.  U.S. 
military doctrine does not tell leaders and planners to be moral, but as will be shown, it 
does exhort decision-makers to take proportionality and necessity into account.  But that 
alone does not ensure moral decisions.  Likewise if principals and agents get together to 
deliberately align their motivations with respect to the objectives for an operation, that 
does not necessitate moral decisions if they don’t follow a doctrinal process.  
I contend that the process of aligning motivations with respect to desired 
outcomes, and the process of planning strategies according to doctrine together lead to 
moral targeting decisions.  By following the doctrinal processes of getting plans approved 
as outlined in Chapter 4, a deliberate dialogue is followed with direction and feedback 
through several steps of planning and approval that result in a detailed process with 
multiple people working on a product that obtains a sort of corporate “buy-in”.  I contend 
that it is difficult to end up with targeting decisions that are not proportional to necessity, 
especially when principals and agents come together in a concerted effort to ensure they 
align their motivations through this doctrinal process. 
The following model illustrates my theory. 
 55 
Model  
The process of developing military strategies to achieve U.S. national interests, 
and executing those strategies to achieve national objectives yields varying moral results 
based upon the interactions of the players and variables shown in the following model: 
 
Figure 3.1, Process to Achieve and Variables Affecting  
U.S. Targeting Decisions in War 
 
Military Planners
Turn National Interests/
Orders Into Strategy 
to Achieve Objectives
Military Executors
Conduct Operations 
to Achieve Objectives
STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS OUTCOME
Legend
Orders
Feedback
Independent Variables
1. Constraining Doctrine
2. Principal-Agent 
Motivations
IV affecting Strategy Development and Conduct of Operations
DV Moral Targeting Decisions
Dependent Variable
Moral Targeting 
Decisions
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Defining the Dependent Variable   
In my review of literature relevant to moral decision-making, I discussed the 
concept of morality in war in broad terms.  Here, I will narrow the concept to making 
moral targeting decisions in war.  Such decisions are critical to determining the total 
levels of damage that will result from combat operations as well as expected numbers of 
individual non-combatant casualties.  Once the decision to go to war is made, the 
decisions of what to target and by what means are the most important moral decisions 
that principals can make. 
 It is important to clearly explain how I define moral targeting decisions in war in 
order to show variance from one military operation to the next.  Some of these concepts 
defy rigorous empirical measures, no matter how detailed the case studies, and there will 
remain a certain debate over what decisions meet Just War criteria.  In considering what 
is and is not just, we must consider both the ends, and the means to those ends.  Neither is 
quantifiable on any measurable scale.  These are subjective measures, and as such, they 
are open to challenge.  However, I will accept that challenge for the purpose of 
conducting this study.   
I define as moral a targeting decision wherein a senior principal specifically 
determined whether foreseeable non-combatant and combatant casualty rates are 
proportional to the necessity of any given objective issued by military or civilian 
leadership.  As Michael Walzer notes, proportionality and necessity must be balanced so 
that no harm is done that does not “tend materially to the end [of victory].”1  If there is 
clear evidence that the proportionality-necessity decision was made for each individual 
target or objective, then I consider the dependent variable to be positive.  If the targets 
                                                 
1 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, New York: Basic Books, 1977, pg. 129. 
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were not considered for proportionality and necessity, or if a blanket number of 
maximum acceptable non-combatant casualties was given for all targets, regardless of 
necessity, then I do not consider the dependent variable to have been met.   
Furthermore, to be considered a moral decision, for accountability purposes, I 
contend that the proportionality-necessity balance decision must be made at the level of 
Joint Force Commander (JFC – the combatant commander with overall command 
responsibility for the particular operation or conflict) or above (Secretary of Defense or 
President) for each objective or target where foreseeable non-combatant casualties are 
likely. 2  I contend the decision should rest at this level because this is the commander that 
has legal authority to conduct combat operations (Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 161) when 
directed by the President and Secretary of Defense.3  The responsibility inherent in these 
decisions means that no person without that responsibility should be delegated that 
authority.  
In all three cases researched herein, there is evidence for the decision either being 
made or not made.  However, if there was not evidence of a positive decision, one could 
infer whether proportionality-necessity decisions were made based on publicized 
targeting decisions and reports of collateral damage. Such inferential examples can 
reinforce hard data on targeting decisions. 
Some may question whether “street-level” military actions may have deleterious 
moral implications and whether I should not lower the threshold for decision-making 
below the joint force commander to those commanders engaged in tactical operations.  
Those “street- level” actions can indeed have moral implications, however, by the time 
                                                 
2 Jeffrey Gingras and Tomislav Ruby, “Morality in Modern Aerial Warfare,” Joint Forces Quarterly 
(Summer 2000), pg. 111. 
3 UNAAF , pg. i. 
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low-level military units are employed, the means with which they can inflict harm 
disproportionate to the overall objective is normally quite low.  If the proportionality-
necessity decision is made, but for some reason a member of the military, or group of 
members, decide to go outside the bounds of that decision, that particular act might very 
well be illegal and would definitely be outside the bounds of the morality of the targeting 
decision that was made.  Such an act would be criminally investiga ted under standing 
laws for murder or disobedience and would not compromise the morality of the 
proportionality-necessity targeting decision. 
The significance level of acceptable non-combatant casualties may vary based on 
some criteria defined by the national leadership, or it may be established in some 
standing orders from the Joint Force Commander.  General guidelines, however, such as 
“minimize civilian casualties” would not be considered sufficient as they are vague and 
leave the proportionality-necessity balance decision to planners and executors.   
As Michael Carlino argues, it is not enough that expected casualties be considered 
in the proportionality-necessity balance, but also those unfortunate casualties that should 
have been foreseen. 4  In that sense, today’s military is different from the past in one 
significant way.  From ancient history through the middle ages and into the early 20th 
Century, militaries had to make positive attempts to directly and disproportionately harm 
non-combatants due to the clear separation of the battlefield from the population.  If they 
ever ransacked a village, it was clear that they intended to do so.  The norm was for 
armies to fight armies in the field.  On the contrary, militaries today have to make 
                                                 
4 See Michael Carlino, “The Moral Limits of Strategic Attack,” Parameters  (Vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 2002), 
pp. 15-29. 
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positive attempts not to harm non-combatants since the line between military and civilian 
has not only been blurred, but, in some cases, erased.   
This definition must suffice for the means to achieve a moral targeting decision.  
It would be possible, however, for a conscious proportionality-necessity balance to be 
made by a senior decision-maker and for accidental unintended non-combatant casualties 
to occur.  Such a situation might happen if a precision weapon malfunctioned by failing 
to guide to its target, killing a large number of people that were not expected to be 
affected in the operation.  Such a scenario would not be considered an immoral decision 
unless the malfunction was known to be likely.   
On the other hand, we must also allow for the possibility that the proportionality-
necessity decision was either not made, or was made without regard to moral ends.  In 
that event, it is also possible that during the planning or execution process the outcome 
could be affected towards a different end than that directed by the senior decision-maker.  
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, I attempt to determine whether or not 
established doctrine constrained a proportionality-necessity balance to be made at a 
senior level, and whether variations in principal-agent motivations affected command 
relationships sufficiently to prevent moral decisions based a proportionality-necessity 
balance. 
While some might posit that such a definition of a moral targeting decision in 
operations is open to blatantly immoral ends as long as some competent authority 
determines the balance and the military carries out the orders, I would have to concede 
such a possibility.  It would be easy to conceive of a hypothetical situation wherein 
civilian principals and military agents conspire to disregard a proportionality-necessity 
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decision for targeting during a future conflict.  However, as I mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, I would find such a situation unlikely in the extreme.  I cannot imagine a 
situation in which national civilian and military leaders would conspire to disregard 
proportionality and have those decisions carried out without question by their subordinate 
officers.  Chapter 4 will expound on the reasons for this confidence in greater detail.  
As easily as some might conceive of immoral decisions being made, there are 
many points in the process from defining interests to executing a strategy during which a 
blatantly immoral policy could be derailed by morally-minded subordinates.  Again, the 
point of this paper is not to write a treatise on morality, but to show variance in moral 
decisions given the previously stated definition.  After all, Walzer notes that the limits of 
proportionality and necessity do not explain the most critical judgments we make of our 
military leaders; that they must calculate costs and benefits only up to a point, doing their 
utmost to win, but only doing that which is necessary to achieve that end.5 
At this point it would be appropriate to refer back to my analysis of the civil-
military relations literature with respect to terminology.  I stated that the authors within 
that field had not been consistent in their definitions, and therefore their resultant analysis 
was also inconsistent.  This is important here because one of my dependent variables, 
doctrine, is a key concept in that literature.  I therefore define and delineate the key 
concepts of policy, strategy and doctrine. 
While U.S. Joint Doctrine differentiates between the three terms, the Air Force 
Doctrine Center best points out the important differences in the three concepts in its 
Command Briefing (see Figures 1, 2, 3 below).  Air Force Doctrine Document 1 says 
                                                 
5 Walze r, pp. 129-130 
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Military doctrine describes how a job should be done to accomplish 
military goals; strategy defines how it will be done to accomplish national 
political objectives…Strategy originates in policy and addresses broad 
objectives and plans for achieving them.  Doctrine evolves from military 
theory and experience and addresses how best to use military 
power…However, because war is an “instrument of policy, ” military 
commanders must ensure that policy governs the employment of military 
power and be prepared to adapt operations accordingly.6 
 
These differences in terminology highlight the separation of responsibility 
between civilian and military leaders.  They also confirm the responsibility that military 
leaders have in carrying out the will of the national civilian leadership.  The military does 
not set policy; politicians do.  The military, in consultation with national civilian leaders, 
develops strategies and plans to carry out specific national tasking to achieve objectives.  
Doctrine is the military’s guide in doing so.  But when the military disagrees with the 
policy, or if the political leadership requests the military to perform a task that is not 
doctrinal, then civil-military relations can be challenged and factors affecting moral 
decisions become more relevant to the issues examined in this study. 
The following figures illustrating the different terms come from the Air Force 
Doctrine Center’s command briefing and are used with permission. 
                                                 
6 AFDD 1, pg. 4. 
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Figure 3.2 
If it...
Ø Gets you in or keeps you out
Ø Debates national interest, starving children, ethnic cleansing
Ø Considers individual action, NATO, UN, regional coalitions
Ø Bounds your response
– War, total war, nuclear war, savage demarche
Ø Answers the questions
– Do chemicals = nuclear?
– Do satellite attacks = homeland attacks?
– Do information attacks = homeland attacks?
• Ex: The US will not allow Country X to Obtain nuclear 
weapons
This is Policy
 
Figure 3.3 
If it...
Ø Is about how to apply available capabilities
– Within the existing international environment 
– To gain desired ends 
– Using approved means (national or international)
Ø Considers:
– National or Operational Objectives
– Alliances and the role they play
– Threat, politics, personalities,  public opinion
• Ex:  The US will pre-emptively disable Country 
X’s nuclear capabilities with a coalition, if 
possible, or alone if required, using a 
combination of land, air, and sea power.
This is Strategy
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Figure 3.4  
 
If it is about...
Ø How you organize and operate
Ø The Military’s agreed upon operationally relevant 
body of best practices and principles supported by:
– History
– Exercises, wargames, contingencies
– Debate and analysis
This is Doctrine
And if it is...
Ø Authoritative, but not directive
Ø Ex: A single Air Component Commander should 
command and control all joint service air assets to 
achieve the Joint Force Commander’s objectives  
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Hypotheses   
Having presented my theoretical model of achieving moral decisions in war and 
having discussed the specific terminology for this model, certain hypotheses naturally 
spring from the theory.  In considering this model, it is important to note that the cycle of 
planning and executing operations (to be expanded upon in the following chapter), 
although doctrinally well defined, is subject to factors that can derail consistently moral 
targeting decisions.  Limiting harm to noncombatants is not always possible, even if 
national civilian and military leadership desire it. This model, therefore, leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
 
1. Moral targeting decisions in U.S. military operations are more likely when 
national civilian leaders specify objectives for the military to achieve in 
combat operations.  Without specific objectives, it is not possible for 
either the civilian leadership or the military CINC to determine what a 
target or objective is worth with respect to non-combatant casualties. 
 
2. Moral targeting decisions in U.S. military operations are more likely when 
Joint Doctrine and Service Doctrines constrain officers to develop 
strategies to achieve specified objectives.  Without such constraining 
doctrine, planners may develop brilliant strategies that defeat enemy 
forces, yet still do not achieve specified objectives or avoid excessive non-
combatant casualties. 
 
3. Moral targeting decisions in U.S. military operations are more likely when 
military planners’ and executors’ (agents) motivations are aligned with 
those of national leaders (principals).  Without aligned motivations, it is 
possible that military leaders will shirk the direction given them by 
political leaders because of their best intentions to win the war. 
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Operationalization of Variables 
Military Planning and Execution Bureaucracy and the Principal -Agent Model 
 In this section, I describe and expand on my two independent variables, aligned 
principal-agent motivations, and constraining military doctrine within the military 
planning and execution bureaucracy.  Rather than merely state my variables, it is 
necessary to describe the framework within which these variables are studied in my 
cases.  Furthermore, it is important to discuss the factors that affect these variables in 
order to understand how the variables affect moral decision-making in war.  I 
operationalize these variables by describing in depth the factors that affect them.  
Before discussing the factors affecting these variables, I explain how they should 
be elaborated within the context of the principal-agent model of bureaucratic politics.  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the model begins with the normative assumption that 
elected officials (national civilian leaders) should be able to control unelected bureaucrats 
(military commanders and war-fighters).  At the same time, there are theoretical 
assumptions that there is goal conflict between principals and agents as well as an 
information asymmetry in favor of the agents.  Therefore, agents will shirk. 
The principal-agent research has shown that these normative assumptions break 
down when one looks beyond dyadic interactions and do not adequately capture dynamic 
interactions that take place between multiple principals and multiple agents at multiple 
levels of command in combat planning and execution in complex operations.7  With 
respect to the military bureaucracy, this notion explains the fact that planners and 
executors must respond not only to their own motivations, but to multiple principals, such 
                                                 
7 See Waterman, Rouse, Wright. 
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as their commanders, the President, and even the International Criminal Court (who is not 
directly communicating with them).   
The multiple layers of unelected principals below the level of the President and 
SecDef seem to violate the principal of unity of command which is considered by many 
the most important precepts of military doctrine.8  Thus, even setting aside day-to-day 
reality of military desire for direction, and accepting the assumptions of the model that 
principals must control shirking agents, how would the national civilian and military 
leadership control the military bureaucracy?  The answer is through oversight.  
 There is a problem, however, with monitoring.  It is very often costly and 
ineffective.  Waterman and Meier posit that principals will not exert precious resources to 
monitor agents that already agree with their objectives.  On the other hand, they say the 
most problematic cases are those where the leaders are not sure their subordinates support 
their objectives.9  If we accept the monitoring assumption, how would principals control 
bureaucratic discretion (which is also shown in the model early in this chapter)?  The best 
methods are through structural design and well-defined procedures, which the military 
knows as doctrine.   
It is not surprising, therefore, that these methods have been instituted by the 
Department of Defense to ensure princ ipal control over the agents, and to grant discretion 
in certain instances where the information asymmetry is accepted and advice from agents 
is desired.  On the other hand, doctrine is developed to limit discretion in order to ensure 
the objectives set by the senior decision makers are achieved.  Regardless how well the 
                                                 
8 See Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Washington, D.C., 10 January 1995, pg. III-1, and Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic 
Doctrine, pg. 12. 
9 Richard W. Waterman and Kenneth J. Meier, “Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?” Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory (Vol. 8, No. 2, April 1998), pg. 192. 
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procedures and structures are defined, however, it is still possible to skirt them to achieve 
decisions that would be classified as immoral regardless of the will of the senior decision 
makers.   
In the following sections, I define and describe the two independent variables in 
my model: principal-agent motivation alignment and constraining doctrine.  Within each 
section, I outline the variable itself and the factors that affect that variable, and 
ultimately, the morality of targeting decisions in war.  The first independent variable I 
discuss is alignment of principal-agent motivations. 
 
Variable 1: Aligned Principal -Agent Motivations 
Principal-agent motivations are aligned when senior military and civilian 
decision-makers clearly agree on the rationale for the conflict as well as the objectives 
and end states for the particular operation.  Aligning motivations of principals and agents 
is not as easy as the boss telling the subordinate to do something and the subordinate 
saluting smartly and carrying out the orders.  Furthermore, I do not measure motivations.  
Rather, I determine whether principals and agents work to align their motivations.  
Several key factors affect whether and how bosses and subordinates align their 
motivations.   
For example, many government executives must spend so much time coping with 
their agencies’ external environment that they have relatively little opportunity to shape 
its internal life.  Moreover, the typical Defense Department presidential appointee is in 
office for less than 2.5 years with many positions going vacant for long periods of time.10  
                                                 
10 Cheryl Y. Marcum, Lauren R. Sager Weinstein, Susan D. Hosek, and Harry J. Thie, Department of 
Defense Political Appointments: Position and Process (Rand Corporation, 2001), pg. 42. 
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As a result, the task of a government agency is more likely than those of a commercial 
firm to be defined by factors othe r than the preferences of the executive.11   
The average tour length for field grade officers in staff assignments is between 
two and three years.12  In that respect, staff officers are not much different from 
presidential appointees in terms of tenure.  With constant turnover among the staff 
planners and even more frequent turnover among senior leaders, the opportunity exists 
for planning staffs to change their direction with respect to moral decision-making as 
often as their leadership changes or as often as enough officers transition onto the staffs 
to change their philosophy regarding the issue of morality. 
Thus, devising a strategy to achieve a given set of objectives can yield numerous 
morally varying targeting decisions.  Graham Allison notes, “The specification of 
operational objectives is as malleable as the notion of efficiency itself.”  He goes on to 
say that organizations “influence the prioritization of purposes into a definition of their 
‘mission’ and are especially influential when the mission is translated.”13  In this respect, 
new planners and bosses constantly rotating through planning staffs have great leeway in 
varying the scope of the objectives given them by the civilian leadership from operation 
to operation.  Motivations of the planners can therefore have a serious impact on the 
direction of operations and therefore on moral decisions. 
Given this constant staff turnover and ability to define their mission, how can 
governments and their militaries move toward a certain moral direction or norm over 
                                                 
11 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, New York: Basic Books, 1989, p. 32. 
12 Data courtesy Air Force Personnel Center.  Officers in assignments coded as Joint Duty billets must be 
left in the position for a minimum of 24 months to obtain Joint Duty Credit in their records.  Assignments 
on the service staffs vary.  Due to budgetary constraints and desire to maintain staff continuity, however, 
the services also generally adhere to the 2-3 year staff tour length. 
13 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2nd Ed., New York: Addison Wesley 
Longman, 1999, pg. 151. 
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time, regardless of their leadership?  James Q. Wilson introduces an applicable 
framework to this issue that identifies four factors that form the foundation for principal-
agent motivations.14   
Within the context of this dissertation, Wilson’s bureaucratic framework can best 
account for the variation in the U.S. military’s motivations in attempting to ensure moral 
targeting decisions in combat operations.  That is, principal and agent motivations can be 
thought of as the summation of the four factors Wilson introduces: circumstances, beliefs 
and interests, and constraints.  In this section I describe how each affects principal-agent 
motivations.  In the case studies, I address each of these to show how the overall 
principal-agent motivations either were aligned or not during the three conflicts studied 
herein. 
Circumstances   
The first factor that affects principal-agent motivations is circumstances, which 
can be considered the political and international context within which issues arise.15   
Examples of circumstances that can affect military planners and executors are issues such 
as media access to the battlefield to report on noncombatant casualties, the nature of the 
operations, i.e. are we responding to a direct attack on the US or are we engaged in a 
peacekeeping operation, and most importantly, the gravity of the threat to national 
interests.   
Aside from the international context, other circumstances Wilson discusses as 
very important are peer expectations and clarity of goals (in the military case, 
                                                 
14 Wilson, Bureaucracy, chapters 3-9. 
15 Wilson, Bureaucracy, Chapter 3. 
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objectives).16  Peer expectations are recognized as a critical component of why soldiers 
and airmen and sailors fight.  Historian John Keegan posits that, aside from the will to 
survive, the most important reasons soldiers stay in the line of fire next to their comrades 
is so as not incur their comrades’ contempt.17 The first two case studies will show that 
peer expectations were different in these operations with respect to moral decision-
making.  Such differences affected principal-agent alignment and moral decision-making. 
Rosen also notes another circumstance that motivates officers in their decisions, 
namely the structure of the security environment.18  As mentioned previously, the line 
between the non-combatant and militarily significant has been all but erased.  In the 
present day, the worldwide focus on non-combatant casualties has forced the military to 
consider innovative ways of employing precision munitions that had not been considered 
in past conflicts.  Such examples will be explored in the final case study. Rosen posits 
that this contextual understanding of the security environment drives the military to plan 
and exercise for what they think the next war will be like.19  If the planners and executors 
see their circumstances, such as the security environment, differently than their 
principals, then it may be difficult to align their motivations. 
Beliefs and Interests   
The second and third factors that affecting principal and agent motivations, are 
beliefs and interests.20  In this dissertation, these are understood to be personal beliefs and 
personal interests.  Variation in both of these can lead to variation in motivations of 
officers to place emphasis on moral considerations in the planning and execution of 
                                                 
16 Wilson, Bureaucracy, p. 48. 
17 John Keegan, The Face of Battle, (London: Penguin Books, 1976) pg. 51. 
18 Rosen, pg. 75. 
19 Rosen, pg. 20. 
20 Wilson, Chapters 4-5. 
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military operations.  Wilson posits that it is underlying beliefs and interests that affect 
bureaucrats’ behavior. 21  Given the often-wide latitude afforded by national decision-
makers to military planners, beliefs and interests are important factors that support the 
norms and culture by which the planners use their discretion in shaping the very interests 
and objectives they must later plan to achieve.  But those beliefs and interests are not 
always exogenous. 
Aside from a person’s underlying convictions, another factor can have an impact 
on his interests.  For example, power is afforded to those who rise through the ranks, yet 
the decision on promotion is made by senior officers themselves.  Rosen points out that 
regardless underlying beliefs, it is in the officer’s best interest to do what his superiors 
require of him, not by being a “Maverick.”22  Steven Stehr also shows that agents want 
overhead direction, saying that they desire to comply with their bosses.23  This reality can 
be a serious force against change, and for working, not shirking, unless some more 
powerful interest emerges to supercede career goals.   
One potential force for superceding individual career goals is an organizational 
culture that becomes embedded in an individual’s underlying beliefs.  Wood notes 
“effective action requires insulation to assure that policy reversals do not occur with 
every fleeting political whim.”24  Such insulation can lead to interests and beliefs gaining 
a foothold or even becoming entrenched in organizations over time.   
                                                 
21 Wilson, pg. 51. 
22 Rosen, pp. 20-21. 
23 Steven D.  Stehr, “Top Bureaucrats and the Distribution of Influence in Reagan’s Executive Branch.”  
Public Administration Review (Vol. 57, No. 1, 1997), pp. 75-82. 
24 B. Dan Wood, “Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC?” American Journal of Political Science , 
1990, Vol. 34, pg. 503. 
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Wood and Waterman discuss this very issue and refer to the phenomenon as 
“tonal shifts” in bureaucratic adaptation, wherein changes occur over a period of time in 
response to multiple stimuli.25 They posit that information asymmetries – in this case by 
the military – would lead to a shifting culture over time as the agents learned and adapted 
to a changing environment.  This concept which Wood and Waterman posit could be 
considered analogous to an internal culture in which learning occurs over time within the 
greater bureaucracy.  Whethe r it is called a culture or a phenomenon in which standards 
evolve based on learning, is not as important as the notion that it does occur.    
Such tonal shifts have resulted in homogenous beliefs within the U.S. military 
officer corps resulting in what some consider the civil-military gap wherein military 
officers are more religious and conservative than the rest of society. 26  If this is indeed 
true, one could infer that officers would be more likely to consider Just War norms, 
whose foundation was religious, in their conduct of operations than civilian leaders with 
differing beliefs.  This would make principal-agent motivations difficult to align, if 
indeed true.    
Yet the case studies should show that in the multiple principal-agent relationships, 
the officers’ professional beliefs and interests did not consistently clash with those of 
their civilian leaders.  Furthermore, if culture were a primary variable, rather than a factor 
in motivations, then the culture should remain constant or evolve linearly over time.  But 
Wood and Waterman show that, within the civilian bureaucracy, there is usually political 
change in behavior to leadership changes in the agencies, regardless the ideology of the 
                                                 
25 B. Dan Wood and Richard Waterman, “The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy,” 
American Political Science Review, 1991, Vol. 81, pg. 801. 
26 See Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, editors, Soldiers and Civilians (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001). 
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agents and the parties of the principals.27  This would support Rosen’s findings that 
officers would do what their bosses want them to do and not necessarily what a culture 
asks of them. 
Constraints 
The final factor that can impact principal-agent motivation is constraints. While 
circumstances are the international and political context, Wilson describes constraints 
boundaries around motivations.  They are methods by which leaders can prevent shirking, 
on the one hand, or setting clear and objective standards to allow an unambiguous sense 
of mission, on the other. 28   It is entirely conceivable, and will be shown in the case 
studies, that when clear missions are delineated, moral motivations are constrained.  
However, as the principal-agent literature has shown, there can be multiple principals to 
an agent in any given situation.  One factor that must be considered here is that agencies 
outside the chain of command can constrain principal-agent motivations through the 
threat or possibility of sanction.  One such external organization that can constrain or 
bound motivations is the International Criminal Court.   
Military officers closely follow the debates surrounding international law and the 
ICC and discuss the possibilities of that organization constraining their actions. 29  Two 
                                                 
27 See Dan B. Wood, and Richard W. Waterman,  “The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation,” 
American Journal of Political Science (Vol. 37, No. 2, 1993), pp. 497-528. 
28 Wilson, Chapter 6. 
29 For example, see Charles Dunlap, “Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 
21st Century Conflicts,” Paper presented to the Humanitarian Challenges in Military Interventions 
Conference, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Washington, D.C., 29 November, 2001, 
pg. 4.  Dunlap argues that international law is being hijacked and used against the U.S. as a tool to limit 
valid military options and counter U.S. national interests.  He posits that foes of the U.S. “see this 
development [near real-time television broadcast of what appears to be a Law of Armed Conflict violation] 
as a vulnerability to be exploited. Lawfare, he argues, is a way to make it appear that the U.S. is waging 
war in violation of international law.  Additionally, Dunlap points out that General Hal Hornburg, 
Commander of Air Combat Command, noted that while lawyers are present in all combat situations to 
advise the commanders and planners, they “need to understand things bigger than just the law.  They’ve got 
to understand combat.” 
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faculty members of the Air Command and Staff College tap into this concern.  MacCuish 
and Ruby develop a scenario-based research paper in which a U.S. general officer is 
brought up on charges before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for orders he 
approved, based on his beliefs and interests, which would not have been punishable under 
the Uniformed Code of Military Justice.30  This paper examines the potential for principal 
and agent motivations being seriously misaligned due to orders being given that a 
principal considers just, but subordinates do not, and their disobedience springing from a 
constraining desire to not be put in front of the ICC.  
Another element of constraining principal and agent motivations is oversight.  
Senior officers, such as a Joint Force Commander, will always be in a position to monitor 
planners to ensure compliance with his directives.  Oversight by the general, however, is 
subject to the same motivations as those described here as affecting the planners.  No 
matter how much the senior leader is convinced that a target’s importance warrants 
higher levels of non-combatant casualties, the planner may still be concerned about ICC 
prosecution despite his belief that the target is worth the casualty risk.  In this respect, 
despite oversight from his direct boss, the planner may take into account other factors in 
the performance of his job and the information he presents to the general. 
So while there are constraints placed on all the principals and agents involved in 
the planning and conduct of military operations, those constraints form principal-agent 
motivations rather than act as variables in themselves.  In some situations, officers might 
be purely motivated by the desire to stay off the dock in the ICC, but in other situations, 
                                                 
30 Donald MacCuish and Tomislav Z. Ruby, “The International Criminal Court (ICC): Could American 
Military Officers be tried in the Hague?” Pew Case Studies in International Affairs. Washington, D.C. 
Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Case 270. 2003.  See also the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, http://www.constitution.org/mil/ucmj19970615.htm.  
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that concern is not a factor at all.  I shall show examples of these situations in the case 
studies presented in the following chapters.   
The bureaucratic politics literature, as well as examples of real-world situations 
shows us that beliefs and interests, context, and constraints affect alignment of principal-
agent motivations.  But that only forms one variable in this study.  The other variable that 
needs to be operationalized is doctrine.  Doctrine - and its two major components, 
structures, and processes - also impacts moral outcomes to military operations. 
 
Variable 2: Constraining Military Doctrine 
As mentioned previously, monitoring of agents by principals is costly and often 
ineffective.  Levels of discretion vary based on the expected alignment of principal and 
agent goals.  One area in which discretion seems to be both broad and constrained is in 
military doctrine.  For the purposes of this research, constraining doctrine comprises 
those structures and procedures that lead officers to develop strategies to achieve specific 
objectives set out by the President and Secretary of Defense.  If constraining doctrine is 
present in an operation and is followed then this variable will be considered present. 
Prior to discussing the operationalization of this variable, one brief analogy 
should illuminate doctrine and the level of discretion it affords.  If a businessman is asked 
to stop at the supermarket on his way home from work, he knows that, in his particular 
family, doctrine says that low cost is more important than brand name.  He knows that 
freshness is very important, but not necessarily at any cost.  He also knows that 2% milk 
is better for his family because of the lower fat content than whole milk.   
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This man knows that he may break with the best practices and principles 
(doctrine) of his family if there is an overriding reason to do so, but this discretion is 
balanced by the bounds of his family’s doctrine.  He does not need a list of which specific 
brand of milk to buy, and he knows that if he needs cream for tonight’s dinner, he may 
choose a fresher brand for a bit more money to achieve a better dinner result.   
Likewise, military leaders and planners do not need to be told which specific 
bombs to drop from which airplanes against which specific targets.  That is not doctrine.  
Doctrine provides a framework with ample discretion for agents to achieve the principals’ 
objectives.  But doctrine must be understood to be made up of two primary factors, 
structures within which principals and agents work and the processes they use to do their 
jobs.  The following sections cover how processes and procedures affect moral targeting 
decisions.  Chapter Four as well as the case studies expands upon this discussion with 
specific examples from U.S. military doctrine. 
Structures  
When considering the bureaucratic structures and their impact on the moral 
outcome of military operations, we must first bound the structures that can have an input 
on those outcomes.  It would be too narrow a study that merely considered the military 
bureaucratic structure within a joint staff.  To fully appreciate the magnitude of impact 
varying bureaucratic structures can have, we must first consider the vast number of 
different structures military planners and executors must coordinate and work with in 
their daily jobs.  
According to Allison, bureaucratic structures constrain behavior in that they are 
established and oriented those organizations “towards doing whatever they do.”  He gives 
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the example of the Chinese restaurant and how it is structured to achieve one particular 
end, namely, serving Chinese food.31  Likewise planning and execution bureaucracies in 
the military are established to perform specific tasks.  When you step outside those 
structures you step outside those constraints.  In Allison’s analogy, you cannot reasonably 
expect to order a hamburger or pizza at a Chinese restaurant.  Likewise, one should not 
expect planning and execution organizations to seamlessly coordinate with or take 
direction from organizations outside their established structure.  Yet this expectation 
often exists.  The moral outcomes of operations, therefore, cannot but vary from expected 
outcomes. 
On any given issue calling for military planning and execution, the planner on a 
CINC staff, in addition to coordinating within his own staff structure, will have to 
coordinate with the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, other CINC staffs, and his service 
component staffs on a wide range of issues from logistics to tactics.  There simply is not 
the expertise on every staff to handle all issues.  Therefore, a more federated planning 
approach is taken.  In addition, depending on the scope of the operations, the planner may 
also have to coordinate with the National Security Council staff, the State Department 
staff for his region, the NATO staff, multiple non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and private volunteer organizations (PVOs), as well as certain service staffs that are key 
to modern operations such as “Checkmate”32 and the “Skunkworks,”33 two Air Force 
divisions on the Air Staff in Washington.   
                                                 
31 Allison, pg. 145. 
32 “Checkmate” is the Current Operations Division of the Operations Directorate on the Air Staff; HQ 
USAF/XOOC. 
33 “Skunkworks” is the Strategy Division of the Plans Directorate on the Air Staff; HQ USAF/XOXS. 
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According to Allison, forcing these outside organizations to work with established 
structures, ones that were built without the “add-ons” for a reason, would be akin to 
improvisation, rather than orchestration.  He says that structures do not include people 
brought toge ther temporarily for a transient purpose.34  Thus, the very constraints that 
drive an organization to achieve the end for which it was established make it difficult to 
achieve evolving objectives in a dynamic environment.  This makes variation between 
the expected outcomes, and those that actually result, likely. 
The potential, thus, for missed or withheld information, leading to a greater risk to 
both combatants and non-combatants alike, is increased when the strategy that the ad hoc 
organization is tasked to develop requires full information.  This military example is one 
that McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast posit in civilian bureaucracy: “Structure and process 
determine the quantity, quality and completeness of available information and the extent 
to which policy decisions must be supported by this information.”35 
Another potential source of variation in moral decision-making based on doctrinal 
structure is the number of varying and diverse organizations within the established 
structures with which planners must coordinate.  For example, if the planners on the 
NATO staff in Mons, Belgium and the planners of the NATO Commander in Chief, 
Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) staff, were directed to support the NATO 
Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy, one could reasonably expect 
variation in moral decisions based on the differences in the bureaucratic structures.  As 
Allison posited, each organization specializes in what they are designed to do, and when 
                                                 
34 Allison, pg. 145. 
35 Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast.  “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,” in Virginia Law Review, (Vol. 75, 
1989), p.440. 
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multiple organizations are thrown together in a planning process that is not strictly 
followed, outcomes different from those expected by principals may result.  Even if the 
organizations have the true objectives in mind, they may not achieve the desired 
outcomes simply because of the different areas of emphasis they focus on based on their 
own niche. 
If the conflict was commanded and controlled out of the CAOC in Italy, with the 
NATO Supreme Commander in Belgium, and with planners and targeteers in 
Washington, D.C., England, Germany, Italy, and Belgium all trying to coordinate on the 
daily planning and subsequent execution of the war, the potential to miss the balance 
between necessity and proportionality could be very real.  When principals are not 
present to clarify guidance and they are not available except through telecommunications 
at set times, and if a process such as targeting is federated across multiple organizations 
in multiple countries and time zones, specific directives can be missed or overlooked 
leading to targeting decisions not vetted for proportionality by senior leaders.  Add to 
these diverse organizations input from the State Department, the National Security 
Council Staff, the NATO allies, and ad hoc groups, the coordination required to conduct 
the operation could become almost unmanageable, let alone a process that would ensure a 
moral balance between necessity and proportionality.   
Having considered the ways in which variations doctrinal structures can impact 
the moral outcome of military operations, I address the other element of this doctrinal 
variable.  Processes developed over time and deliberately designed to achieve certain 
purposes, such as moral conduct of operations, round out the important doctrine variable 
in this study. 
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Processes   
In his classic Inside Bureaucracy, Anthony Downs posits that structure and 
motivations aside, processes can be put in place to produce particular ends or induce 
particular behaviors, regardless of motivations.  He says that:  
Whenever there is no clear linkage between the nature of an action 
and its value or ultimate end, pressure arises for the development of 
formal rules to help individuals decide their behavior.  Formalized rules 
are efficient means of coordinating complex activities.  If no such rules 
existed, each bureau member could respond to any given situation in 
whatever manner appeared appropriate to him at that time.36  
 
Likewise, Allison states, “Like house thermostats, organizations rely on relatively 
prompt corrective actions to eliminate deviations between actual and preset, desired 
temperature” and the temperature outside.37  One can thus infer that when the Joint 
Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) deviates from their procedures, moral 
decisions can vary from the desired outcome.  Therefore, the DoD works to establish 
constraining doctrinal procedures with oversight to limit such deviation.  While moral 
decision-making has not traditionally been the primary concern, it has become more 
important over time.  Doctrinal procedures and oversight can help to ensure moral 
decisions are made. 
Given the wide possibilities of strategies, and hence outcomes, of operations, even 
within doctrinally defined procedures, how can the military planning and execution 
bureaucracy be steered into a direction to achieve moral outcomes?  As I mentioned in 
the previous section, law can influence individual motivations.  Staff Judge Advocates 
(military lawyers) are present on every planning staff and must advise commanders as 
                                                 
36 Downs, p. 59. 
37 Allison, pg. 152. 
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part of the planning process.  This insertion of lawyers into planning is what Charles 
Dunlap refers to as “Lawfare.” 38   
Dunlap contends that hyperlegalism within the planning and execution process 
works against the effective use of U.S. military power by constraining strategy, thus 
opening the U.S. to vulnerabilities by enemies that will hijack international law in the 
hopes the U.S. will not attack certain types of targets in order to prevent outcries from the 
international community.  In this case, both agents and principals lose control over the 
process and potentially the desired objectives that they plan and strategize to achieve.  
Such was a line of discussion of a panel at the Strategic Studies Institute-sponsored 
conference on Morality in Warfare in April 2001 at the Army War College. 
On the other hand, there exists within the doctrinal process the opportunity for 
sabotage of the objectives by officers within the planning and execution bureaucracy.  
Brehm and Gates note that sabotage is an overlooked, yet significant phenomenon in 
which subordinates prevent particular objectives from being achieved.39  Examples could 
be pilots refusing to drop bombs on certain targets they deem unnecessary, or planners 
inserting targets that were not vetted by senior leaders that the planners think are 
important.  On the other hand, Brehm and Gates point out that when the principals 
become concerned enough about a process, regardless of the reason, oversight of the 
process becomes more stringent, and their desired outcomes become more likely. 
Downs points out “many decisions of bureaus covered by formal rules involve 
interactions with people outside the bureau.  If no formalized rules governed such 
decisions, the bureau’s response to similar conditions might be quite different for 
                                                 
38 Dunlap, pp. 4-6. 
39 John Brehm and Scott Gates, Working, Shirking and Sabotage (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1999), pg., 28.  
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different clients.  The less the importance of the decisions involved, the more likely they 
are to be handled by rules rather than by explicit review of high authorities.”40  Likewise 
doctrine established processes for formal coordination between various staff elements and 
command levels to achieve given national and military objectives.  When followed, it is 
more likely that moral targeting decisions will result and the military will not have to 
“mitigate potentially undesirable consequences resulting from the outcome of those 
operations.”41 
 Having defined my variables and described how they affect moral decision-
making, I next outline the design by which I conduct my research and determine the 
effect of these variables in actual case studies of U.S. military action. 
 
Research Design 
 
In this dissertation, I determine whether two independent variables, constraining 
doctrine, and aligned principal-agent motivations, account for variations in moral 
targeting decisions in American military operations.  I use Frendreis’s most-similar 
research design for this dissertation.  Frendreis posits that case studies are best used when 
you have a small number of cases on one or all the variables.  Frendreis recommends that 
in the most similar design, control variable(s) do not vary across cases.42   
In this dissertation, I study three cases of American conflict: Desert Storm (the 
First Gulf War), Allied Force (the Air War Over Serbia), and the Global War on 
                                                 
40 Downs, pp. 59-60. 
41 Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 
D.C., 17 January 2002.  
42 John Frendreis, “Explanation of Variation and Detection of Covariation: The Purpose and Logic of 
Comparative Analysis,” Comparative Political Studies (Vol. 16, No. 2, July 1983), pp. 255-272. 
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Terrorism (to include only the overseas operations against Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
Second Gulf War).  While some observers might argue that Afghanistan and Iraq should 
be separated because they are different types of operations, I decided to keep them 
together in a single case for several reasons.  First, the U.S. military considers them both 
campaigns within a single global war on terrorism.  Second, the key planning staff 
officers planned both operations.  Finally, a single joint force commander determined the 
proportionality-necessity decision for all pre-planned targets for both operations. 
I chose these three particular conflicts as cases for the following reasons.  First, 
the international environment is similar for all three conflicts: the Cold War is over; the 
U.S. is the overwhelming military and economic power; while arguing that interests were 
definitely at stake, U.S. vital national survival interests were not threatened; the U.S. led 
international coalitions in each conflict.  Second, all three of these conflicts were fought 
under the military structure established under Goldwater-Nichols in 1986 meaning that 
the legal and doctrinal hierarchy and command framework were common for all three 
conflicts, eliminating the possibility of structural change as a variable.  There have been 
other deployments and conflicts during this time, but these cases constituted major 
employment of U.S. force in response to major international crises.   
Third, there is a general constant in many of the officers involved in all three 
operations: given the 12 year time between the first and third case, a large number of the 
military actors partic ipated in all three conflicts. Many officers who were the primary 
war-fighters as Captains and Majors in Desert Storm participated in Allied Force as 
planners and executors and are now commanders or senior planners in the War on 
Terrorism.  The same partic ipants should see different outcomes based on variation in the 
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variables. Finally, there is a great deal of primary source information available on the 
processes (doctrinal or not) used in the planning and execution of these operations as well 
as the factors influencing bureaucratic motivations of the primary participants.   
The US, as the primary superpower in the world, can normatively affect what 
other states do in their own military operations.  Thus, if the U.S. acts morally, there is a 
strong precedent set for similar operations by other countries.43 Furthermore, I chose to 
study the U.S. military for two other primary reasons.  First, I am studying situations in 
which there is a military-civilian bureaucratic hierarchy that makes decisions in war.  
Certainly the U.S. is not the only country in which such a hierarchy exists, but it does 
exist, and is well accepted as a stable bureaucracy.  Second, I chose to study the U.S. 
military, and the Air Force in particular, due to the availability of data for each of my 
cases, as well as the fact that the air forces, due to technology and political decisions, 
have been the primary combat elements employing weapons in the vicinity of 
noncombatants since 1991.  Finally, by limiting the research to variation between 
conflicts involving the US, I remove the possibility of an external national culture 
variable potentially affecting the outcomes between different countries. 
One potential problem with the design of this research is the fact that the cases 
may not be conditionally independent due to temporal dependence.  This means that it is 
possible that what was learned from these variables in one conflict might impact the 
dependent variable in the next case.  If all three conflicts were conducted at the same time 
with different countries at war, then the research design could more accurately determine 
                                                 
43 See Joanne Gowa, “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for 
Hegemonic Stability Theory?” World Politics (Vol. 41, 1989), pp. 307-324, and Michael C. Webb and 
Stephen Krasner, “Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment,” Review Of International 
Studies (Vol. 15, 1989), pp. 183-198, for a discussion of hegemonic stability theory and the influence of a 
hegemonic state on others in the international community. 
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the outcome variable independently from case to case.  But the fact that wars take place 
in temporal succession makes this a design issue that I cannot isolate and control for.  
However, this issue with the design is common to many such qualitative case studies and 
must be accepted here due to the nature of the issue researched and inability to conduct 
detailed quantitative analysis on internalization of moral norms in the military 
bureaucracy during the period of my research.  
One other issue that is not controlled for in this study is the potential socialization 
of the officer corps to make moral decisions.  I did not attempt to control for this factor 
because I contend tha t although the U.S. military actively tries to socialize its officers to 
make the right decisions for various reasons, such as wanting to avoid international 
incidents, wanting to avoid defending officers in court, and simple economy of force, any 
socialization to norms impacts the variable of motivational alignment, but is not strong 
enough to make a difference on its own. 
 The results of these case studies indicate that during Desert Storm, moral 
targeting decisions were not consistently made.  There was not established doctrine that 
constrained planners and executors to specifically link military operations to national 
objectives.  Furthermore, principal-agent motivations were not necessarily aligned to 
achieve those ends.  During Allied Force, moral targeting decisions were also not 
consistently made.  Sound doctrine did exist, but principal-agent motivations were not 
necessarily congruent with national objectives.  However, in operations against 
Afghanistan and Iraq, moral targeting decisions were made.  Sound doctrine constrained 
planners and executors to conduct operations only so as to achieve national objectives.  
At the same time, principal-agent motivations supported the achievement of moral 
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decisions.  Thus, with sufficient variation across the independent variables, I am able to 
discern variation on the dependent variable in a methodologically sound manner. 
 
The cases can be seen to fall into a simple 2 X 2 matrix of variables as shown. 
Table 3.1, Case Study Matrix 
No Constraining Doctrine and Principal-Agent 
Motivations Not Aligned è   
 
Not Moral Targeting Decision 
 
No Constraining Doctrine and Aligned Principal -
Agent Motivations è  
 
Not Moral Targeting Decision 
 
Constraining Doctrine but Principal-Agent 
Motivations Not Aligned è  
 
Not Moral Targeting Decision 
 
Constraining Doctrine and Aligned Principal-
Agent Motivations è  
 
Moral Targeting Decision  
 
Sources   
For Desert Storm and Allied Force, there are available numerous well-researched 
papers that deal with the variables of this dissertation.  In addition to these journal 
articles, Gordon and Trainor44, have written about various aspects of decision-making in 
Desert Storm, and I synthesize their research in this dissertation.  For the Desert Storm 
case, I rely heavily on the Air Force Historical Research Agency, which maintains 
complete transcripts of official Air Force research interviews with the key participants 
(planners, and commanders) of that operation conducted by professional historians 
shortly after the end of that war.  Furthermore, as a participant-observer in Desert Storm, 
I draw upon my own experience as the chief mission-planner at a multi-squadron, multi-
national fighter wing that attacked surface targets daily during the war. 
                                                 
44 Michael R. Gordon, and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War, 1995, Boston: Back Bay 
Books. 
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For the Allied Force case study, I use journal articles, open source interviews with 
key military and civilian leaders of the operation, and primary source memoranda and 
studies from the Air Force.  During Allied Force, I was assigned to the Headquarters Air 
Force Doctrine Center, and was given permission by the commander and vice-
commander to use unclassified internal correspondence and reports for this research 
project.  A Government Accounting Office report on doctrinal lapses in Allied Force is 
another key source document.  Furthermore, I have the unclassified notes taken by the 
Chief of Targets Intelligence for NATO during the operation, as well as personal 
observations of several planners and flyers who participated in this conflict. 
For the War on Terror, since it is ongoing at the time of this research, the volume 
of source material will necessarily be less developed than the previous two operations.  
However, I have had access to several key participants that I interviewed in research 
visits and over the telephone.  Some of these participants are the Chief of Target 
Development at U.S. Central Command (the Unified Command with responsibility for 
prosecuting the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq), the director of Intelligence at Air Force 
Special Operations Command, a member of the Strategy Planning Council in the 
Pentagon, members of Checkmate, the Air Force contingency planners in the Pentagon, 
as well as field grade officers at the Air Operations Center in the Persian Gulf region and 
forward controllers in Iraq.  In addition to these primary sources, I refer to several 
briefings presented to various commanders and policy-makers in the DoD.   
Some might argue that it is best to wait until after the present operations are 
completed before including them in as case studies for measuring these variables.  
However, I believe it would have been irresponsible to ignore available data merely to 
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wait for these conflicts to conclude.  Most importantly, the volume of available data is 
not as important as the quality of data.  In this dissertation, I am most interested in the 
pre-planned targeting decisions.  For the War on Terror case, I have sound sources that 
describe these decisions very credibly. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In 1995, President Clinton found out that as the senior-most principal in the U.S. 
government, he did not have the complete control he thought he had with respect to 
deploying forces to Bosnia for the NATO and UN Peacekeeping missions.  He told the 
Secretary and Assistant Secretary of State that he would decide if and when to deploy 
U.S. forces overseas.  They replied that the DoD and NATO bureaucracies, both civilian 
and military, had designed and approved plans, in his name, that would automatically 
deploy U.S. forces if certain trigger events occurred.  The principal-agent motivations 
and objectives of the Pentagon senior leaders, the State Department leadership, foreign 
governments, and the President all differed.  Yet this international plan was in place and 
was executed despite the different preferences by the actors.45  If this was the case in a 
peace-keeping deployment, imagine the potential moral issues that could result if this 
occurred in combat operations. 
 Downs points out: 
The very nature of large organizations creates a number of 
obstacles that prevent efficient spontaneous coordination.  These 
obstacles fall into two major categories: conflicts of interest and 
technical limitations.  Conflicts of interest spring from differences in 
the explicit goals officials pursue, and in their modes of perceiving 
                                                 
45 Allison, pg. 275. 
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reality.  Technical limitations occur because each person has limited 
capacity for knowledge and information. 46 
 
 
It is critical that both the senior decision makers who set and define the national 
interests, as well as the planners and executors who plan and carry out operations to 
achieve them desire moral outcomes, with respect to proportionality and necessity.  If the 
motivations of those who set national objectives are in line with those who translate those 
objectives into strategies, as well as with those charged to carry out those strategies, it is 
likely the outcome will be deemed moral.  However, the fact that there are multiple 
agents in multiple layers of command that can have varying motivations almost ensures 
that somewhere in the process, planners and/or executors will not be in agreement with 
the political and senior military decision-makers.   
For those reasons, doctrinal structures and procedures are established to constrain 
discretion and ensure outcomes are in line with set objectives.  Note that nowhere in U.S. 
joint doctrine nor in Air Force doctrine are planners told to make moral decisions. 
Doctrine tells them the best way to plan strategies to achieve national objectives.   
Specifically, the Joint Force Commander may limit or restrict action against 
certain targets based on political cons iderations, military risk, the Law of Armed 
Conflict, Rules of Engagement (ROE).47 How does he make that determination?  Joint 
Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, says the Joint Force Commander must 
take into account the Law of Armed Conflict.  It specifically mentions, among other 
issues to consider necessity and proportionality.  The document says that “Under no 
circumstances would military necessity authorize actions specifically prohibited by 
                                                 
46 Downs, p. 50. 
47 Joint Pub 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting (Washington: CJCS, 2002), pg. III-2. 
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LOAC such as…the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians.”  Furthermore, the pub 
says “the principle of proportionality prohibits occurrence of collateral civilian casualties 
so excessive in nature when compared to the expected military advantage to be gained as 
to be tantamount to the intentional attack of civilians, or to a wonton disregard for the 
safety of the civilian population.”48  However, the Joint Pub does not go so far as to tell 
the commander how to weigh that proportionality and necessity. 
That specific process, within the doctrinally established structures, produces those 
moral decisions when principal and agent motivations are aligned.  The falsifiability test 
for my theory and model would be met if doctrine was followed and principals and 
agents aligned their motivations to specifically decide on immoral actions.  However, my 
theory contends that such an end is highly unlikely when principals and agents work to 
align their motivations and when planners follow doctrine. 
Some spurious possibilities also exist.  It would be possible that, despite a moral 
decision on proportionality-necessity, an accident, such as a weapons malfunction, causes 
a different outcome.  Also, if the senior decision maker does not make a proportionality-
necessity decision, it may still be possible for the planning and execution bureaucracy to 
rectify that lack of decision through set structures and procedures to achieve a moral 
outcome.  On the other hand, if the senior leader does not make the moral balance 
decision, and the bureaucracy does not follow procedures within established structures, 
then a moral outcome cannot be guaranteed.  The case studies that follow should shed 
light on these issues and show how variations occur. 
However, before presenting the case studies, I discuss in the next chapter the 
lengths to which the Defense Department goes to professionalize the officer corps and to 
                                                 
48 JP 3-60, pg. A-1. 
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assure moral motivations. That chapter will also detail the established doctrinal processes 
and structures that will serve as the baseline for understanding and discerning variance in 
the three case studies that follow.
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Chapter Four 
 
Controlling The Environment: Shaping Values And Processes In The U.S. Military 
Officer Corps For Planning And Execution Of Military Operations  
 
 
Having established a theory that posits principal-agent motivations and doctrine 
as the primary determinants to moral targeting decisions in U.S. combat operations, it is 
appropriate to discuss the methods the American military and national civilian leadership 
use to shape the motivations of military planners and combatants as well as the doctrinal 
processes and structures that guide combat planning and operations.  In this brief chapter, 
I first discuss some steps the military, particularly the Air Force, uses to educate its 
officer corps on moral norms a well as methods of increasing professionalization, which 
the bureaucratic literature tells us decreases shirking.  I then discuss the present state of 
doctrine and the formalized structures within which planning and execution are supposed 
to take place and processes that are supposed to be followed. 
 
Influencing Bureaucratic Motivations  
Downs and Wilson, as well as Brehm and Gates discuss the importance of 
motivations such as professional norms in limiting goal conflict between principals and 
agents and thus making easier the control of bureaucracy. 1  Brehm and Gates show that 
for police officers, the culture of shirking and obedience varies from city to city and from 
external circumstance to circumstance.  Most importantly, they claim, is the very strong 
finding that professionalism affects shirking.  Brehm and Gates find that the most 
                                                 
1 See Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, New York: Little-Brown and Company, 1967, James Q. 
Wilson, Bureaucracy.  New York: Basic Books, 1989, and John Brehm and Scott Gates, “Donut Shops and 
Speed Traps: Evaluating Models of Supervision of Police Behavior,” American Journal of Political Science 
(Vol. 27, No. 2, 1993), pp. 555-81. 
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professional police officers shirk 46% less than the average policeman.  And policemen 
that dislike their jobs shirk 20% more than average.2  The U.S. military obviously 
understands the issue of professionalism and principal-agent relationships as is evidenced 
by the continuing professionalization of the officer corps. 
The military services use both peer expectations and professional military 
education to enhance professionalism.  Within the U.S. Air Force, peer expectations are a 
consistent motivator for excellence.  In fighter squadrons throughout the Air Force, every 
pilot’s scores on training events such as bombing accuracy and gunnery rankings are 
posted for all to see.  In the culture of the Combat Air Forces (CAF)3, peer evaluation and 
ranking is important for motivating officers to maintain a keen fighting edge.  Fliers need 
to know that their wingmen will always be there and will be competent enough to 
accomplish the tasked mission no matter how difficult it is to find the target and how 
rough the defenses surrounding that target.  However, peer expectations are not 
systematic motivators to perform well and obey commanders.  A more formal method to 
instill professionalism is the system of professional military education within the 
services. 
The system of Professional Military Education (PME) that exists in its present 
form was formalized by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Re-organization Act of 1986.  
Each service runs a three-tiered system of officer education consisting of schools for 
junior officers, intermediate service schools for field grade officers (command and staff 
colleges) and senior service schools (war colleges).  While all the schools differ 
somewhat in their specific course offerings, all meet a standard of instruction set by the 
                                                 
2 Brehm and Gates, 1993, pp 574-575. 
3 That subset of the Air Force which carries out offensive and defensive combat missions. 
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  For example, the Air Command and Staff College 
(ACSC) curriculum, accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, 
offers professional seminar courses in three broad primary areas: leadership and 
command, national and international security studies, and national military planning and 
execution processes.     
Within the curricula of these PME schools, besides studying national security 
processes and international relations, the schools also educate and annually refresh all 
military personnel on the Code of Conduct, as well as the Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC).4  Air Force Major Gerald Swift, in a research paper for the Air Command and 
Staff College, details the extent to which the DoD educates its officers on this issue in 
order to motivate them towards proper behavior in the planning and conduct of 
operations.5 
Swift notes that the Department of Defense has institutionalized Law of War 
training in the services through DoD Directive Number 5100.77, DoD Law of War 
Program.  This directive is meant to ensure that DoD components: observe the law of 
war obligations, implement programs to prevent violations, and provide for reporting and 
investigating violations.  Each Military Department Secretary is responsible for ensuring 
that “the principles and rules of the law of war will be known to members of their 
respective Departments, the extent that such knowledge be commensurate with each 
individual’s duties and responsibilities.”6 Whether for the purpose of encouraging their 
                                                 
4 Examples of LOAC training can be found at: 
http://www.offutt.af.mil/55thWing/55JA/Briefings/loac/HISTORY.HTM, 
http://www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/ja/briefings/LOAC.ppt.  
5 Major Gerald Swift, “The Teaching of Morality in Warfighting in Today’s Officer Corps,” Air Command 
and Staff College, Montgomery, Alabama, research paper, 10 April 2001. 
6 Swift, pg. 5. 
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officers to internalize norms, or to make them understand the consequences of their 
actions, the services are trying to influence the bureaucratic motivation of planners and 
executors. 
As an example of how one service affects motivations by implementing this 
directive, I will summarize the Air Force’s program.  Law of Armed Conflict training in 
the Air Force is structured to comply with the DoD directive.  Air Force Policy Directive 
51-4 mandates that “all commanders make sure their people are trained in the principles 
and rules of LOAC needed to carry out their duties and responsibilities” at least 
annually.7  The directive states that, as a minimum, instruction must include “training 
required by the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims and the 
Hague Convention IV of 1907, including annexes.”8  Furthermore, Air Force Instruction 
51-401 assigns Air University the additional responsibility to “include instruction on 
LOAC in Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, Squadron Officer School, 
Reserve Officer Training Corps, and Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy 
curricula to ensure adequate knowledge of the subject commensurate with the nature of 
each enrollee’s duties and responsibilities.”9  This example is representative of like 
education in all services. 
Although the curricula of the professional military education offerings in morality 
and ethics is not standardized among the service war colleges or command and staff 
colleges, the education does occur consistently from junior to senior level at all schools.  
While some schools offer electives in morality and warfare, others include specific 
                                                 
7 Air Force Policy Directive 51-4, Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict, Headquarters U. S. Air 
Force, 26 April 1993, pg. 1. 
8 AFPD 51-4, pg. 1. 
9 Swift, pg. 6. 
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lessons on these topics in their core courses.  The Army War College even conducts an 
annual mock war crimes tribunal against World War II Air Force General Carl Spaatz for 
the decisions to firebomb Dresden and Hamburg with senior officer students sitting in 
judgment.10   
Besides teaching officers the legal side to moral issues surrounding planning and 
executing combat operations, the courses go further.  Some specifically emphasize 
feedback to the higher levels of leadership requesting clarification or making 
recommendations.  In various war gaming exercises at the Air Command and Staff 
College, objectives given by the President and SecDef are purposely made vague or 
unclear or even contradictory to reinforce in the officers the need to request clarification 
from senior leadership.11  Furthermore a major learning point that the schools try to instill 
in the officers is that even with clear and unambiguous objectives, the possible strategies 
to achieve those objectives vary tremendously.  Therefore, if they accept unclear or vague 
objectives without questioning them or making recommendations to senior leadership, 
the possible strategies become nearly infinite and open the greater possibility for 
unlawful actions. 
The point is that DoD considers the subject important enough to teach Law of 
Armed Conflict to officers and enlisted personnel at least annually and then more 
rigorously in their professional education, whether to ingrain as a belief or to deter non-
compliance.  It is no longer acceptable for the serviceman to say, as did King Henry V’s 
men “We know enough if we know we are the King’s men.  Our obedience to the King 
                                                 
10 Swift, pp. 7-13. 
11 The Joint Planning Exercise is the practical exercise at the end of the Joint Campaign Planning Course, 
and the Aerospace Exercise (AeroEx) is the culmination, or capstone, course at ACSC. 
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wipes the crime of it out of us.”12  But beyond countering potentially non-aligned 
motivations with education on Laws of War, the Department of Defense also deals with 
potential variations in moral outcomes by establishing structures and procedures for 
planning and conducting combat operations. 
If professionalization was the sole answer to the issue of bureaucratic shirking, 
principals would not need to establish processes and structures.  Terry Moe showed a 
comprehensiveness of relationships between multiple principals and agents in civilian 
bureaucracy that parallels the military process.13  Planners and executors are influenced 
by the President, their CINC, their own commander, their peers, professional norms, and 
their PME, among others.  Those influences run concurrently and do not necessarily 
align, so there are instated structures and procedures to regulate agent actions. 
  McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast posit that deviations by the agency (in this case 
the military planning bureaucracy) from the outcomes intended by principals (in this case 
the President, SecDef, and Congress) are difficult to punish after the fact, and therefore 
they establish strict procedural rules to achieve those outcomes.14  In the following 
section, I will describe the doctrinal processes by which DoD attempts to control and 
direct the conduct of operations, and how that relates to moral decision-making.  I will 
then introduce examples of variation in following processes that will be covered in 
greater detail later in this dissertation in the case studies. 
 
                                                 
12 Walzer, pg. 39 
13 See Terry Moe, “Control and feedback  in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB,” American 
Political Science Review (Vol. 79, No. 4, Dec 1985), pp.1094-1116. 
14 Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,” Virginia Law Review (Vol. 75, 1989), 
pg. 443. 
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Control Through Doctrinal Processes 
As if in response to Downs, the DoD and services have put into place elaborate 
systems of processes to ensure particular outcomes, not the least of which is a moral 
conduct of operations.  Many of these processes carry the weight of service or joint 
doctrine, which both the joint publications and service doctrine documents such as Air 
Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, say are authoritative, but not 
directive.15  This means that although each situation is contextually different and 
commanders and planners must take into account that context, the doctrine should be 
followed unless there is strong cause to disregard it.  In the following paragraphs, I will 
outline the doctrinal planning processes for both deliberate planning and crisis action 
planning as described in Joint Pub 5-0, AFDD 2, and AFDD 2-1. 16  These processes are 
designed to achieve particular outcomes, as Downs notes, despite potential individual or 
organizational motivations to the contrary. 
When planning military operations, orders from the President and Secretary of 
Defense are passed on to the planners with specific directions for the planning process 
and desired end state.  In the template for Joint Doctrine-directed orders issued on behalf 
of the President and Secretary of Defense, the first items to be specified are the tasked 
organizations, their specific relationships (such as who is supporting and who is 
supported), and directions for coordinating among themselves.  The following paragraphs 
summarize what Joint Doctrine says a military staff structure should look like. 
                                                 
15 See Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine For Joint Operations, 10 Sep 2001, pg. i, and Air Force Doctrine Document 
1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, September 1997, pg. v. 
16 See Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, Joint Publication 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, Air Force 
Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2 Organization and Employment of Aerospace Forces, Air Force Doctrine 
Document 2-1 Air Warfare. 
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Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) provides doctrine 
and policy for unified direction of the U.S. armed forces, defines command relationships 
and chains of command, and provides policy and doctrine for establishing joint 
commands and their staffs.  It outlines the basic formation of a joint force with a 
commander and a mixture of subordinate joint task forces, service, and/or functional 
components.  It also lays out the doctrinal staff that a joint force commander should 
consider establishing, but allows for the commander to deviate for operational 
necessity. 17   
Doctrinally, each staff should have the following divisions: Manpower and 
Personnel (J-1), Intelligence (J-2), Operations (J-3), Logistics (J-4), Plans and Policy (J-
5), and Command Control, Communications and Computers (J-6) under the direction of a 
Chief of Staff.18  One potential variation comes into play when some staffs combine their 
planning and operations functions, which some officers believe burdens the staff officers 
and raises the likelihood that some functions will be missed or not accomplished as well 
as if they were separated.  A larger variation in outcomes can occur when ad hoc 
organizational structures are established that are not in line with doctrinal norms.  In such 
instances, officers on staffs responsible for coordinating planning or execution functions 
that do not know about the ad hoc structures may miss an important step in the 
coordination process.  They may also get unwittingly involved in “turf battles” over 
important issues.   
Two phases of national military planning, namely deliberate planning and crisis 
action planning, are established in U.S. joint doctrine with detailed procedures listed for 
                                                 
17See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) , 
10 July 2001. 
18 UNAAF, pp. V-14-15.  
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each.  Both are relevant to my model and theory in that these are the specific doctrinal 
procedures that, if followed, should lead to moral decision-making prior to and during 
war.  Deliberate planning is a peacetime process by which combatant commanders turn 
guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense into an executable plan in a 
continuously updated and collaborative cycle that takes 18-24 months.19   
Desert Storm and the Iraqi campaign in the War on Terror were based on 
deliberate plans that were “on the books” at U.S. Central Command.  From a bureaucratic 
theory standpoint, it would seem that the deliberate planning process is designed to limit 
bureaucratic discretion (in his case by the planning bureaucracy – the Joint Strategic 
Planning System (JSPS)) because of the strict procedural guidelines established in joint 
doctrine that are rigidly enforced by the Secretary of Defense.  Let me review those 
procedural guidelines. 
Deliberate Planning.  The Deliberate Planning Process contains five distinct 
phases, each with specific milestones, responsibilities, and coordination required.  Those 
phases are initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and 
supporting plans development.20  Each phase comprises multiple steps requiring 
coordination between the regional combatant commander staffs and outside, supporting 
players. As the tasked CINC (through his staff) accomplishes each specific step in the 
process, that step is reviewed and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
with advice and input from his Joint Staff.  The Chairman, as the principal advisor to the 
SecDef and President acts on their behalf to ensure the process runs on schedule and 
                                                 
19 Joint Pub 5-0, Chapter III, Section B. 
20 Joint Pub 5-0, p. III-4. 
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fulfills the principals’ intent.  At the end of the process, the completed plan is approved 
by the SecDef.   
As this process consumes countless hours of time and resources among the 
supported staffs and all the supporting staffs, it is in the planning bureaucracy’s interest 
to produce a plan that will be approved by the principals.  On the other hand, planners 
work to protect their own interests and desires.  This can result in requests for changes to 
the guidance, or variations in strategies to achieve the desired ends.  In this respect, 
motivations and structures come into play despite strict procedures to affect outcomes.  It 
is the long-term nature of the deliberate planning process that should ensure the 
development of plans that would result in moral outcomes.  However, the international 
environment does not necessarily allow for long-term development of plans.  Therefore, 
just as U.S. military doctrine establishes a strict process for deliberate planning of 
foreseen long-range potentialities, there is also a planning procedure for near-term crises. 
Crisis Action Planning.  Crisis Action Planning (CAP) uses established 
“procedures to adjust or implement previously prepared joint operations plans, or to 
develop and execute Operations Orders where no useful plan exists for the evolving 
crisis.”21  Unlike deliberate planning, CAP is governed by an actual, evolving 
geopolitical context. Additionally, rather than 18-24 month planning cycle, CAP is 
expected to be accomplished in hours or days.   
CAP can be thought of as a tennis match where the responsibility moves from 
combatant commander and his staff to the CJCS and his staff and then back again to the 
field.  The CAP phases are situation development, crisis assessment, course of action 
                                                 
21 Joint Pub 5-0, pg. III-9. 
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development, course of action selection, execution planning, and execution. 22  The key 
point to take away is that while the process is doctrinally defined, each step is open to 
being affected by the motivations of the multiple bureaucratic players, as well as the 
multiple senior leaders involved.   
Deviations from the defined process can cause significant variations in moral 
outcomes to operations.  For example, an Operations Order (OPORD) is required to be 
issued by the commander responsible for the operation “for the purpose of effecting the 
coordinated execution of an operation.”23 If it is not issued, that coordination required to 
execute operations, such as defining support relationships and accession of command, 
will likely be absent.   
These detailed processes for planning operations shows that the military desires to 
prevent recurrent instances of straying outside established procedures and structures 
which can lead to uncertain outcomes.  In this effort, the military expends considerable 
effort to ensure that commanders as well as officers on planning staffs and key 
organizations are taught crisis action planning at Professional Military Education courses.  
For example, a lesson on CAP taught at the Air Command and Staff College 
(Montgomery, Alabama) to the top field grade U.S. and foreign officers states the 
following rationale for knowing the process of CAP:   
     Many ignore Crisis Action Planning procedures until a crisis 
occurs, then “look them up” once they need them.  Perhaps we feel 
that we do our best work “on the fly” or “inventing as we go 
along.”  While imagination and innovation are valuable skills when 
planning for any contingency, graduates of Phase I JPME at the 
staff college level are expected to be well-versed in planning 
                                                 
22 Joint Pub 5-0, pg. III-11. 
23 Joint Pub 5-0, pg. GL-10. 
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procedures—the other members of your joint team won’t have 
time to teach you this information in a crisis.24 
 
 
Military officers are told to “analyze national security and military strategic 
direction as well as appropriate guidance in alliance and coalition directions, including 
long- and short-term objectives for conflict termination.”25  That springs from direction in 
Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning which states in bold lettering: “When objectives 
are unclear or ambiguous, the combatant commander or subordinate joint force 
commander must seek clarification and convey the impact, both positive and 
negative, of continued ambiguity with the NCA [National Command Authorities].”26  
And because the staff, not the commander himself, develops the plan it is all the more 
important to request clarification. While some might argue that conveying to the 
President and Secretary of Defense what the commander believes to be the “impact of 
ambiguity” inserts the military into a political decision-making process, such is their 
respons ibility as combatant commanders as defined in law. 27 
Perhaps the most important document in the process of making a moral targeting 
decision is Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting.  This publication 
describes the structures and procedures that result in the best practices and principles of 
targeting.  Targeting is “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the 
appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and 
                                                 
24 Air Command and Staff College, Joint Campaign Planning Course, Lesson JP-513, Teaching Plan, 2001, 
pg. 4.  
25 Air Command and Staff College, Joint Campaign Planning Course Teaching Plan, Lesson JP-509, pg.7. 
26 Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning  (Washington: CJCS, 2002), pg. II-3. 
27 The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 states that combatant commanders have a responsibility to advise 
the President in addition to commanding forces in their theaters. 
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capabilities.”28  Nowhere does the definition of targeting mention morality or 
proportionality, but it does discuss economy of force and achieving objectives.  The best 
way to do that is through the establishment of a Joint Targeting Coordination Board 
(JTCB) which the publication says should be established to unify the effort of planning.   
But is the process of making moral targeting decisions as easy as saying “make it 
so” and have those principles followed?  The following case studies show it is not.  While 
the definition of targeting does not include words about proportionality and necessity, the 
Joint Targeting Pub does discuss those principles and exhorts officers to consider them in 
making their targeting decisions.  Furthermore, JP 3-60 leaves this responsibility in the 
hands of the JTCB members (and ultimately with the Joint Force Commander himself 
when he approves the target list) and leaves the discretion to the JFC to make that 
balance.  In my model, this is the lowest level at which the decision should be made, and 
if it is, I consider it a moral decision.  But once again, there is wide latitude afforded that 
commander in determining what is necessary and what is proportional. 
In the wake of NATO’s air war against Yugoslavia, during which time national 
leaders from the many NATO countries delved deeply into the planning process by 
selecting targets and overruling military decisions on targeting, many leaders within the 
services decided to not repeat the same mistakes in future conflicts.  Six months after 
Operation Allied Force, the U.S. Air Force held an unpublicized summit of 4-Star 
generals and key subordinate general officers in January 2000, to discuss the deviations 
from doctrine that occurred during the Yugoslav war.29   
                                                 
28 Joint Pub 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting (Washington: CJCS, 2002), pg. I-2. 
29 Author was a member of the Air Force Doctrine Center and participant in the planning of the summit to 
include topics and issues for general officers to address. 
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The first goal of the summit was a review by AF senior leadership of the conduct 
of the war and a call for generals to explain their deviations from doctrinal structures and 
procedures.  The second was to show a consensus on the importance of following 
doctrine in the future in order to avoid moral issues and the poor publicity that comes 
with it.   Such a summit reinforces Brehm’s and Gates’ contention that supervisors cannot 
know their subordinates’ true preferences; they can only monitor actions.30  Hence the 
desire to attempt effective control through establishment and oversight of structures and 
procedures is necessary. 
These examples of the military attempting to deal with individual and 
bureaucratic motivations through teaching standards of conduct and defining structures 
and procedures for planning and carrying out operations show that the military believes 
them necessary to achieve certain outcomes.  These examples of teaching Law of Armed 
Conflict and standards of conduct were consistent throughout the period of the cases 
studied.  But did these doctrinal procedures and annual refresher courses in Laws of War 
lead to moral targeting decisions in combat?  The following comparative cases study the 
effects of variation in motivations and doctrine on the morality of military outcomes. 
                                                 
30 John Brehm and Scott Gates, Working, Shirking and Sabotage, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997, pg. 19. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Desert Storm Case Study: 
Morality Meets Precision and the First Live Media War 
 
We have got to review things to make sure we're not bombing just 
for the sake of indiscriminate bombing. – General Colin Powell, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff1 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Given a theory in which constraining doctrine and aligned principal-agent 
motivations affect moral outcomes in military operations, I seek to determine in this 
chapter whether events in Operation Desert Storm2 confirm my model.  I define as moral 
those decisions in which the non-combatant and combatant casualty rates are reasonably 
expected to be proportional to the necessity of any given objective issued by military 
(joint force commander or above) or civilian (President and Secretary of Defense) 
leadership.  Furthermore, to be considered a moral outcome, for accountability purposes, 
I contend that the proportionality-necessity balance decision must be made at the level of 
Joint Force Commander, or higher, for each objective or target where foreseeable non-
combatant casualties are likely.3   
In Desert Storm, despite the low level of casualties compared to previous wars, 
the proportionality-necessity balance was not made according to my model.  Doctrine at 
                                                 
1 William M. Arkin, “Baghdad: The Urban Sanctuary in Desert Storm,” Airpower Journal, 11, 1, Winter 
1997, pg. 4. 
2 For the purposes of this chapter the dates for this operation are August 1990 to March 1991.  Although 
combat operations did not begin until January 1991, planning for the operation began in August 1990. 
3 See Jeffrey Gingras and Tomislav Ruby, “Morality in Modern Aerial Warfare,” Joint Forces Quarterly 
(Summer 2000), pg. 111. 
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the time of the war was not adequate, either structurally or procedurally, and principal-
agent motivations did not necessarily align prior to and during the war. 
During Operation Desert Storm, the American people watched in rapt attention, 
many during all their waking hours, newscasts coming from the Middle Eastern deserts.  
People saw a war seemingly fought with precision, almost sanitary in its cleanliness. 
Bombs fell into elevator shafts or through specific windows in specific buildings. CNN 
showed videos of cruise missiles flying over the streets of Baghdad and making precise 
turns towards specific military or government targets.  The effect was different than seen 
in any previous wars in that entire sections of cities were not destroyed. 
The word on the streets of the Iraqi capital was that the populace was safe from 
direct attack, and as the war progressed, life seemed to take on a surreally normal quality 
despite the daily bombings.  General Norman Schwarkzkopf, the Commander in Chief, 
U.S. Central Command said, “We are not indiscriminately targeting civilian targets and I 
think that the very action of the Iraqi ’s themselves demonstrates that they know damn 
well that we’re not attacking civilian targets.  Since right now they’ve dispersed their 
airplanes into residential areas, they’ve moved their headquarters into schools, they’ve 
moved their headquarters into hotel buildings, [and] they’ve put guns and things like that 
on top of high rise apartment buildings.  Under the Geneva Conventions that gives us the 
perfect right to go after those things if we wanted to and we haven’t done it.”4 
 But was the war conducted in such a precise and clean manner as depicted?  
Certainly, there were not daily attacks on the major population centers of Iraq as there 
were in World War II, Korea, and even Vietnam.  The U.S. public and its coalition states 
would likely not have accepted direct attacks against the noncombatant population.   
                                                 
4 Biography, Television interview, The Arts and Entertainment Network, 1991. 
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However, another picture of the morality of the conduct of operations in Desert 
Storm has emerged since the end of the war, a picture that is less clear as to decisions and 
outcomes.  NBC News Military Analyst Bill Arkin noted, “Even the highest military and 
civilian decision makers evidently did not understand the bombing campaign. Moreover, 
disproportionate attention focused on Baghdad - an otherwise statistically minor part of 
the air war - bred misguided assumptions about targeting and strategy, ones that persist to 
this day.”5 
 General Charles Horner was quoted as having told his flyers that no targets in all 
of Iraq were worth the loss of a single airplane.6  As a result, many targets that would 
normally have been attacked during daylight to increase weapons accuracy were instead 
hit at night, lowering accuracy of non-precision delivery methods.  Furthermore, many 
other attacks were conducted from higher altitudes far higher than coalition aircrews 
normally practiced, also reducing accuracy.  Arkin claims that 3,200 civilians died during 
Desert Storm and that far more were left affected by the loss of electricity due to 
targeting of power plants.7  Was this harm to non-combatants proportional to the 
necessity of driving the Iraqi army out of Kuwait?  While the total number of non-
combatant deaths seems low compared to previous wars, the issue remains whether those 
deaths were necessary to achieve objectives. 
 In this chapter I broadly consider the targeting decisions made during the conduct 
of military operations in Desert Storm with respect to joint service and Air Force doctrine 
and the motivational alignment of the key participants. First, I review the doctrine at the 
                                                 
5 Arkin, “Baghdad: The Urban Sanctuary in Desert Storm,” pg. 4. 
6 Thomas A. Kearney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Airpower Survey Summary Report, 1993, Washington, 
D.C., pg. 214. Hereafter referred to as GWAPS. 
7 William Arkin, “Not Good Enough Mr. Rumsfeld,” Washington Post online edition, 
www.WashingtonPost.com,  25 February 2002. 
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time of the operation to determine the extent to which it constrained planners and 
operators to turn national objectives into theater strategy.  I consider the processes and 
structures in place at the time of the war and determine the extent to which they 
contributed to moral outcomes. 
I then describe the various principal-agent relationships and attempt to determine 
how individual motivations affected the planning and development of strategy, given the 
available doctrine, and thus the moral outcomes of the war.  I bound the scope of the case 
study by defining who I consider to be the key principals and key agents of the war.  I 
then discuss motivations of the key participants and how they affected the direction of the 
war effort, that is, how they exercised control over following doctrine.  Finally, I discuss 
whether the proportionality-necessity balance was properly made.  
 
II. State of U.S. Military Doctrine Prior to Desert Storm 
In 1990, modern joint doctrine (both structurally and procedurally) was in its 
infancy following the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.  That law 
came about as a result of the realization that failures in Vietnam, the Iranian hostage 
rescue, Lebanon, and Grenada all had several major common denominators: “poor 
military advice to political leaders, lack of unity of command, and an inability to operate 
jointly.”8  One of the keys of Goldwater-Nichols was the development of Joint Doctrine, 
namely the best practices and principles of joint operations instead of methods that put 
primacy of one service over the others. 
                                                 
8 See James R. Locher, “Has It Worked?” Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn 2000), pg. 
96.  In this article, Locher explains how Congress was forced to reorganize the DoD in the wake of the 
services’ refusal to reorganize and operate jointly.  See also David T. Fatua, “The Paradox of Joint 
Culture,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 26 (Autumn 2000), pp. 81-87, for a discussion of the difficulty of 
removing service parochialism in all doctrinal and planning issues. 
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Joint service doctrine in 1990 was, simply put, Army-centric.  The U.S. military 
planned to defend Europe from a Soviet invasion primarily with heavy army forces 
supported by tactical airpower.  Strategic air power was accepted to mean nuclear, and 
thus was discussed separately from joint terminology and support to the Army.  A 
reading of joint doctrine at the time of the Gulf War shows that the documents were much 
more about service rivalries than about service integration to achieve nationally-defined 
objectives.   
The two main governing joint doctrine documents applicable to Desert Storm 
were JCS Pub 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations (from Overseas 
Land Areas), dated 1 April 1986, and Joint Pub 3-0 (test pub), Doctrine for Unified and 
Joint Operations, January 1990.  Neither document guided U.S. forces in targeting to 
achieve national objectives or to take into account a proportionality-necessity balance.  
The only conceivable objective was victory by defeating the enemy’s army. Few, if any 
military and civilian leaders thought about doctrine in terms of achieving specific 
political objectives through the military use of force.  The U.S. military was so focused 
on a general war in Europe, where survival was at stake for our allies, that little thought, 
if any, was given to planning and executing strategies for objectives short of total defeat 
of an opponent.   Discussion of limited war only served to remind officials of Vietnam. 
At the time these publications were promulgated to the services, there was intense 
interservice rivalry for funding and prestige.  Carl Pivarsky, an Air Force Lieutenant 
Colonel at the Air War College in 1992, noted that at the time of Desert Storm, “Current 
joint doctrine produces barriers to the equal participation of the most powerful Air Force 
in history from the joint maneuver paradigm. Its logic is carefully crafted to keep the air 
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component from command of any portion of the JFC ’s battlespace.  The air component 
is denied the command authority that can be exercised by any other shooter on the 
battlefield.”9 
There was no military-wide agreement how best to use the new technologies, 
precision attack capabilities, and information technology that allowed forces to 
dramatically increase the tempo of operations and decrease the decision cycles.  On the 
contrary, interservice rivalries written into old doctrine were destructive of efforts to 
achieve national objectives.  Certain Victory, the U.S. Army ’s official account of Desert 
Storm, avidly recounts the air component ’s ‘failure’ to support the surface commander’s 
‘scheme of maneuver’ (the Army’s own plan of what they wanted to do).10  Furthermore, 
when visitors walked through the Pentagon’s River Entrance, the one closest to the 
Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff offices, the graphic depictions of Desert 
Storm show the “war” to begin with the Army’s advance into Kuwait and Iraq and did 
not mention 43 days of war conducted by air forces of all the U.S. services and allied 
countries. 
The dysfunctional parochialism of doctrine made targeting to support national 
objectives difficult by not directly tying strategy to objectives.  One could also argue that 
this doctrinal problem allowed the major escape of Iraq’s Republican Guard forces which 
then led to the famous attacks on the “Highway of Death.”  There was no common 
agreement on a concept of operations to unify effort.  Of the issues surrounding principal 
direction over moral decision-making within doctrinal bounds, Pivarsky wrote: 
                                                 
9 Carl A. Pivarsky, “Airpower in the Context of Dysfunctional Joint Doctrine,” Air War College, 
Montgomery, Alabama, research paper, 1992. pg. 13. 
https://research.au.af.mil/Papers/special_collection/max-pap/mp07.pdf. 
10 Pivarsky, pg. 18. 
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XVIII Corps created an additional sanctuary for the enemy along 
the escape routes at Basrah that could not be appreciated at the time. The 
actions of XVIII Corps, like those of VII Corps, were doctrinally correct. 
The retrospective assessment of that action in Lucky War embraces the 
spirit of jointness and is refreshing for that reason if no other. Although 
the official U.S. Army version of the events outlined in Certain Victory: 
the U.S. Army in the Gulf War, blames the CINC for interfering with 
Corps commanders as well as the air component for the escape of the 
Republican Guard, more current information revealed in The General ’s 
War contradicts the Army official position. The fixing of blame throughout 
Certain Victory diverts attention from our fundamental problem; a 
dysfunctional joint doctrine rooted in the concept that only surface 
maneuver forces [read U.S. Army forces] should command and control the 
battlefield.  Unless this issue is confronted and resolved the integrity of 
joint doctrine will remain subject to the politics and friction of component 
competition and not component cooperation. The ideal of team 
warfighting will remain at odds with the reality of a corrupt doctrine. 11 
(emphasis original) 
  
Like joint doctrine, Air Force doctrine was woefully dated at the commencement 
of Desert Storm. The most current Air Force doctrine document at the time, Air Force 
Manual 1-1, was promulgated in 1984, and it, too, focused on nuclear warfare and 
support to Army ground operations.12  Dated doctrine does not necessarily mean bad 
doctrine, but, in this case the document and its contents were hardly known to the forces 
deployed to the Persian Gulf region to fight the war.   
Neither I, nor any officers in the 363rd Tactical Fighter Wing Mission Planning 
Cell, or officers at Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) Headquarters with whom 
the 363 TFW Mission Planning Cell coordinated ever mentioned Air Force doctrine in 
                                                 
11 Pivarsky, pg. 27. 
12 Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 was released in 1984. See also Lt Col Kurt Cichowski, “Aerospace 
Doctrine Matures Through A Storm: An Analysis of the New AFM 1-1,” 
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/SAAS_Theses/Cichowski/cichowski.pdf, and Price T. Bingham, 
“Airpower in Desert Storm and the Need for Doctrinal Change,” Airpower Journal, Vol. 6, No. 4. 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/price.html , wherein he claims that the real doctrine 
under which the war was fought was promulgated in 1959, but ignored during the conduct of this war. 
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planning for and conducting air operations.13  This was typical for all wings with whom 
the 363 TFW coordinated both prior to the war’s commencement and during combat 
operations.  Most importantly, although there was an understood directive to avoid 
civilian casualties and collateral damage to the greatest extent possible, there was no 
standing, doctrinal guidance that planners and executors could follow to operationalize 
the term “excessive” and achieve that end. 
 Lt. Gen. Ron Keys was the first commander of the Air Force Doctrine Center and 
later the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations on the Air Staff.  He notes that prior to the 
establishment of the Doctrine Center and publication of Air Force Doctrine Document 1, 
Air Force Basic Doctrine, in 1997, and the subsequent family of doctrine publications 
thereafter, doctrine was not agreed upon; it was not relevant to the technology and theory 
of the day; it was not disseminated and read; it was fragmented among the various 
regional and functional commands within the Air Force.   
General Keys posits that the Air Force behaved like various native tribes: each 
regional or functional command had its own way of doing things, its own idea of the best 
way to do things; its own idea of the most important priorities.14  The result was an 
inability to maximize the inherent capabilities of airpower and build strategies to 
effectively achieve national strategic and theater military objectives.  What were those 
objectives? 
                                                 
13 Author was a participant-observer during the First Gulf War.  Author served as wing intelligence officer 
and Chief of the 363rd Tactical Fighter Wing Mission Planning Cell during combat operations.  The 363 
TFW was a workhorse air-to-ground squadron that flew over 2000 combat missions into Iraq and Kuwait 
against targets ranging from fielded forces to SCUDs.  As such, it was typical of all air-to-ground fighter 
wings in theater. 
14 Ronald Keys, Lieutenant General, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, interview 
by author, Washington, D.C., 22 April 2003. 
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On 8 August 1990, President Bush spoke to the nation and declared the following 
as U.S. objectives for deploying forces:  
1. Secure the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait  
2. Restore the legitimate government of Kuwait,  
3. Assure the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region 
4. Protect American lives.15   
 
Key directives handed down by the president and military leadership reminded 
forces to minimize collateral damage.16  However, those directives clashed with various 
seminal teachings in military, and specifically airpower, history that emphasized breaking 
the will of the enemy population and defeating the nation’s military.  Some could argue 
that this was implicit doctrine.  However, it was not agreed-upon, nor relevant to the 
types of conflicts foreseen after the Cold War.  The concepts of defeating a nation in total 
war and merely expelling its army from another country clashed.  The result was U.S. 
forces knowing that they were supposed to do one thing (expel the Iraqi army from 
Kuwait), but often executing in a different manner (bombardment of strategic-level 
targets in Baghdad), one in which they trained for years, which was contradictory to 
presidential directives.   
Officers in their staff colleges widely read and were taught studies such as Carl 
von Clausewitz’s exhortation to go after the enemy centers of gravity, the primary being 
the opponent’s army, and Giulio Douhet’s advice to target the will of the enemy through 
aerial bombardment, and the 1930s Air Corps Tactical School’s Industrial Web study, 
                                                 
15 Thomas A. Kearney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Airpower Survey Summary Report, 1993, 
Washington, D.C., pg. 27. Hereafter referred to as GWAPS. 
16 Charles A. Horner, 2 December 1991, Transcript of Oral History Interview conducted by Suzanne Gheri 
and Richard Reynolds, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Document 
Number K239.0472-93, pg. 23. 
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which led to the plan to defeat Germany in WWII.  These teachings were taken by many 
officers to be doctrine, and the official doctrine that existed at the time of Desert Storm 
took into account these historical principles and precepts.  The moral problem arose when 
the national objectives laid out by the President, and supported by United Nations 
resolutions, and the multi-national coalition opposing Iraq, were limited to some strategy 
short of what the military traditionally planned in unconstrained war wherein the survival 
of the state was at stake.  The U.S. military did not adjust its strategy to align with the 
limited objectives.  Thus the targeting strategy could not claim necessity (with respect to 
the national objectives) for many of the targets that were repeatedly attacked during the 
war. 
Strong doctrine that detailed the process of developing a strategy that links 
national objectives with available capabilities in a non-nuclear environment was absent.  
The situation that existed in August 1990 allowed for “proving” one theory over another.  
Edward Mann, in his detailed study of airpower theory and its impact on Desert Storm, 
notes that: 
[Colonel John] Warden and his planners hoped to correct what they 
felt were America's previous “mistakes ” of applying airpower in a 
gradualistic, supporting role (especially in Vietnam)…Indeed, some of the 
planners hoped to prove that airpower could in fact win a war “all alone.” 
At the very least, the U.S. would avoid the horrible mistakes of Vietnam 
(i.e., bomb a little here, a little there, and see if the enemy is ready to be 
more accommodating).  They called their plan Instant Thunder in direct 
opposition to the Vietnam era's Rolling Thunder campaign. There would 
be no gradualism or escalation —no pauses in the bombing until Hussein 
gave up or the Iraqi conscript army removed him.17 
 
                                                 
17 Edward C. Mann, Colonel, USAF, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates.  
1995, Montgomery: Air University Press, pp. 1-2. 
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While the bombing without pauses until Hussein gave up was not part of the President’s 
official direction, it is arguable that this was the actual desire of the administration 
because the senior civilian leaders did not overrule this strategy. 
Had doctrine for planning joint or even service air operations been available and 
understood at that time, it is unlikely that the process of developing and publishing a 
strategy to evict the Iraqi forces would have been less coherent than the process which 
actually took place.  Doctrine gives us the agreed upon best practices and principles.  But 
when it isn’t available, people do the best they can to make it up as necessary.  The result 
in Desert Storm was, in many respects, a brilliant example of event-driven process-
generation in real time.  Yet with no doctrine to guide the war planning, a fragmented and 
highly compartmentalized process evolved. 
 According to the Gulf War Airpower Survey (GWAPS), researched and written by 
Thomas Kearns and Eliot Cohen, Schwartzkopf’s CENTCOM staff did not have the 
manpower and experience to develop an air plan for the situation that faced them, 
especially since they were burdened with managing the deployment of forces.  In fact, 
there was “no complete operations plan or operations order in existence that captured the 
essence of the planning taking place.”18  The doctrinal structure and process that flows 
from Presidential direction through planning to execution simply did not exist. 
Needing a way to retaliate against Iraq and defend Saudi Arabia with the Air 
Force and Navy air assets available to him in theater, Schwartzkopf requested planning 
support from the Air Staff in Washington.  He did not know that since shortly after Iraq 
invaded Kuwait, Colonel John Warden had led a small group of officers in the Air Force 
                                                 
18 GWAPS, 33. 
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Operations Directorate’s Warfighting Division (called “Checkmate”) through a process in 
which they developed a plan to defeat Iraq using airpower alone.   
Warden’s plan involved attacking Iraq’s key “centers of gravity” – those elements 
of the Iraqi state from which the enemy forces obtain their strength.  It was simply 
assumed that doing so would lead to Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait.  Targets included 
Saddam Hussein himself, and his ability to lead his forces, as well as regime control 
targets, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons facilities, electrical power grids, and 
military production facilities.  The initial plan called for only Air Force assets to attack 
Iraq and all but openly claimed that Iraq would capitulate based on this short air 
campaign. 19 
Schwarztkopf, accepting the only plan available at the time, sent Warden and his 
planners to Riyadh to brief Lt. Gen. Chuck Horner, Schwartzkopf’s air component 
commander and senior commander in theater.  Horner was not pleased with Warden’s 
presentation.  However, instead of throwing out Warden’s plan, he turned it over to 
Brigadier General Buster Glosson, a man he brought in to specifically run air planning.  
Glosson and his staff built upon Warden’s original plan as more and more assets arrived 
in theater.20  Glosson, who had not read Warden’s book or papers, did understand the 
concepts of his strategy.  The effect was to take one plan developed outside doctrinal 
structures and build upon it in another non-doctrina l structure. 
The Special Planning Group, the secret organization headed by Glosson, was 
quickly nicknamed the Black Hole by those in theater, and although its existence was 
known within the CENTAF staff, admission to its offices in the basement of the 
                                                 
19 GWAPS, 35-37. 
20 Gordon and Trainor, 96. 
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headquarters building in Riyadh was strictly limited and controlled by Glosson himself 
and the wing commanders of the various deployed units. 21  The secrecy in which the 
Black Hole operated extended to the entire CENTAF staff to include the intelligence 
directorate.  The very organization tasked with providing information, analysis and 
targeting support to the combat planners and commanders was not provided access to the 
plans in the Black Hole that required their support.  Such doctrinal disconnects impeded 
any proportionality-necessity balance being made and thus led to questionable targeting 
decisions once the war began. 
It is often said that necessity is the mother of invention, and that since the U.S. 
was in a situation that required bold leadership, bold new leaders, like Warden, would 
step to the fore and provide that leadership.  On the other hand, if we rely on situational 
leadership and someone to step up to show brilliance in times of crisis, then we leave 
ourselves open to failure if such a leader does not appear.  Hence the need for sound 
doctrinal procedures and structures.  Checkmate was not a part of CENTCOM or 
CENTAF.  Warden was not charged to correct previous mistakes.  That is not to say that 
his organization should not have been asked to support the planning effort.  Doctrine is 
never that rigid, lest it become dogma.  However, the fact remains that Warden was a 
supporter of the process that allowed him to be the key driver instead of follower. 
The lack of sound doctrine at the time of the war makes it impossible to compare 
what was supposed to happen from what actually happened.  The procedures and 
structures established prior to the war were ad hoc and accepted as necessary to fight in a 
coalition environment.  From flying the air tasking order on Lear Jets to every base due to 
                                                 
21 See Michael R Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War for detailed descriptions of the 
establishment and functions of the Black Hole. 
 119 
a lack of procedures for transmission, to establishing separate organizations like special 
planning cells that did not share information with officers who were not read into special 
plans, the innovative procedures developed by planners made it difficult to determine the 
long-term impact of this war.  There was not a doctrinal baseline from which to measure 
moral variance from that doctrinal norm. When doctrine to create strategies based on 
national objectives did not exist, the moral outcome was left to the motivations of 
principals and agents.  In the following section, I will show how those motivations did 
not necessarily align and the impact that had on the moral outcomes of the war. 
 
III. Principal-Agent Motivations in Desert Storm 
 
In any discussion of principals associated with military operations, it becomes 
necessary to bound the actors.  Otherwise, one could make an argument that every actor 
that was in any supervisory or leadership position was a principal, which, factually is 
true, but not practically for this study.  In this case study, I define as principals: 
President - George Bush  
Secretary of Defense - Richard Cheney  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - General Colin Powell 
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command - General Norman Schwartzkopf 
Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) - Lieutenant General Charles 
Horner 
Director of Air Campaign Planning for CENTAF - Brigadier General Buster 
Glosson 
Deputy Chief for Offensive Air Planning - Lt. Col. David Deptula 
Director of Checkmate - Colonel John Warden.   
While some of these officers were lower ranking than the national leadership, 
they certainly must be considered as principals because of the decisions they made in the 
planning and execution process.  Colonel John Warden was not a national leader, but he 
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did make the fundamental planning decisions upon which the entire Gulf War campaign 
was based.  The commanders of the other service components were certainly key players, 
especially in the ground campaign, but, the decisions and motivations of these named 
principals played such an important role that we do not lose critical information by 
omitting any others. 
 Unlike the key principals, one could argue that every soldier, sailor, airman and 
marine was an agent because every one of them had the opportunity to either follow 
directions, or to shirk on every mission they were assigned.  It is neither 
methodologically possible, nor necessary, to examine the decisions of every individual 
person who participated in the war.  Another study could well research the motivations 
and decisions made by lower level actors, and the role of principal oversight of those 
agents.   
It is necessary, however, to determine and bound the key agents in this war.  The 
key agents studied herein were also principals themselves, such as General Schwartzkopf, 
General Horner, General Glosson, and Colonel Warden.  Their actions and decisions 
were different, based on the circumstances, constraints, and their beliefs and interests in 
which those actions and decisions were made, as a principal or as an agent.  The other 
agents I considered in this study, too numerous to name individually, were the Black 
Hole Staff, the Wing Commanders and staffs of the bomb-dropping wings, and the 
aircrews who flew nearly 120,000 combat missions during the 43 days of the war.22 
In the following sections, I consider the factors affecting principal-agent 
motivation alignment as presented in Chapter 3.  Principal and agent motivations and 
how those motivations affected moral decisions were decidedly affected by chronological 
                                                 
22 GWAPS, pp. 184-185. 
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events and by the limited options available to them in addition to their personal biases.  
Individual people in their positions made key decisions at key moments which led to 
particular actions and results.  A short chronology of events leading to the planning 
process will introduce the circumstances in which key principal and agent motivations 
came into play. 
 
Circumstances 
Iraq invaded the small Gulf emirate of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, just two days 
after General Norman Schwartzkopf briefed the service chiefs, the JCS Chairman, and 
Secretary of Defense that he thought such an invasion was unlikely.  Without standing 
U.S. forces in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility, any forces sent to repel the 
anticipated Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf oil fields would have to deploy 
from the U.S. or bases in Europe.  When Generals Schwartzkopf and Horner briefed 
President Bush and his Cabinet at Camp David on Saturday, August 4th, their only 
briefing options were for defense of Saudi Arabia with minimal forces.  The President 
sent the generals to Saudi Arabia with the SecDef to gauge the situation from the theater.  
General Schwartzkopf left Horner in Riyadh as the forward U.S. military commander and 
returned home to oversee deployment planning with the JCS Chairman. 23 
One key circumstance Horner faced was that if he was to defend Saudi Arabia, 
the only immediate combat power that could be brought to bear would have to be air 
power.  If Iraq did not invade Saudi Arabia, and the task was to expel the Iraqi military 
from Kuwait, air power would still be the dominant element until such time as sufficient 
                                                 
23 Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq, 1995, 
Montgomery: Air University Press, pp. 1-13. 
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ground forces could be assembled for an invasion and attack against entrenched Iraqi 
forces.   
Besides a defensive plan, Schwartzkopf wanted an option to directly attack Iraq 
and take the fight to Saddam offensively, thus forcing him to withdraw support from his 
forces in Kuwait.  Because his air component, as well as his own headquarters, was 
focused on the logistics of deploying personnel and equipment halfway around the world, 
Schwartzkopf called the Air Staff in Washington to ask if they could come up with a 
“strategic air campaign” plan.  He was very happy to hear that the Air Staff already had a 
team of officers headed by Colonel John Warden working such an option and gave them 
the charter to develop the plan. 24   
For three days prior to Schwartzkopf’s request that the Air Staff develop a 
strategic air campaign, Colonel Warden and his staff had been engaged in comprehensive 
planning to produce an air option that the CINC could use before ground forces were 
even deployed to theater.  By the time he briefed Schwartzkopf and Powell, Warden had 
developed what he thought was a plan to take down the Iraqi regime with Air Force 
assets alone.25  Since this was the only clear plan and the only serious planning effort 
being conducted either in Washington or the CENTCOM staffs, it necessarily became the 
foundation for the eventual war plan. 
Warden briefed Secretary of Defense Cheney that after only six days of an air 
campaign, the expected results would be: 
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q Iraqi National Leadership Destroyed 
q Iraq’s Strategic Offensive and Defense Eliminated for Extended Period 
q Internal Economy Disrupted 
q Iraq’s Ability to Export Oil Not Significantly Degraded 
q Gulf Nations Have Ability to Deal With Residual Iraqi Forces26 
  
On Schwartzkopf’s direction, Warden took his plan to Riyadh in August 1990 to 
brief General Horner on how to bring Saddam Hussein to capitulation without fighting 
his army in Kuwait.  Horner, however, was facing the possibility of an Iraqi assault into 
Saudi Arabia if U.S. forces attacked Baghdad.  His circumstance on the ground in Riyadh 
was quite different from what planners in Washington faced.  When Warden told Horner 
that he (Horner) focused too much on the Iraqi army, Horner abruptly sent Warden back 
to Washington.  He didn’t want someone from Washington telling him to ignore what he 
believed to be the primary threat to his command. 
To build the plan that Horner could put his own stamp on, he brought in Buster 
Glosson, Schwartzkopf’s former deputy Joint Task Force Commander off a command 
ship in the Persian Gulf.  Glosson kept several of Warden’s planners, the primary being 
Lt. Col. Dave Deptula, and expanded and built upon Warden’s plan.  Horner told them 
that Warden had brought a good theoretical study, a good start at a target list, but that he 
wanted Glosson’s people to turn it into an executable plan. 27 
That plan had to include the geopolitical reality that the theater of operations was 
halfway around the world from the United States.  Moving large numbers of personnel 
and equipment meant that any military action would have to wait until a sufficient force 
was available to achieve the given objectives.  As UN resolutions passed and more 
                                                 
26 Gordon and Trainor, 188. 
27 David Deptula, 22 May 1991, Transcript of Oral History Interview conducted by Suzanne Gheri, Edward 
Mann, and Richard Reynolds, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Document 
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countries joined the coalition, these assets would have to be integrated into the ad hoc 
structures and their forces would have to be found a role to play in eventual operations. 
 
Contraints 
The issuance of United States objectives on August 8th was not the first step in the 
process that led to war.  Generals Schwartzkopf and Horner had previously met with the 
President and the National Security Council to brief them on the situation and options for 
defending Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.  The generals briefed the NSC that they 
could, with deploying airpower assets, defend Saudi Arabia and “punish” Iraq if they 
attacked with chemical weapons.28  The generals were directed to begin planning for such 
a contingency in the event that diplomatic and economic instruments of power did not 
work. 
 As mentioned in the doctrine section, the President and Joint Chiefs Chairman 
admonished their commanders to minimize collateral damage.29  General Horner notes 
that President Bush repeatedly discussed the moral limits (constraints) on this operation 
and the need to garner international support for any U.S. actions.30  Horner himself was 
so concerned about the propriety of a plan to specifically go after Saddam Hussein that he 
told his staff that the U.S. might suffer repercussions for 200 years.  “In the short term, 
yeah, we might win, but in the long term, the way the Arab world will view us will not be 
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to our advantage.”31  Yet, even then such desires did not translate to systemic decisions 
regarding proportionality and necessity. The problem is that those directives to minimize 
collateral damage, no matter how noble, cannot guarantee moral decision-making if not 
operationalized in the form of a specific proportionality-necessity balance decision for 
each objective and target.   
General Glosson did state that he presented some examples of targets in every 
target set to the President and Cabinet specifically to put them on the table in order to 
prevent “selective recall” after the conflict.  He briefed what he considered to be the most 
controversial targets in each set so as to leave “no doubt in anybody’s mind as to what 
type of targets” they planned to attack.32  However, there was no discussion at that time 
on proportionality weighed against necessity to achieve objectives.  In fact, Glosson 
states that until the “bunker problem” (the attack against the Al Firdos bunker to be 
discussed in detail later in this chapter), nobody in Washington ever had any input into 
the target selection process.33 
It is evident in the documents I researched and in my experience and discussions 
with colleagues from Desert Storm that there was a constraint to wage a moral war.  
However, the meaning of that constraint was not clearly understood.  It was certainly not 
an error of commission at the time.  The leaders genuinely wanted non-combatant 
casualties to be as close to zero as possible.  However, merely stating that desire did not 
ensure the moral outcome.  Absent clearly defined constraints, the beliefs and interests of 
the principals and agents became the primary factor in moral motivations. 
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Beliefs and Interests 
General Norman Schwartzkopf was in a position unlike any commander since the 
Korean War.  He was a unified commander of an operation that, unlike Vietnam with its 
multiple simultaneous operations and commanders, would see a single commander in 
charge of all forces and operations in his theater.  Though a ground combat soldier by 
training and experience, Schwartzkopf understood the need to bring together all elements 
of the force.  Furthermore, faced with the prospect of combat operations halfway around 
the world with no forces stationed in theater, he could not afford to be parochial in 
August of 1990.  Had Schwartzkopf been motivated by service rivalries, he would likely 
not have requested a plan from the Air Force and then accepted it so willingly.   
It seems apparent from interviews with Schwartzkopf’s subordinates, as well as 
histories such as those of Gordon and Trainor’s The Generals’ War, that Schwartzkopf 
was motivated by a sincere desire to achieve the national objectives with the lowest cost 
in total lives possible.  He was not about to authorize an expected high-casualty ground 
invasion until overwhelming force was in place.34  Despite calls from within the Army 
Staff for a ground invasion lest the Army find itself unnecessary after the war, 
Schwartzkopf won out.  General Horner says that Schwartzkopf was under intense 
pressure to start the ground campaign before he did.  His underlying beliefs and interest 
won out.  Horner says: “If Schwartzkopf is a hero, I will tell you why he is a hero: 
                                                 
34 Michael R. Gordon, and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War, 1995, Boston: Back Bay 
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Because he did not want to spend a life unnecessarily of a single soldier.  That is 
absolutely true.”35 
General Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), was also 
concerned about casualties, but he was in a different position than Schwartzkopf.  Horner 
was only weeks away from retirement when Iraq invaded Kuwait.  He was a fighter pilot 
who came up through the ranks during Vietnam and the Cold War era and who had 
reached the pinnacle of command.  He was not interested in interservice rivalries, but 
wanted to achieve the president’s objectives with the lowest cost, and not fight any 
ideological or parochial service battles.36 
Disturbed by the incremental nature of U.S. escalation in Vietnam, he pushed for 
a rapid achievement of objectives, but all the while within the moral bounds set by the 
President.  Horner discussed these bounds in the early days of August 1990: 
You have got to understand where we were at the time.  We didn’t 
have a policy.  We didn’t have an [Iraqi] invasion of Saudi Arabia…The 
things that happened when the President started asking questions showed, 
first of all, a great moral aversion to war…that provided sort of the 
yardstick by which I measured every one of our actions.37 
 
Horner distrusted planning carried out in the Pentagon rather than in the theater 
where the war would be fought.  He felt it was too much like Vietnam where officials in 
Washington selected targets and dictated courses of action to theater commanders.38  This 
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mistrust would play an important role in his later decisions, especially with respect to the 
actions of Pentagon planners. 
Horner explained the purpose of his assault on Washington planners in a 
television interview after the war, “War is extreme violence and the way to halt the 
suffering is to get the war over as quickly and decisively as you possibly can.  You have a 
moral obligation to get it over as quickly as possible and that is why we fought this war 
with such great intensity and unyielding pressure on the enemy until we had 
accomplished our goals.”39   
But back in Washington, the motivations were not merely on achieving 
objectives.  While those in the military and civilian leadership certainly looked to achieve 
the national objectives with minimal loss of life, there was also the need to prove 
personal theories and maintain service primacy. 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell presided as the 
senior military officer at a time when shrinking military budgets were seen as inevitable, 
yet when forces had to be deployed in support of national interests.  He was very 
concerned with unnecessary loss of life as well as interference by officers in Washington 
in what was a CINC’s command.40  While skillfully managing the Washington front of 
this war through his daily press briefings, presidential updates and Congressional 
testimony, General Powell was ever an Army officer.  He was not in favor of an air only 
plan (even one which included significant Naval and Marine air assets), as evidenced by 
numerous statements made both in public and in private.41 
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When told that the air campaign might achieve the President’s objectives without 
a ground invasion, General Powell shifted the focus of the effort to ensure Army 
participation when he stated, “Okay, but I don’t want those guys [the Iraqi army in 
Kuwait] to go home.  I want to destroy those tanks.”  Such a formal change to the 
President’s objectives was never made in writing, although it was eventually carried 
out.42  Schwartzkopf even warned Brigadier General Buster Glosson about Powell’s 
desire to see the Army obtain a greater role prior to Glosson’s briefing of the air 
campaign plan to the President.  After Secretary Cheney approved the briefing, Powell 
told Glosson to cut the presentation and to not give it all to the President.43 
Powell’s beliefs and interests also played a major role.  His service parochialism 
and desire to see the Army play a significant role can be seen in his response before 
Congress to the plan put forth by the Air Force.  Rather than arguing more forcefully 
against the merits of the accepted strategy, an argument he may have won given the 
desire to expel the Iraqi army out of Kuwait, he instead argued against the air campaign’s 
architects in a personal manner.  This argument looked like a service rivalry more than a 
difference in strategic vision.  Furthermore, the strategy Powell desired would likely have 
caused far more U.S. casualties, which would have been unacceptable to the 
administration and public.   
Instead, Powell made the following comments about air combat planners: 
Many experts, amateurs and others in this town, believe that this 
can be accomplished by such things as surgical air strikes or perhaps a 
sustained air strike.  And there are a variety of other nice, tidy, alleged 
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low-cost, incremental, may-work options that are floated around with 
greater regularity all over this town.  One can hunker down, one can dig 
in, one can try to disperse to try to ride out such a single dimension attack.  
Such strategies are designed to hope to win; they are not designed to 
win.44 
 
From the very beginning, Powell argued that airpower had its limits.  He recalled 
the days in Vietnam where his soldiers took bullets even after American aircraft bombed 
opponents’ positions.45  This is not to say that Powell had a political agenda against air 
power, but that he did not see evidence in his career that it would work as laid out in the 
air plans.  Finally, when it came time to select a deputy for Schwartzkopf, Powell looked 
past Air Force Lt. Gen Butch Vicellio and selected instead Army Lt. Gen. Calvin Waller, 
an old friend of Schwartzkopf’s.  While Powell had good reason to select Waller – he 
believed Waller to be the one man who would be able to temper the commander’s 
volatility – the top three leadership positions were held by Army generals, giving the 
appearance that Powell’s motivations lay outside sound doctrinal employment.46 
Perhaps the most important person and catalyst for principal-agent motivation 
discussions in Desert Storm was Colonel John Warden.  Colonel Warden was first and 
foremost a great thinker.  He wrote a book in 1988 titled The Air Campaign wherein he 
put forth his theory of airpower.  Warden’s beliefs and interests formed the basis for the 
eventual U.S. operation and the debate that raged for a decade thereafter. 
Warden posited that it was possible to incapacitate and separate the leadership of 
a country from its forces and render that country incapable of resisting if coercion did not 
motivate that country to capitulate.  Rather than use airpower merely to support ground 
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forces in a gradual manner, or gradually escalate as in Vietnam, he believed it was 
possible to attack an enemy from the inside out and thus win the war without ever 
employing surface forces.47  Although many claim today that Warden’s writings merely 
repeated the thoughts of the Air Corps Tactical School of the 1930s, this was a radical 
theory in an era where even the senior Air Force fighter commander said “Tactical 
aviators have two primary jobs – to provide air defense for the North American continent 
and support the Army in achieving its battlefield objectives.48 
Because it became the basis for the eventual campaign, it would be prudent, at 
this point, to examine the theory of airpower put forth by Warden first from a 
methodological and then from a moral perspective.  It is important to understand that 
Warden was not putting forth a doctrine, but a strategy of how to achieve a particular end.  
It was the absence of a practical doctrine that allowed this strategy to form the core of the 
Desert Storm plan that was executed against Iraq in 1991.   
Warden argued that rather than seeing the enemy as merely an army, an air force, 
and a navy, the entire state should be looked at as a system.  He argues that “Contrary to 
Clausewitz, destruction of the enemy military is not the essence of war; the essence of 
war is convincing the enemy to accept your position, and fighting his military forces is at 
best a means to an end and at worst a total waste of time and energy.”49   
To convince the enemy to accept your position, Warden posited a theory that 
advocated bypassing those fighting forces and sought instead to coerce the enemy into 
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capitulating.  This concept of parallel warfare held that it was not necessary to 
sequentially attack targets or target sets, but that they could be attacked simultaneously to 
achieve multiple concurrent effects.  This concept found much support within the DoD 
prior to Desert Storm, and has even made it into the capstone Air Force Doctrine 
Document 1.50  In the context of the Middle East, this type of strategy may prove superior 
to those planned to defend Germany’s Fulda Gap in the 1980s against a Warsaw Pact 
armor invasion.   
Warden provided a model by which to understand how the entire enemy state can 
viewed as a system. 51  In this model (Table 5.1), he shows how any enemy, be it a person, 
a state, a cartel, or a company, can be broken down as a system for conceptual and 
targeting purposes.  The top row shows the various examples of systems, and the left 
hand column shows the five major elements to be targeted in any of these systems. 
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Table 5.1 
Warden’s Model of Targeting Systems 52 
 
  Body State  Drug Cartel Electric  Company 
Leadership 
Brain 
-eyes 
-nerves 
Government 
-communication 
-security 
Leader 
-communication 
-security 
Central Control 
System Essential 
Food/oxygen 
-conversion via 
vital organs 
Energy 
(electricity, oil, 
food), money 
Coca source 
plus conversion 
Input (heat, 
hydro) 
Output 
(electricity) 
Infrastructure Vessels, bones muscles 
Roads, airfields, 
factories 
Roads, airways 
sea lanes 
Transmission 
lines 
Population Cells People 
Growers, 
distributors, 
processors 
Workers 
Fielded Forces Leukocytes Military, police, firemen Street soldiers Repairmen 
 
 
                                                 
52 Warden, Air Theory. 
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Warden also provided a second conceptualization of the same model, his famous 
“5 Rings,” showing how he considers the center rings the most important for targeting 
(Figure 5.1).53 
 
Figure 5.1 
Warden’s Model as a 5-Ring Conceptualization  
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In discussing his model, Warden consistently emphasized Sun Tzu’s exhortation 
that winning without defeating your enemy’s military is the greatest victory.  “Strategic 
war is war to force the enemy state or organization to do what you want it to do. In the 
extreme, it may even be war to destroy the state or organization. It is, however, the whole 
system that is our target, not its military forces (emphasis original).”54  It is important to 
note that there is an inherent assumption that the overriding objective in any conflict 
requires attacking all aspects of the state simultaneously, bringing down the opposing 
regime or government if necessary.  There is no mention that the objectives could be less 
than total defeat of the opposing state. 
When researching the motivations that directed Warden in his planning efforts, 
one overriding thing became clear: Warden was an unapologetic, zealous airpower 
advocate who stopped at nothing to advance his views and prove his theory.  Throughout 
his post-Gulf War interviews with historians, he continually stated that senior leaders 
both in the Air Force and other services did not understand air power nor its 
possibilities.55   
When he felt that the Joint Chiefs Chairman General Powell prevented his plan 
from going forward to the President, Colonel Warden convinced Senator John Warner 
(Republican from Virginia) of the Armed Services Committee to phone the President and 
ask that the service positions be presented (the Air Force Chief of Staff was firmly behind 
Warden).  He also took his presentation to Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in 
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55 Warden, Document Number K239.0472-113, Warden, Document Number K239.0472-114, Warden, 
Document Number K239.0472-115. 
 136 
order to line up political support for his plan among defense civilians.56  When DoD 
blocked the CIA Director’s request to have Warden brief them on his plan, he went 
anyway without approval.57  He was certainly committed to this plan and his idea of how 
to defeat the Iraqi regime. 
It appears obvious that the expected results Warden briefed to Cheney (listed in a 
previous section) do not match the President’s limited objectives.  To that charge Warden 
countered in a post-war interview, “a great country cannot have a little war.  There is no 
such thing as a limited war.  If you weren’t prepared to expend the effort that was going 
to assure victory, then you shouldn’t play.”58  Absent strict doctrinal guidance, Warden’s 
motivations to see his service win a war without Army involvement and his 
understanding of historical conflict led him to devise a plan that would prove his theory 
correct.  Because his motivations were not aligned with the motivations of his principals, 
without oversight and deliberate alignment, Wardens plan would have led to 
disproportionate non-combatant casualties.  
Warden’s plan, however was not implemented unchecked.  To this day we do not 
know, and can only surmise whether it would have worked as briefed in August of 1990.  
We do know that proportionality and necessity were not really considered in that plan.  
The following section will cover that process in the actual conduct of the war, and I will 
show the impact of the variables doctrine and principal-agent alignment on the actual 
conduct of operations. 
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IV.  Moral Intent Versus Moral Decisions: Proportionality vs. Necessity  
 
 While Warden was motivated by a desire to show that air power could bring a 
country to capitulation, thus achieving the national objectives, Glosson and Deptula set 
out to achieve the national objectives first.  They both believed that air power could do 
the job without a ground invasion, but they also understood that it was possible and 
politically necessary to attack not only leadership targets in Iraq, but also simultaneously 
the Iraqi military in Kuwait.59  They factored in circumstances and constraints rather than 
only their beliefs and interests.  To that end, they took the basis of Warden’s plan and, 
maintaining close contact with him in Washington, built upon it and expanded it as more 
forces arrived in theater until the war eventually was executed.  Their motivations were 
more aligned with their principals than were Warden’s. 
 The approved plan was even trumpeted by Air Force Magazine as a righteous 
one.  “Instant Thunder had one restriction in common with earlier American strategic 
bombing: It was designed to avoid civilian casualties.”60  The Secretary of State and 
Undersecretary for Political Affairs even reviewed the final target list with the Secretary 
of Defense and Joint Chiefs Chairman just days prior to the war’s commencement and 
found it to be politically acceptable.61  However, that “one restriction” did not lead to 
specific proportionality-necessity decisions to ensure civilian casualties were limited.  
Merely approving targets without collateral damage estimates and issuing orders to limit 
such damage is at best contradictory.  Had these principals found the target list 
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61 GWAPS, 46.  
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unacceptable, it may not have mattered.  By that time, the plan was too firmly set to 
significantly change had they so counseled.   
Research since the war has uncovered questions that should have been discussed 
during the strategy development.  There was a dichotomy between the moral intent 
(evident in the pre-war discussions on limiting casualties mentioned earlier) and the 
outcomes (lack of proportionality-necessity decisions) of combat operations as a result of 
the strategy developed by Warden and refined by General Glosson and his Black Hole 
planners.  There is no question that the key players understood morality and ethical 
norms, but that understanding did not necessarily, and in itself, translate to moral 
targeting decisions. 
Warden never advocated a direct attack on the enemy’s civilian population; he 
believed such attacks are difficult and “morally reprehensible.”  He discussed the 
difficulty of affecting enemy populations through direct attacks and the dubious results of 
attempting to break the will of a population.  He acknowledged that although such attacks 
are reprehensible, they will likely continue in the future by other countries.  Yet nowhere 
in the discussion of civilian population did he discuss the morality of indirect effects on 
the populace, and nowhere did he posit the possibility of limited objectives against an 
enemy state.62  Thus we saw that without constraining doctrine the declared limited 
objectives outlined above were left to be achieved with a strategy that was not limited, 
but total in nature. 
Attacking enemy leadership and its support mechanisms theoretically can bring a 
regime down quicker than working to defeat the opposing armed forces.  Supporters of 
precision airpower can rightly point out that the number of bombs required to achieve 
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specific objectives is a small fraction of that required in World War II or even Vietnam. 
One laser-guided bomb could achieve the same effect that required more than 9,000 
bombs in WWII. 63  Given new precision technology and the horror of WWII fire-
bombings, the days of mass obliteration bombing of cities and civilian populations 
became repulsive to Western norms.  However, attacking leadership and support 
mechanisms normally means targeting dual-use facilities.  Cutting electricity to a 
command post in an enemy capital could well mean cutting electricity to non-combatants. 
When General Mike Dugan, the Air Force Chief of Staff, told the media that the 
overwhelming force used against Iraq would be air power and that the “cutting edge 
would be Baghdad,” he was relieved and retired for openly discussing the plan ahead of 
the war.64  However, J. Bryan Hehir, Professor at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center and 
Dean of Harvard’s Divinity School said that Dugan’s words repudiated the central tenet 
of limited warfare: the protection of non-combatants.  He says that the nature of 
Saddam’s “ruthless” regime made it all the more important to not punish the innocent 
people for the leader’s actions.65   
Yet Dugan was correct in his words, if not his presentation.  He told the media 
what he was briefed.  He was not relieved for promoting an immoral strategy, but for 
publicizing the plan while it was still secret.  While never refuting Dugan, the 
administration merely distanced itself from him by stating that the General was not in the 
chain of command.66  
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Most fundamentally, Colonel Warden’s theory and subsequent plan, although not 
intended specifically to harm innocents, was not consistent with national objectives or the 
moral norms of Just War.  The September 1990 CENTAF Operations Order, written by 
the Black Hole staff and approved by General Horner, stated: “When taken in total, the 
result of Phase I will be the progressive and systematic collapse of Saddam Hussein’s 
entire war machine and regime.”67  Arguably, despite limited stated objectives, this is 
exactly the outcome President Bush desired.68   
Yet, Generals Schwartzkopf and Powell both disavowed such objectives.  
Furthermore, such objectives ran counter to another section of the same Operations Order 
that directed avoiding “anything which could be considered as terror attacks or attacks on 
the Iraqi people.”69  Such contradictory direction by the air headquarters, as well as the 
continued influence of Colonel Warden’s theory on his former staff members in Riyadh 
would necessarily require decisions by the planners on which directions to follow.  
Again, in the absence of well-defined doctrine, these decisions were left entirely to the 
motivations of individual officers.  
For example, when a mission is not clearly defined, questions arise as to 
discretion and moral bounds at the pilot level.  During Desert Storm several pilots in one 
fighter wing, who were targeting an anti-aircraft artillery location, upon seeing the 
gunners flee their guns and run to bunkers, targeted the bunkers so that the gunners could 
not come back to fight another day.  Other pilots in the same package of aircraft targeted 
only the anti-aircraft guns.   
                                                 
67 GWAPS, 45-46. 
68 Bob Woodward, The Commanders, 1991, New York: Simon and Schuster, pg. 237. 
69 GWAPS, 45-46. 
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After the mission, the pilots gathered together with their intelligence officers and 
commanders to discuss whether it was their job merely to take out the anti-aircraft guns, 
or to kill the gunners if they were away from the guns.  That particular discussion 
centered not so much on the issue of morality, as one might expect, but on peer 
expectations.  The pilots who targeted the fleeing gunners raised the question of peer 
support with respect to those who did not target the men.  The issue at the tactical level 
was whether the pilots cared more about their fellow fliers or the fleeing gunners.70   But 
leaders at higher headquarters thought more strategically.   
However, nowhere in any of the documents, interviews, or books that I researched 
did I find that Horner, Glosson, Deptula or Warden mention weighing proportionality 
against necessity, despite, for example, Warden’s previously mentioned belief that it is 
reprehensible to attack noncombatants.  That does not mean that they did not weigh those 
moral issues. Obviously, it would not be necessary to use those specific terms to make a 
moral decision.  However, there is no evidence of any debate as to the necessity of any 
targets against the given objectives, how many non-combatant casualties would be worth 
those targets or objectives.  Some notable examples of lasting outcomes due to a lack of 
proportionality-necessity decision follow. 
The Al Firdos bunker incident was the most visible example of unintended 
consequences during the war.  It is even more significant because while a true accident 
(and thus not a war crime), it highlighted the process of targeting and the lack of senior 
oversight over the process which my model says is necessary.   
                                                 
70 Author was 363 Tactical Fighter Wing Mission Planning Cell Intelligence Chief during Desert Storm, the 
Gulf War of 1991.  He led the officers and enlisted who planned all combat missions and debriefed the 
fliers upon their return from their missions. 
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Three and one half weeks into the war, on the night of 13 February 1991, two F-
117s each dropped a 2,000 pound laser-guided bomb onto one of ten known leadership 
bunkers being used on various schedules in the Baghdad suburbs.71  What intelligence did 
not know was that the Iraqi government had put civilian non-combatants into the upper 
floors of one particular building under the guise of a shelter without informing the people 
that the building was actually a leadership bunker.  The result was 204 innocents killed 
and a media frenzy that brought the first major international scrutiny of the war onto the 
targeting process.72  Despite the fact that placing non-combatants at a valid command and 
control target is a clear violation of the Geneva Conventions, it seemed as though 
international media scrutiny was placed on the American planners of the attack, rather 
than on the Iraqi leadership. 
After the bunker incident, Lt Col Deptula had to provide justification for every 
target and rationale for going after any targets in Baghdad.73  Prior to the 13 February 
attack, General Glosson was himself the approval authority for all targets, not General 
Schwartzkopf, who had legal command authority over the operation. 74  After conferring 
with Schwartzkopf, Powell and Glosson, both Secretary Cheney and President Bush 
stated that they supported Glosson in selecting that bunker as it was a military target and 
that the Iraqis should have known not to place civilians there.75  Although it was a 
military target, no one explained how attacking that command bunker would lead to the 
                                                 
71 GWAPS, pg. 69. 
72 Mann, pg.  
73 David Deptula, 12 December 1991, Transcript of Oral History Interview conducted by Suzanne Gheri, 
Edward Mann, and Richard Reynolds, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 
Document Number K239.0472-85, pg. 121.  
74 An Air Force historian asked Glosson, “Sir would you say that for the initial weeks of the war, and 
certainly prior to the actual start of the war, that you and your folks had virtual autonomy in target selection 
and what have you?”  To which Glosson answered with one word: “Total.”  Glosson, Document Number 
K239.0472-89, pg. 83. 
75 Glosson, Document Number K239.0472-89, pp. 84-85. 
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attainment of the primary objective of expelling the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait, nor how 
necessary that target was and the weight of non-combatant casualties that would be 
acceptable to achieve the effect on the target. 
On another target set, the air attacks rapidly shut down the electrical system 
forcing Iraq to use back-up power, yet the Iraqis quickly restored this damage without 
external assistance, showing that the Coalition inflicted little long-term destruction on the 
Iraqi power system.76  Some critics quoted in the GWAPS stated that the strategic air 
campaign resulted in very few Iraqi civilian casualties due to power outages. However, 
other critics believe that the loss of electrical power “contributed to” 70-90,000 postwar 
civilian deaths above normal mortality rates between April and December 1991 due to 
the interruption of power to water purification and sewage treatment.  According to NBC 
News Military Analyst Bill Arkin, the final death toll was 111,000.77  
These numbers or casualties, in and of themselves, are not inherently immoral.  
However, they indicate a degree to which analysts and historians should question whether 
proportionality and necessity decisions would have been made to allow this result if the 
estimates prior to targeting those elements would have yielded these casualty figures. 
All of the above-mentioned operations had varying effects on achieving 
objectives, but one target set stood out as the most decisive in the outcome of the entire 
conflict.  The attacks on the Iraqi fielded forces were very effective, resulting in at least 
50% armor vehicle attrition before the start of the ground war.78  This is quite ironic as it 
is the outer, and supposedly least influential, ring in Warden's theory, yet attacks on this 
ring had the most success with respect to stated objectives.  Adding to the irony, they 
                                                 
76 GWAPS, pg. 75. 
77 GWAPS, pg. 75. 
78 GWAPS, pg 119. 
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were not listed on the “strategic” target list because of their tactical nature and mobility.  
Yet the attacks on the Iraqi forces in Kuwait so debilitated them that when coalition 
forces rolled into Kuwait, Iraqi forces either retreated, surrendered, or were found 
decimated. 
The bottom line from the Desert Storm strategic aerial bombardment campaign is 
that the “strategic” portion (those attacks against regime support targets in Baghdad) 
likely did aid in the speed and decisiveness of the victory.  Yet the extent to which it 
brought about a quicker end to the war may never be accurately known.  What is 
conclusively known is that the use of air power against the fielded forces was very 
effective and had a decisive impact on the outcome of the war.  Attacks against fielded 
forces yielded extremely low collateral damage due to the lack of non-combatants in the 
vicinity of fielded forces, yet achieved the major objective of weakening the Iraqi army 
and forcing its removal from Kuwait. 
 
V. Conclusion 
It is readily apparent that senior civilians who ordered this war intended to limit 
the suffering of the non-combatant population in Iraq.  Furthermore, the officers who 
planned and executed this operation acknowledged the moral issue of harm to non-
combatants as a factor in planning. However, that intent to limit harm to non-combatants 
did not necessarily translate to specific decisions on the necessity of targets and the level 
of acceptable non-combatant casualties.  There were, it appears certain, moral 
motivations by the principals and agents.   But there was not a process of specifically 
aligning those motivations between principals and agents.  Furthermore, there was no 
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doctrine in place to drive planners and commanders to translate objectives into moral 
targeting strategies. 
When asked about pre-war doctrine, Colonel Warden responded, “If we mean the 
1984 Air Force 1-1, then it was neither validated nor invalidated because the 1984 
version, in my mind—and this may be somewhat unfair—was so unspecific that there 
was no real solid thread, core, belief that was incorporated in it other than tha t air power 
was good.”79  That lack of specificity allowed the planners the latitude to go outside of 
and beyond the desires of the American national leadership. 
General Buster Glosson said, “You cannot develop an air campaign unless you 
know what the objective is and what you are trying to do.  Once you know what that is, 
and if you have the luxury of having the resources of the entire free world at your 
disposal, you should ask yourself a straightforward question: ‘What is the smartest 
military way to reach these objectives with the minimal amount of casualties and the 
minimal collateral damage.’  I think in today’s society we must strive to that end.  I think 
it is consistent with our way of life and the type of people we are—what we are all about 
as a Nation.”80  Did the U.S. do what Glosson said?  The answer, from my research, is 
only partly.  The administration and planners tried to define objectives, but did not 
coherently determine the means to achieve them with minimal casualties. 
To General Horner, the objectives were clear: “After talking to Schwartzkopf, to 
the President, the idea was this: To get the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait.  That was right 
from the President, and to cripple the nuclear/biological/chemical—I use ‘cripple’ 
                                                 
79 Warden, Document Number K239.0472-114, pg. 60. 
80 Glosson, Document Number K239.0472-89, pg. 120. 
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because it was revisionist history.  It was destroy.”81  However, Colonel Jim Blackburn, 
Director of Targets for the Air Staff in 1990, and a planner on Colonel Warden’s ad hoc 
staff, stated repeatedly to his superiors during the planning, as well as to historians after 
the war, tha t he was concerned over the difference in General Schwartzkopf’s objectives 
and those that Colonel Warden developed.82   
Clearly some planners recognized a misalignment of principal and agent 
motivations that could have led to less than moral targeting decisions.  Blackburn did not 
say whether his concern was moral or practical, but either way, a practical concern could 
have a moral component, especially with respect to targeting elements of the enemy state 
that do not materially lend to the attainment of the national objectives. 
Likewise one of the two key links between Warden’s planning group and the 
Black Hole in Riyadh, Lt Col Dave Deptula, said that the daily guidance for planning did 
not come from the JFACC, General Horner, but was developed within the Black Hole by 
the planners and signed out by General Glosson.  He said that they had “more freedom 
than any operation in history,” and that their targeting decisions were based on Warden’s 
“5-rings thing” rather than direction from the CINC or President.83  Another person that 
linked Warden’s planners with the wartime execution in the Black Hole, Major Mark 
“Buck” Rogers, said that the planners tried to counter those who were determined to fight 
the Iraqi Army to achieve the primary objective.  Rogers stated after the war, “You don’t 
                                                 
81 Horner, Document Number K239.0472-93, pg. 53. 
82 James Blackburn, 21 April 1993, Transcript of Oral History Interview conducted by Suzanne Gheri, 
Edward Mann, and Richard Reynolds, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 
Document Number K239.0472-73, pp. 10, 75. 
83 Deptula, Document Number K239.0472-85, pp. 2,4. 
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have to fight his force to win.  You attack those things that he holds dear or those centers 
of gravity that will impact his ability to fight.”84   
Such a position, however, assumes that to “win” it is necessary to affect those 
centers of gravity outside the battlefield.  By all accounts, that was not a position that the 
President, Secretary of Defense, CJCS and CINC held after the Al Firdos bunker was 
attacked based on the restriction to target in Baghdad after that attack.  It seems certain 
that given the motivations of the principals and agents, had doctrine existed that 
established formal processes to ensure objectives were translated into strategy, then it is 
probable that, at the very least, the CINC would have been likely to make a decision to 
balance the necessity of the targets against the proportionally acceptable number of 
noncombatant casualties.   
In my research, I have not found any references to any of the major players 
having been asked prior to the war how many total non-combatant casualties the 
objectives were worth.  Nor was I able to find evidence of this question being asked after 
the war and compared to the reported casualty figures from the GWAPS.  However, it is 
hard to imagine that the same targeting decisions would have been made if the estimates 
approached the actual post-war reports. 
In Chapter Three I put forth the following hypotheses: 
1. Moral outcomes to military operations are more likely when the planning and 
execution community follows established doctrinal procedures that constrain 
planners to develop strategy that achieves specified national objectives. 
 
2. Moral outcomes to military operations are more likely when military planners’ 
and executors’ (agents) motivations, and those of national leaders (princ ipals), 
are aligned and focused on moral ends. 
                                                 
84 Mark Rogers, 3-4 June 1991, Transcript of Oral History Interview conducted by Suzanne Gheri, Edward 
Mann, and Richard Reynolds, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Document 
Number K239.0472-103, pg. 72.    
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In this case study I showed that few doctrinal procedures existed at the time of 
Desert Storm and that key players did not follow them.  Furthermore, the motivations of 
certain key agents did not line up with principals’ objectives.  The lack of oversight by 
principals allowed for processes and structures to be established on an ad hoc basis.  
Although these were arguably brilliant decisions and resulted in a decisive victory, there 
was not a proportionality-necessity balance made for objectives or targets by the Joint 
Force Commander or his superiors.  The result was that while senior national leaders 
desired moral targeting decisions, the numbers of acceptable non-combatant casualties 
was not consistently weighed against target necessity during Desert Storm. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Operation Allied Force Case Study: 
Can You Stop Paramilitaries From Torching A Neighborhood  
By Bombing A City 300 Miles Away? 
 
Air Vice Commodore David Whilby said this past Saturday (3 
Apr) “the sole purpose of the bombing is to stop the suffering.”  Yet we 
hear from other capitals that the purpose is to punish the Yugoslav Army 
for its attacks on Kosovo.  But we also hear that the bombing was intended 
to prevent a regional humanitarian crisis, which has since grown worse 
than most could have imagined.1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Throughout most of the 1990s, the world witnessed the kind of ethnic warfare in 
the Former Yugoslav Republics that contradicted the vision of harmony and integration 
that Europe was trying to achieve.  Despotic local rulers, rape camps, murderous criminal 
elements given free reign to terrorize populations, terrorists openly transferring arms 
drugs, and people across borders, refugees flooding European countries struggling to deal 
with issues from reunification to recession, international peacekeepers being used as 
Human Shields – these issues were a shameful blight on the progress Europe made at 
ending the seemingly constant warfare of previous centuries.  When the Albanian 
population of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo began an active bid for independence and 
Serbian paramilitaries began a terror campaign against the Albanian population in 1998, 
the international community understood that an imposition of force would likely be 
necessary to end the latest chapter in this saga.   
                                                 
1 Air Force Doctrine Center internal memorandum, dated 6 April 2000.  Used with permission of HQ Air 
Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, Al. 
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After the humiliations the international community suffered in Bosnia -- with UN 
peacekeepers handcuffed as human shields to bridges and other potential targets without 
a clear response -- there was an understanding that UN peacekeepers would likely not be 
effective.  Credible force would be necessary to compel whatever sanction the 
international community placed on the belligerents.  NATO took the lead for this round 
of action against Serbia.  On 24 March 1999, NATO countries initiated their first combat 
operations, named Operation Allied Force, to coerce Yugoslav President Slobodan 
Milosevic to end Serbian actions against the Albanian population in Kosovo.  The 
decision to enter into combat operations and the criteria for Jus ad Bellum are beyond the 
scope of this study.   
I will explore, however, the moral implications of events that occurred during 
combat operations.  During Allied Force, constraining doctrine was in place but not 
followed.  Furthermore, principals and agents made no effort to align their motivations 
with respect to objectives and targets.  As a result, proportionality-necessity targeting 
decisions were not consistently made.   
As in the previous case study, I explore the doctrine in place at the time of the 
operation and determine the extent to which it directed planners to take into account 
national objectives when developing strategy.  In the case of Allied Force, the doctrine at 
the time of the planning for the war was sound for guiding the planning and conduct of 
operations.  However, I show in this chapter that doctrine was not followed and could not 
necessarily be followed due to a lack of clear and consistent objectives.  A 2001 General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress noted that “many U.S. participants in the 
operation believed that these departures [in doctrine] resulted in a longer campaign, more 
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damage to Yugoslavia, and greater risk to alliance forces than likely would have occurred 
if doctrine had been followed.”2  Such a longer operation and greater damage to 
Yugoslavia would certainly call into question whether moral norms were followed.  I 
review the doctrine in place prior to the war and the structures and processes that were 
followed and circumvented during the planning and execution of operations.   
I then explore the principal-agent relationships and motivations that affected the 
planning and execution of combat operations.  It was the motivations of the principals, 
planners and war fighters that affected whether doctrine was followed and whether moral 
targeting decisions were made.  During the war, these motivations did not align between 
principals and agents.  Whether it was disagreements as to how long the war would last 
or disagreements regarding appropriate targets, the alignment between principal and 
agent motivations was absent.  I explore these variables with respect to whether or not a 
proportionality-necessity balance was made for each objective or target.   
 
II. State of U.S. Military Doctrine for Operation Allied Force 
 
After the lessons of Desert Storm, the DoD and Air Force undertook an updating, 
and in some cases, a baseline writing of operational war-fighting doctrine. Several key 
joint doctrine documents were published or revised between Desert Storm and Allied 
Force.  The capstone joint doctrine publications, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed 
Forces of the United States, and Joint Pub 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) 
                                                 
2 United States General Accounting Office, GAO-01-784, Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain 
Alliance Cohesion Resulted in Doctrinal Departures, Washington, D.C., July 2001, pg.2.  The title to this 
document seems to explain why doctrine was not followed, however, even in the case of maintaining 
alliance cohesion, with different objectives promulgated to planners, both objectives and cohesion could 
have been achieved.  
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were published on 10 January 1995 and 24 February 1995 respectively.  The two other 
key publications, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations and Joint Pub 5-0, 
Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations were published in February and April 1995.  And 
the Doctrine for Command and Control of Joint Air Operations was published in 
November 1994.  These publications came about as a result of lessons learned by the 
services during Desert Storm, each being published after the standard two-year research 
and coordination process between the services and Joint Staff.   
As with all doctrine, they are authoritative, and bear the following exhortations to 
the services and commanders implementing them: 
The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this 
doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the 
commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.3 
 
 
Most importantly, the new doctrine documents were more joint– that is they were 
not as centered on a single service as a result of the success of joint operations in Desert 
Storm.  While they did not necessarily fully eliminate service leanings, they strongly 
stressed the best practices and principals necessary to achieve the good of the entire 
country rather than the good of the individual services. 
The U.S. Air Force also undertook an update of its own service doctrine after its 
Chief of Staff established in 1997 the Air Force Doctrine Center, which reported directly 
to him and his successors.  In September of 1997, Chief of Staff General Ronald 
Fogleman signed Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine. 
The Center also undertook researching and writing the entire family of Air Force doctrine 
                                                 
3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) , 
Washington, D.C., 24 February 1995, pg. i. 
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documents to put AF doctrine in line with joint service doctrine and provide the Air 
Force input to joint doctrine.  These doctrine documents provide airmen a framework 
from which to organize and employ air power in the pursuit of national interest as 
dictated by the President.  The primary doctrine documents relevant to the planning and 
conduct of Allied Force were the UNAAF, JP 5-0, JP 3-0, AFDD-2 Organization and 
Employment of Aerospace Forces (the draft version of AFDD-2 that was in the field 
being used for the planning of Allied Force was identical to the final signed version that 
was officially published after the war)4, and AFDD 2-1 Air Warfare.   
In the following sections, I follow the format from Chapter 3 and discuss the extent to 
which the U.S. military followed doctrine in Allied Force based on its structures and 
processes.  I then review the factors that affected principal and agent motivations. 
 
Doctrinal Processes 
The new doctrine publications were, first and foremost, good starting points from 
which planners could develop strategies to achieve objectives.  The doctrinal process 
outlined earlier in chapter four was established and practiced by U.S. military planning 
staffs worldwide and set to be implemented for Allied Force.  However, a set of 
circumstances arose that made it virtually impossible to follow established doctrine.   
Objectives that military leaders require from national leaders were virtually non-
existent and when available, contradictory.  The planning staffs and doctrinal structures 
were split up and separated by General Wesley Clark, the Commander in Chief, U.S. 
European Command (CINCEUR) and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
                                                 
4 Personal correspondence from Lt Col (Ret.) Bob Poynor, Air Force Doctrine Center, principal author of 
AFDD-2, 22 August 2003.  
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(SACEUR).5  This precluded smooth and even necessary coordination between his 
subordinate staffs.  Finally, fighting the war under the banner of NATO command and 
control, while separating U.S. forces and planning processes from the rest of the allied 
doctrina l structure, made coordination between staffs difficult at best.  The result of these 
factors was a breakdown in the balance between proportionality and necessity.  
As Serb paramilitary attacks against Albanians in the Kosovo province increased 
through 1998, and as the peace talks in Rambouillet, France, seemed to be going 
nowhere, NATO’s staff issued official messages to its member states.  On 24 September 
1998, NATO’s highest political body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) voted to issue 
and Activation Order to member states’ militaries to prepare for both a Limited Air 
Response and Phased Air Operation against Yugoslavia in support of NATO 
Contingency Operational Plan (CONOPLAN) 10601.6 
However, that very month, during the lead-up to potential operations against 
Yugoslavia, there was an absence of clarity as to the objectives for which planners were 
ordered to develop strategies and an absence of constraints on planners.  Senior general 
officers at the Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Europe (USAFE) requested the Air Force 
Doctrine Center to deploy three officers with a sound understanding of the region and 
conflict, air operations, and experience in joint planning for combat operations.  The 
Doctrine Center agreed and sent a team along with officers from the College of 
                                                 
5 General Clark assigned the planning of the air operations to the Combined Air Operations Center in 
Vicenza, Italy, nominally under the command of the NATO Commander In Chief, Allied Forces Southern 
Europe in Naples, Italy, with key intelligence Staffs in Germany and England, as well as his own targeteers 
in Belgium.  Courtesy Air Force Doctrine Center Case Study, November 1998, and Final Air Force 
Doctrine Center Allied Force Assessment, 1999.  
6 Minutes of Evidence, “Kosovo Political/Diplomatic/Military Chronology,” Select Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, The United Kingdom Parliament, accessed at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/9111806.htm on 29 Oct 2003.  
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Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) to conduct a case study of the 
planning to date for potential combat operations.7   
The purpose was to determine if the planning process had followed established 
doctrine to date and to assist the various staffs in correcting any problems.8  For three 
weeks, the team consulted officers at various headquarters involved in the planning to 
that date, including HQ USAFE, in Ramstein, Germany, HQ EUCOM in Stuttgart, 16th 
Air Force in Aviano, Italy, the NATO Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in 
Vicenza, Italy, 6th Fleet in Naples, Italy as well as NATO Commander of Allied Air 
Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), also in Naples.  
What the officers conducting the case study found was multiple, parallel, 
disjointed planning processes that violated multiple doctrinal tenets.  The major findings 
were that the planning process violated the principals of unity of command and 
objective.9  All the problems spawned from those two doctrinal principals.  In the 
following paragraphs, I address those findings and the measures taken to correct them. 
Before planning can be accomplished, strategies conceived, and coordination 
between various elements on the planning bureaucracy to develop a strategy, planners 
require specific objectives as a minimum starting point.  AFDD 1 explains: “Success in 
military operations demands that all efforts be directed toward the achievement of 
common aims…this principle holds that political and military goals should be 
                                                 
7 Air Force Doctrine Center, “Trip Report, Warrior Preparation Center, Einsiedlerhof, Germany 18 Oct – 4 
Nov 98,” 9 Nov 98. Internal unclassified report to the Commander, AFDC, by officers performing 
“Doctrine Wingmen” Case Study.  Used with permission of AFDC Commander and Vice Commander, 
2001.  
8 Author was a participant-observer as a member of that Doctrine Center team deployed to conduct the case 
study in Europe in October 1998.   
9 See Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Washington, D.C., 10 January 1995, pg III-1, and AFDD 1, pg. 12, for a discussion of the principals 
of war and how they guide doctrine. 
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complementary and clearly articulated.”10 (emphasis original)  According to a finding 
by U.S. Air Force researchers, multiple separate sets of objectives were officially 
transmitted to the planners and forces designated to deploy in support of operations in 
Yugoslavia.  None were identical, each emphasizing a different aspect of the objectives, 
such as to maintain alliance cohesion, or to degrade the Yugoslav air defenses, or to 
destroy fielded forces.  The objectives from the Commander, US EUCOM, did not match 
those transmitted by the Joint Staff, or those sent by the Air Component Commander or 
even one low level staff in Germany that had no authority to transmit the objectives but 
did so anyway. 11   
The clarification of those objectives was one thing the “doctrine wingmen” were 
not able to rectify.  Every staff they visited and assisted, and every commander they 
spoke to, gave the same answer, namely that clear objectives were never transmitted from 
Washington or from the CINC, General Wesley Clark.  Inferences about the reasons for 
this will be discussed in the following section on principal-agent motivations.  However, 
one theme was consistently brought up and that was that the planning staffs had to try to 
divine the specific intent of the President and CINC absent clearly defined and 
measurable objectives.12 
The planners on the various U.S. and NATO staffs were not told specific 
objectives, but they were told to prepare to conduct operations, either as a coalition, or for 
U.S. forces only.  They were told by the North Atlantic Council to prepare to implement 
                                                 
10 AFDD 1, pg. 13. 
11 Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center Case Study Final Briefing, November 1998.  Information used 
with permission from the Air Force Doctrine Center.  Author was participant observer in this research trip 
to U.S. European Command to determine compliance with doctrine in the planning that led to Allied Force. 
12 Air Force Doctrine Center, “Trip Report, Warrior Preparation Center, Einsiedlerhof, Germany 18 Oct – 4 
Nov 98,” 9 Nov 98. 
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NATO CONOPLAN 10601.  This plan did not define specific objectives, but it did 
outline three phases of operations the planners were to define strategies for. 
Phase I: establish air superiority over Serbia and supremacy over Kosovo 
by taking out Serbian air defense systems, and reduce Serbian 
command and control capabilities; 
Phase II: attack military targets inside Kosovo, as well as Serbian 
reinforcements in Yugoslavia south of the 44th parallel; 
Phase III: expand air operations to cover a wide range of military targets 
throughout the whole territory of Yugoslavia.13 
 
However, there was no guidance as to when the phases would change, or the specifics of 
what end was to be achieved through these phases.  With the technology available to 
NATO forces as well as the limited number of targets that would correspond to these 
objectives, it would have been possible to conduct all three of these phases in parallel, 
rather than sequentially.  Still, these phases and their objectives were difficult to quantify 
and measure.  The command staffs could not know how wide a range of targets to attack 
in Yugoslavia, or at what point command and control was sufficiently reduced. 
Despite requests by nearly all planning staffs to synthesize objectives, the 
differences remained after the commencement of operations.  Even President Clinton and 
the NATO Secretary-General gave speeches outlining different objectives for the NATO 
forces, as did the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen.   
One day prior to the commencement of the war, NATO released the following 
political and military objectives.  Political: 1. help achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis 
in Kosovo by contributing to the response of the international community and 2. halt the 
violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political solution. 
                                                 
13 John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, Traci Williams, European Contributions 
to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation , Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 
2001, pg. 16.  
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Military: 1. halt the violent attack being committed by the Yugoslav Army and security 
forces, 2. disrupt their ability to conduct future attacks against the population of Kosovo, 
and 3. support international efforts to secure Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreement 
to an interim political settlement.14 
On 24 March, 1999, Secretary Cohen told the media at a press conference that 
“The military objective of our action is to deter further action against the Kosovars and to 
diminish the ability of the Yugoslav army to continue those attacks if necessary.”15  This 
wording was a close paraphrase of the first two NATO objectives, but it did not match 
the wording of either the President or NATO Secretary General.    That same day, 
President Clinton, at a press conference, stated three objectives for Unites States forces: 
1. To demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to [the Serb] 
aggression [against Kosovar Albanians] and [NATO’s] support for peace. 
2. To deter the Serbs from attacking helpless Kosovar Albanians and to make 
them [the Serbs] pay a price for their actions if they continued to do so. 
3. To damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo by seriously 
diminishing [Serbia’s] military capabilities.16 
 
In fact, in military terminology, there is a huge difference between “halting a 
violent attack” and “deterring further action.”  Halting involves a potentially much 
greater use of force.  But “demonstrating NATO’s seriousness” is an unmeasurable 
objective. Planners had three different primary objectives that would require three 
different levels of effort and force structures. 
But those differences in direction were not the end to the conflicting guidance.  A 
week after the previous guidance was given, the NATO Secretary General put forth the 
                                                 
14 GAO-01-784, pg. 20. 
15 Department of Defense News Briefing, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 23 March 1999. Available on-line: 
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar1999/t03241999_t0324sd.html.  
16 “President Clinton Address to the Nation Regarding NATO Air Strikes Against Serbia.” 24 March 1999, 
On-line.  Available at http://kiev.usembassy.gov/press/990326_clinton-kosovo_eng.html   
Accessed 15 April 2004. 
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following as NATO objectives, still not identical to the guidance given previously by his 
staff: 
1. Stop the killing in Kosovo 
2. End the refugee crisis; make it possible for them to return 
3. Create conditions for political solutions based on Ramboulliet Accord17  
 
Gingras and Ruby point out that serious problems can arise from a lack of 
coordinated direction: 
The contrast in wording from an address by Clinton nine days 
earlier was enough to cause a serious difference of opinion regarding how 
to conduct the war. American planners, ordered to damage the capacity of 
Serbia to wage war, subjected a range of targets to attack. Other members 
of the Alliance did not recognize that U.S. objective as a NATO aim and 
would not agree to certain targets. This dispute over guidance inserted 
friction into the process of coordinating multinational planning staffs and 
into the operations of the coalition as a whole. 18 
 
Such friction can lead to political differences, such as those that arose during Allied 
Force.  Even worse, it could hinder coordination that would prevent disproportionate non-
combatant as well as combatant loss of life.  While the differences could be attributed to 
the nature of the political behind-the-scenes dialogue taking place, the fact remains that 
planners and commanders needed clear and measurable objectives and direction.  They 
must be measurable and concrete so that commanders could tell when they achieved a 
given objective.  The question most often asked by planners and commanders to the 
                                                 
17 Transcript of press conference given by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and SACUER General 
Wesley Clark, 1 April, 1999 in Brussels, Belgium.  Accessed 15 April 2004 at 
http://listserv.cc.kuleuven.ac.be/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9904&L=natopres&T=0&F=&S=&P=264. 
18 Jeffrey Gingras and Tomislav Ruby, “Morality in Modern Aerial Warfare” in Joint Forces Quarterly 
(Summer 2000), p. 110. 
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Doctrine Center study team was “How do we know when we have demonstrated NATO 
resolve, or degraded a capability?”19 
One key doctrinal procedure that was not followed was the issuance of a formal 
Operation Order (OPORD).  When an OPORD, the formal document that outlines 
objectives, and command relationships between the combatant components, is purposely 
not issued, as was the case during the early planning for operations in Yugoslavia, 
planners and executors lack the guidance Huntington said they should expect to receive.  
While only General Clark can definitively say why he would not publish an 
OPORD, there is one possible reason that a researcher could infer.  As the CINCEUR 
(wearing his U.S. hat) and SACEUR (NATO hat), General Clark would not have been in 
direct command of this operation.  This operation was fought within the NATO command 
structure, and because the U.S. joint task force was established under the command of 
Admiral Jim Ellis, who was also the NATO commander of the operation and based in 
Naples, Italy.  As such, General Clark was not in command of the forces in the field.  
Publishing an OPORD would clearly delegate command authority to a subordinate flag 
officer who would then control forces.  Without an OPORD, the CINCEUR could 
continue to direct forces and conduct of operations through an informal daily video-
teleconference and have all communication go through him instead of from the JTF 
commander directly to the Pentagon. 
U.S. Air Forces in Europe published the Air War Over Serbia (AWOS), One Year 
Report, which pointed out the following in an unclassified section: 
(U) As previously mentioned in the planning chronology, for reasons 
best known to those staffs, neither European Command nor Joint Task 
Force Noble Anvil developed any operations orders.  Without the 
                                                 
19 AFDC Case Study, November 1998. 
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European Command staff having developed a plan or an order, the Noble 
Anvil staff had no firm starting point for its planning, a condition shared 
with European Command's other components and Noble Anvil 
subordinate components (Sixteenth AF as the Air Force Forces staff).  
Without CINCSOUTH updating a four-month old operations plan into an 
operations order, the JFACC [Joint Forces Air Component Commander] 
and his staff had no firm starting point for their planning.20 
 
Without clear guidance, strategies cannot be developed to achieve a measurable 
end state.  How does a person measure whether the U.S. has supported the international 
effort?  How does the alliance deter further attacks?  One might argue that flying low 
over the country’s capital city demonstrated resolve, or that it is necessary to shed blood. 
These unquantifiable objectives cannot lead to sound military strategy.  The GAO report 
noted: 
Since the goals of the military action were not to defeat the 
Yugoslavian leadership but to get it to stop the violence and reach a peace 
agreement, it was unclear how to achieve the goals with air operations. 
Several officials stated that the NATO alliance’s objective of 
demonstrating resolve led initially to approved targets that were selected 
to show that the NATO alliance was serious rather than tied to a coherent 
military plan. It was not until the objectives were clearer with defined end 
states, about 1 month into the operation, that the military leaders 
developed guidance that could be translated into a coherent campaign.21 
   
Another political decision limited the scope of the operation, which went against 
doctrine, but which was the prerogative of national leadership.  Namely, President 
Clinton ruled out ground forces from the beginning of planning for combat operations.  
Rationale for this decision as well as others that affected doctrinal planning will be 
discussed in the section on principal-agent motivations.  While the President had valid 
political reasons for ruling out ground forces, doing so publicly afforded the Yugoslavs 
                                                 
20 United States Air Forces in Europe/Studies and Analysis, Air War Over Serbia, One Year Report, 2000, 
pg. 266. 
21 GAO-01-784, pg. 7. 
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the ability to move their forces around in a manner they would not have done had the 
threat of ground forces remained on the table – a threat that could have tremendously 
aided NATO planners.   
Furthermore, few targets were approved for the initial attacks and none of them 
would have had any effect on stopping the Serb paramilitaries from attacking Albanians 
in Kosovo.  The GAO reports “the alliance approved only about 50 carefully chosen 
military targets prior to the campaign.  The alliance expected to strike these initial targets, 
which were mostly air defense systems, within 2 days.”22  In hindsight, it is obvious that 
bombing surface to air missile sites outside the Kosovo province would not necessarily 
stop paramilitaries from torching homes.  However, this strategy was followed as a 
coercive air campaign aimed at changing the Serb leadership’s calculus.   
The military and doctrinal problem with this strategy is that you do not know if 
you are succeeding until the opponent ultimately gives up.  There is no way to know 
whether one more day will make the difference or whether it will take a month of the 
same strategy.  So this then impacts the moral targeting decisions.  If there is no way to 
measure success until success is ultimately achieved (or in the opposite manner the U.S. 
decides to cease the strategy as in Vietnam), this leads to the moral question of how can 
the leadership measure necessity and proportionality.  If there is no way to measure the 
success of the coercive strategy was working, it would be impossible to meaningfully say 
that one target was worth the necessity and another was not.  All coercive targets could 
be said to be worth the harm to non-combatants involved. 
The GAO report discusses two other areas in which existing doctrine was 
adequate for the operation, but was not followed, resulting in problems with the 
                                                 
22 GAO-01-784, pg. 8. 
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execution of the mission.  The first is the development and issuance of dual air tasking 
orders (ATO).  Because of the dual and separate structures (to be discussed in detail in 
the following section) for US-only and NATO forces, separate ATOs were issued on a 
daily basis.  The GAO report says this did not effectively support air operations to the 
fullest extent possible, but that the doctrine was sound and should have been followed 
with the publication of a single ATO.   
Second, the GAO report finds that while doctrine for joint intelligence operational 
support existed, it was not followed. Multiple, and often conflicting intelligence reports 
from various countries were not coordinated and shared within the alliance. These issues 
impacted the proportionality-necessity decisions through information availability and the 
separation of ATOs led to different principals making the decisions based on different 
understandings of what was being targeted.  
Finally, doctrine was not followed with respect to the targeting process.  Whereas 
joint doctrine called for a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) to be established 
by the joint force commander, this was not done in Allied Force.  The JTCB typically 
“reviews target information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and may prepare 
and refine joint target lists.”23  Instead, multiple organizations worked in a “federated” 
targeting process to develop targets that could be attacked.  The problem was that absent 
clear guidance as to desired effects that would be achieved, and that would logically lead 
to attaining objectives (which were never clearly defined), the goal became finding 
anything that could be considered a military target, rather than achieving any desired end 
state.  The process went in reverse of what doctrine called for, and in effect became a 
strategy in search of an objective, rather than the other way around.. 
                                                 
23 Joint Pub 3-0, pg. III-26. 
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According to a senior USAF planning commander, the CINC hoped a strategy 
would arise as a result of the targets attacked. 
At the very highest levels [General Clark], DMPIs [Desired Mean 
Points of Impact – the actual aim points for the bombs] were carefully 
chosen by looking at maps and target descriptions.  From this, certain 
targets could expect to receive some level of damage.  From this, effects 
on target systems could be estimated.  Based on this, objectives would 
become apparent, and in the end a strategy might fall out.24 
 
This process is exactly backwards from that presented in doctrine, but once the senior 
commander decided on this process, his subordinates had little choice but to follow.  The 
senior U.S. targeteers at NATO headquarters agreed with this assessment by stating that 
General Clark personally selected targets based on a punishment strategy, rather than 
through a methodological process to achieve a given effect.25  That strategy in the end 
worked, but doctrinally, there was no way to plan targets to achieve effects since the 
desired effect was the macro- level punishment of the Serbian regime. Morally, this 
strategy can lead to situations where there is no way to measure necessity except by 
saying that all targets were necessary. 
According to a post-war briefing by a senior USAF general officer, the planning 
process skipped all the steps that would have ensured non-combatant protection. 26 This 
senior leader said, at the AF Doctrine Symposium in March 1999, that the planning 
process skipped from determining objectives directly to picking targets without any 
attempt to match desired effects with appropriate weapons or platforms.  The NATO 
                                                 
24 Senior USAF planning officer and commander during Allied Force.  Personal electronic correspondence 
with author, 3 October, 2003. Officer asked not to be named since he is presently serving in a senior 
leadership position. 
25 Personal interviews with Col Scott Bethel, then Chief of Targets Intelligence, NATO Headquarters 
Intelligence Directorate.  Series of interviews between April 1999 and Jun 2002. 
26 “Integration of Air and Space in Operational Planning,” briefing to AF Doctrine Symposium, Maxwell 
AFB, Ala., 1 March, 1999. 
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Chief of Targets during Allied Force agreed, saying that there were so many targets 
added to the list so quickly in order to build up a large list, that there was not enough time 
to accomplish a proper workup on them all.27   
The Washington Post agreed: “NATO began the war over Kosovo with a one-
volume Master Target File containing 169 targets.  It ended the war with more than 976, 
filling six volumes.”28  This non-doctrinal directive resulted in a waste of resources 
(bombs, fuel) and lives (both of non-combatants on the ground and potentially for airmen 
flying through threats) without achieving any operational or strategic effect.   
Of course, some may argue that this bombing did have the strategic effect of 
showing resolve.  However, I would ask how that effect can be measured until the war is 
conceded by one side or the other.  How can that objective be measured for 
proportionality?  How many non-combatant lives are worth demonstrating resolve?  If a 
national leader actually made a decision that the objective of demonstrating resolve was 
worth a certain number of non-combatant lives, then the strategy could only proceed up 
until that number was reached, whether the opponent conceded or not. 
Dana Priest in the Washington Post reported that Clark had made the threat out to 
be so significant that they had more assets than targets to attack.  “By late April, NATO 
had more combat planes than it had targets to hit.  Both Clark and the airmen putting 
together each day’s tasking orders were frustrated.”29  With so few targets and so many 
planes, and ever more flowing into theater, the few approved targets were continually 
attacked, even after they were functionally or totally destroyed.  It appeared as though the 
                                                 
27 Bethel interview.  The process of building up the target list to the 2,000 targets General Clark demanded 
of the staff became known as “T2K” and for many people became the sole focus of their work. 
28 Dana Priest, “Target Selection Was Long Process” Washington Post, 20 September 99, A11. 
29 Priest,  “Target Selection Was Long Process”. 
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alliance’s objective was a particular sortie rate, rather than a desired effect or end state.  
From a moral standpoint, this was arguably a waste of resources and needlessly 
threatened the lives of NATO airmen and Yugoslav and Albanian non-combatants.   
Because target selection became an issue, so did the process by which targets 
came to be approved.  Civilian leadership inserted itself into a targeting process that 
would heretofore only be accepted as the military’s responsibility.  Prior to the conflict, 
the few pre-planned targets were approved at the White House in what would be 
considered a satisfactory moral decision, especially since the initial targets were all 
selected against specific remote military facilities with very low, if any, expected non-
combatant harm.30  However, those targets were quickly exhausted with no response from 
the Serbian government but defiance.  So the “T2K” target process was begun.  As 
mentioned above, this process was so intense that none of the targeteers or planners 
interviewed could say that they made any true non-combatant casualty estimates for their 
commanders.  As a result, when these targets were attacked, the non-combatant casualty 
rate began to rise. 
When casualties among non-combatants began to rise, civilian leaders began to 
ask what we were hitting and why we were hitting it.  When those civilian leaders were 
not satisfied that target necessity was properly balanced against proportionality of non-
combatant casualties, they exercised their authority over the military.  French President 
Jaques Chirac, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Bill Clinton all determined to 
“review targets that might cause high casualties or affect a large number of civilians.”31   
                                                 
30 Ronald Chilcote, Colonel, USAF, personal interview with author, 22 Jan 2004.  Colonel Chilcote was 
commander of the 32nd Air Intelligence Squadron, and was responsible for the pre-war target slides sent to 
the White House for approval. 
31 Priest, Dana, “Bombing By Committee”, Washington Post, 20 September 1999, A1. 
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The issues discussed regarding doctrinal processes are often endogenous with 
doctrinal structures.  The processes were often not followed because structures were in 
place to prevent such a process, but also because of non-aligned principal-agent 
motivations.  The following discussion will cover the doctrinal structures that affected the 
moral outcome of operations. 
 
Doctrinal Structures   
Another potential source of variation in moral decision-making based on doctrine 
is the number of varying and diverse organizations within the established structures with 
which planners must coordinate.  For example, in Operation Allied Force, the planners on 
the NATO staff in Mons, Belgium, were not the lead planners, despite the international 
nature of the operation.  Neither were the planners of the NATO Commander in Chief, 
Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), the legal commander for the combat 
operations over the Former Yugoslavia.   
The lead planning and command and control center for the war was the Combined 
Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy.  With the war commanded and 
controlled out of the CAOC, and with the NATO Supreme Commander in Belgium, and 
with planners and targeteers in Washington, D.C., England, Germany, Italy, and Belgium 
all trying to coordinate on the daily planning and subsequent execution of the war, the 
potential to miss the balance between necessity and proportionality was exacerbated.   
The Air Force Doctrine Center officers that traveled to Europe to conduct the case 
study of planning for combat operations in Yugoslavia in October 1998 found that, at 
least as disturbing as the lack of clear and unambiguous guidance from senior leadership 
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was the completely disjointed command structure established by the commander, U.S. 
European Command.  At the time the ACTORD was issued from NATO, there was no 
NATO command structure for this operation, but there were at least three U.S. joint task 
forces (JTF) established to handle various and overlapping missions or functions within 
Yugoslavia.   
There was a JTF for a limited air response that was based out of the U.S. 6th Fleet 
Headquarters.  The task of this JTF was to conduct limited air and cruise missile strikes 
against Yugoslav targets.  The second JTF was for a phased air operation and was tasked 
to conduct continued strikes if a short-duration of strikes failed to coerce the Yugoslav 
regime to reign in paramilitary forces in Kosovo.  This JTF was established at the U.S. 
16th Air Force Headquarters.  The third JTF was set up for the purpose of extracting the 
Kosovo Verification Mission personnel there under the auspices of the OSCE.  In the 
event of hostilities towards the observers, this JTF was tasked to forcibly enter 
Yugoslavia to rescue these observers.  A fourth JTF was in the process of being 
established during the case study period for the sole purpose of search and rescue of 
downed airmen during hostilities.32 
The doctrinal problem was that this setup broke the principle of unity of 
command, and thus unity of effort.  All four of these functions assigned to the various 
JTFs were simply functions that could and should be performed under a single command 
structure.  The first two JTFs were essentially the air and naval components of wha t 
eventually became the Allied Force command structure.  But the commander of European 
Command wanted separate commands under his direction.  Had the disparate JTFs gone 
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to war as initially organized, the prospect for serious coordination issues, potential 
fratricide and lack of proportionality-necessity balance would have been high.   
Numerous individual U.S. fighter, bomber, and tanker squadrons were assigned to 
all three of the JTFs concurrently.  The AFDC case study researchers inquired at the 
various staffs about the deconfliction required to ensure that none of the assets were 
tasked to fly different missions at the same time by different JTFs, or that one was not 
tasked to fly through an area in which another asset was dropping ordinance.  When 
asked which air taking order they would fly if tasked by multiple JTFs, the units in 
theater all said that they hoped it would never come to that and that the higher 
headquarters would work it out between themselves.33  There was, in fact, no answer to 
that question. 
However, the research team found that the multiple JTFs were not communicating 
because they had not been authorized to coordinate among themselves.  The senior 
commanders felt that they had a good working relationship between peers, but the final 
case study report found that their subordinate staffs did not have that same relationship.34 
The case study team also found that for the JTFs that were planning strikes, there was no 
effort to make a proportionality-necessity balance largely because there was no guidance 
about what should be attacked or what end state they were to achieve. 
The case study officers made a formal recommendation that a single command 
structure be established along established NATO command and control lines.  The 
multiple JTFs should dissolve and the U.S. commanders of the JTFs should assume their 
NATO roles (which they hold aside from their U.S. commands).  The JTF that was 
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commanded by the 16th Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Short, became the air 
component headquarters for Allied Force.  The JTF commanded by Vice Admiral 
Murphy became the naval component of Allied Force.  These components fell under U.S. 
Navy Admiral Ellis, who served as Commander In Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe 
(AFSOUTH).  Without the outside recommendation by the AFDC study team, a team 
requested by senior leadership in Europe to audit the planning, it is unlikely that the 
changes in structure would have been made. 
Two important factors facilitated this beneficial change in the command structure. 
First, NATO decided to afford the Milosevic government time to accept the terms of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  Therefore, the Alert 
Order sent from NATO to its member states was not acted on and afforded the U.S. time 
to reorganize the command structure and align it with NATO.  The second factor was that 
there was a convenient NATO structure into which the U.S. could plug its assets.  
General Short, besides being the commander of 16th Air force, was also the commander 
of NATO’s Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH), and Admiral Murphy was 
not only the commander of 6th Fleet, but also of NATO’s Strike Forces South.   
If fighting only as the US, they would report to CINCEUR, General Clark.  But 
under the NATO command, they would fight under the command of CINCSOUTH, 
Admiral Ellis.  To align the U.S. command with the NATO command, General Clark 
accepted the recommendation from the AFDC case study team and disbanded the various  
JTFs and named Admiral Ellis the commander of the new, single JTF for Allied Force. 
As the commander of both AFSOUTH and the U.S. JTF (called JTF Noble Anvil), he 
would command forces in both chains of command jointly from one headquarters. 
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However, even after the formation of a single JTF (Noble Anvil), the problem 
was far from solved.  The GAO report says the following about the doctrine and the 
departure from said doctrine regarding the structure under which the war was executed: 
Doctrine: Formation and organization of a joint task force : A 
joint task force should be representative of the force that is participating 
and trained to be effective. 
Departure From Doctrine : Joint Task Force Noble Anvil was not 
staffed with people representative of the force that was participating nor 
was the staff trained to conduct combat operations.35 
 
General Short addressed this departure in his End-of-Tour Report as a major 
problem from the outset of the war. 
We spend all our career learning that wonderful bumper sticker: 
“train the way you intend to fight.” And here we did exactly the opposite. 
We invented a headquarters that never existed before, used as a core, the 
NAVEUR [US Navy Europe] staff that had no warfighting background, or 
experience, or training and was a Navy-only staff, and put them in charge 
of a NATO operation. Absolutely ludicrous. We got through it by 
happenstance and not by design.36 
 
Although no such incidents occurred during the war, running parallel command 
structures with parallel communications architectures and separating US-only 
information from other NATO allies could have led to political fallout due to injury to 
U.S. forces or loss of life from fratricide.  Non-US NATO countries generally approved 
their own missions flown during the war based on their own calculus of the risk weighed 
against the expected benefit.  What they were not able to balance was the risk to their 
forces to U.S. actions they did not know about due to separation of tasking orders.   
                                                 
35 GAO-01-784, pg.6. 
36 End of Tour interview with Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, 
(Aviano Air Base, Italy) and Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (Naples, Italy). Conducted 
on 23 March 2000 at Naples, pg 20.  Obtained from the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell 
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Internal Air Force Doctrine Center correspondence shows that there was a great 
concern about potential coordination problems between U.S. and non-US forces.37  For 
example, U.S. B-2 stealth bombers were not put on the NATO ATO.  The B-2s flew from 
the central U.S. to Kosovo non-stop for their bombing missions.  Small changes in the 
winds over the Atlantic Ocean or aerial refueling durations could have been enough to 
delay their bombers’ times over their targets.  But allied jets going over those same areas 
without knowing of the B-2s’ locations could have flown underneath bombs from the 
bombers.  Such is only one example of problems that may arise with dual chains of 
command.   
Add to these separate chains of command organizational input from the State 
Department, the National Security Council Staff, the NATO allies, and ad hoc groups 
such as the one established by the U.S. Air Forces in Europe Director of Intelligence to 
determine combat assessment of targeting.  These structures were outside the normal 
doctrinal structure of an operation, and the coordination required to conduct the operation 
became almost unmanageable, let alone follow a process that would ensure a moral 
balance between necessity and proportionality.   
The aforementioned ad hoc intelligence group brought in to perform combat 
assessment was a classic example of what Downs says will happen in such cases: “The 
actual design of informal structures created primarily to serve the bureau’s formal goals 
will be influenced by the personal goals of the creating officials.  As a result, all informal 
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with permission of AFDC.  
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structures and procedures in bureaus, whether primarily reactive or adaptive in nature, 
will be designed and used partly to serve the self- interests of the officials concerned.”38   
For example, this specially-picked group of intelligence officers was brought in 
under the direction of an Air Force Colonel to do specifically what the established 
structure could not or would not accomplish: find evidence favorable to the political 
administration and the Supreme Allied Commander, with respect to bombing accuracy 
and achievement of desired effects in the face of mounting evidence that the air war was 
not stopping Serbian action in Kosovo.39  Rather than using the available intelligence 
information to determine how to best achieve the military outcomes, the personnel were 
working to justify the operations beyond the inherently visible effects of the bombing 
operations.  This was necessary because the personnel working in the established 
intelligence structures that were doing the combat assessment were not finding damage to 
fielded forces as was stated by in daily press accounts. So another, outside group was 
necessary for finding and determining outcomes that the doctrinal structures could not. 
American military doctrine for establishing joint commands, as well as planning 
and executing combat operations was in place prior to the conduct of the Air War Over 
Serbia was sound.  The problem was that it was not followed.  Certainly doctrine affords 
commanders the discretion to deviate from its procedures and structures when 
circumstances dictate.  However, as was evidenced by the critical self-reflection within 
the military, the circumstances did not dictate that doctrine should have been set aside.  
The result was aircraft flying missions against targets that had no clear or even remote 
relationship to Serbian military and paramilitary forces operating in Kosovo or the 
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government directing them.  U.S. combatants flying into harm’s way to attack those 
targets and the non-combatants near them were harmed disproportionately to their 
necessity to achieve objectives.  Given these doctrinal lapses, perhaps they can be 
understood in light of the principal and agent motivations that formed decision-making in 
this war. 
 
 
III. Principal-Agent Motivations in Allied Force 
 
As with the previous case study, it is necessary to bound the actors researched 
herein.  Otherwise, one could make an argument that every actor in any supervisory or 
leadership position was a principal, which is factual, but not practically true for this 
study.  In this case study, I will define as principals: 
President – Bill Clinton  
Secretary of Defense – William Cohen  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - General Hugh Shelton 
Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe (SACEUR) - General Wesley Clark 
US Joint Force Commander and NATO Commander in Chief, Allied Forces 
Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) – Admiral Ellis 
US Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) and Commander NATO 
Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH) - Lieutenant General Michael 
Short 
 
The primary agents I consider are: 
General Wesley Clark 
Lieutenant General Michael Short 
Planners and targeteers at Vicenza, Italy, Mons, Belgium and Ramstein, Germany 
Aircrew flying the combat missions 
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Having defined the principals and agents for this case study, I will attempt to 
show how the factors I outlined in Chapter 3 that affect principal-agent motivations, 
circumstances, constraints and beliefs and interests, affected the primary U.S. actors in 
this conflict.  I will show how these factors affected alignment of principal-agent 
motivations and thus, moral outcomes of Allied Force.  Because these factors all 
influence a single variable, it is natural that there would be a compounding effect 
between them, such as beliefs and interests compounding the effects of cons traints or 
circumstances. 
  
Circumstances 
The first and foremost circumstance that affected all principals and agents was the 
fact that there was not a direct attack against the U.S. by an adversary.  There was no 
U.S. vital national interest at stake.  The interests affected by the Kosovo crisis would be 
considered as important interests under the construct of the 1998 National Security 
Strategy. 40  With mid-term congressional elections set for the autumn of 1998 and with a 
very difficult domestic situation in the form of a sex scandal, the President was treading 
carefully with domestic popular opinion and poll numbers.41  The President could not and 
would not fight a major war that could potentially bring down his domestic support. 
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Force in His Administration,” Washington Post, 31 December 2000, pg. A1. Harris notes “polls were the 
essential device in helping Clinton survive and govern in a hostile Washington climate that for at least two-
thirds of his tenure required him to fight to preserve his influence.” See also John M. Broder, “The White 
House Memo ; Laurels Elude President as Public Judges War,” New York Times, 22 June 1999, Pg A24.  
“Mr. Kohut [Director of the Pew Center] noted the oddity that Mr. Clinton's public approval ratings rose 
after he admitted an adulterous relationship with Monica S. Lewinsky, but fell markedly when he unleashed 
the first missile attack on Yugoslavia in March.” See also Mark Gillespie, “Support For Mission Holds 
Steady, But Skepticism Grows” Gallup News Service, 2 April 1999.  Gallup poll shows that 64% of 
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The second major circumstance affecting principal-agent motivations was the fact 
that this would be a coalition war.  The United States would have to lead the war effort, 
but that fight would have to be under the NATO umbrella.  As such, the U.S. could not 
dictate the terms of engagement or the terms to end the conflict.  Under the NATO 
umbrella, all 19 member states (the number at the time of Allied Force) had to agree upon 
for all actions.  Even though an American was the SACEUR, he had a British deputy and 
German chief of staff to counter his weight in discussions.  Given the necessity for 
consensus, American principals and agents could do things without challenge from allies. 
However, the U.S. administration and military were not ready to wait for the 
Alliance to make consensus decisions on those planning and execution issues they 
thought most important.  To this fact, General Short said: 
That’s why we invented Noble Anvil two months before the war 
started. The clear message we sent to our NATO allies was “well, when it 
gets to shooting time, only Americans are really capable of being in 
charge and making the tough decisions and running things. The rest of you 
guys can all be helpers and facilitators but we'll make the hard decisions 
and run this thing.” Quite frankly, our NATO allies will never forget the 
arrogance that we showed in doing that. And I think we’ll be years in 
recovering from it.42 
 
From the general’s words, it appears clear that there he disagreed with his 
principals on this decision dealing with the circumstances under which the U.S. would 
fight.  That disagreement and the ramifications of the decision to establish a US-only side 
of the war governed many principal-agent interactions for the entire conflict.   
Finally, the daily press briefings from NATO Headquarters in Mons, Belgium 
would open the entire operation to public view every day.  That circumstance played in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Americans thought NATO bombing has worsened the situation, and only 41% believed that the U.S. could 
achieve its objectives through NATO.   
42 General Short, End-o f-Tour Report, pg. 21. 
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the back of every operator’s mind.  Having to stand up in front of journalists every day 
both in Europe and in Washington, principals and agents knew the ir actions and decisions 
would have to stand up to public scrutiny.   
For example, one A-10 pilot who dropped bombs on a convoy of what turned out 
to be largely Albanian refugees was brought to Mons, Belgium, to develop a presentation 
of what he saw and why he bombed the convoy to the press corps at NATO headquarters.  
What was not said during the press conference was that he was discussing the situation as 
he saw it on the radio with senior commanders in the CAOC who were looking at the 
same convoy from a feed from an unmanned aerial vehicle.  The leadership at the CAOC 
gave him clearance to drop on the convoy based on the belief that it was a paramilitary 
convoy under disguise.  No other aircrew member wanted to be in the same position as 
this pilot and they were subsequently very hesitant to bomb anything they were uncertain 
of for the duration of the war.43   
 
Constraints 
Several constraints significantly affected principal and agent motivations, which 
affected moral outcomes.  Among these were the decision not to use ground forces, the 
strict constraint on the military to limit friendly casualties, and the strict constraint to 
limit collateral damage. Another constraint intended to facilitate command and control 
but also to limit shirking was the daily video teleconference (VTC) conducted among key 
principals and agents.  Finally, I will discuss the impact of the presence of the 
                                                 
43 Bethel personal interview, 12 May 2002.  Also confirmed by an officer who was on duty at the CAOC at 
the time of this incident.  Officer asked not to be named.  
 178 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) on principal and agent 
motivations.   
The first constraint that led to misaligned principal-agent motivations was the 
limited nature of the war and subsequent escalation.  For the first week of the war, the 
NATO alliance flew only 48 strike sorties a day.  Retired Air Force General Buster 
Glosson, who led the planning effort during Desert Storm, commented that "When you 
fly less than 50 bombing sorties per day for seven days, you're not serious about what 
you're doing. At best, it's sporadic bombing."  Furthermore, when the U.S. administration 
took ground forces off the table for planners from the beginning, that action severely 
limited the options of U.S. and NATO forces.   
Alexander Haig, former Secretary of State and U.S. Army general, along with 
Colin Powell, opined that this was a very poor strategy.  The Air Force Chief of staff 
even said that the strategy of limited strikes and no ground forces went against the 
opinion of the majority of senior military officers.44  Without the ability to fix Serbian 
ground forces with the threat of NATO ground action, NATO allowed the Serbian ground 
forces free reign in Kosovo.  At the same time NATO thus limited itself to attack other 
types of targets only through the air that could only coercively affect the Serbian 
leadership, which could not be measured and assessed by NATO planners and 
intelligence personnel. 
 Another constraint affecting principal-agent motivations was the strict order from 
the national civilian leadership to limit collateral damage. This constraint may have been 
based in large measure on the desire to maintain positive domestic poll numbers as 
                                                 
44 Joel Hayward, “NATO’s Air War in the Balkans: A Preliminary Assessment,” New Zealand Army 
Journal  (No. 21, July 1999). 
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discussed in the previous section.  Yet this must be accepted as a valid reason for wanting 
to limit collateral damage.  As far as my model is concerned, it is neutral as to the reasons 
moral decisions are made. A moral decision is not better because the decision-maker 
wanted to consider morality than if he made the moral decision out of a desire to maintain 
public opinion.  However, in this case no systematic proportionality-necessity decision 
was made for Yugoslav targets.   
There were, on the other hand, a flat number of non-combatant casualties that 
were set as the upper limit for any target regardless of importance.  That number was 25 
and it was set internally within the American planning structure and did not come from 
the President or his advisors.  If 25 or more non-combatants were expected to be harmed 
by an attack on any given target, then the target was to be rejected.   
There was no methodology for determining the expected number of non-
combatant casualties other than guessing at how many people should be in a particular 
building at a given time.  There was no prioritization of targets based on objectives, as 
was called for in joint doctrine.  The planners simply wanted to do what they thought 
their principals desired and thus set an arbitrary number that was never challenged or 
questioned by their principals.  Early in the war, this desire led targeteers who were 
closest to the general officer principals in the headquarters to make estimates consistently 
below 25 casualties.45  With targeteers spread all over the world and feeding targets to the 
CAOC, there was no consistent method for estimating non-combatant casualties.  This 
was both a structural and procedural problem with targeting.  
                                                 
45 Bethel interviews.  Author also interviewed another targeteer from the operation on 8 October 2003.  
This targeteer was a major at the time and requested to remain unnamed. 
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Here, principal-agent motivations were affected by proximity to principals and 
those who can coerce or provide oversight of their agents.  However, this proximity did 
not always affect agent compliance, and the motivational differences were more likely to 
lead to shirking the farther away from senior principals the agents were.  I will give 
examples of this in the following section. 
Another example illustrating how motivations can change based on constraints 
springs from the ICTY.  One key CAOC planning officer interviewed for this dissertation 
stated that he went into Operation Allied Force motivated to plan for a moral conduct of 
operations based on internalized moral norms.  During the course of the conflict against 
Serbia, however, the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia requested permission from U.S. authorities to interview certain members of 
the NATO planning staff on which this officer served.  The U.S. denied the request, but 
the request sent strong signals through the force.  This officer’s motivation quickly 
changed from wanting to do the right thing morally to not wanting to go in front of an 
international court. 46  While the outcome of this officer’s motivation was the same, as the 
base motivation changed which could lead to misalignment of motivations with his 
principals. 
This officer was not confident of the U.S. being able to protect him from 
prosecution while stationed in another country if a foreign prosecutor and court found his 
actions to be punishable.  Therefore, the recommendations this planner made to his 
commanders was affected by the constraint of fear of prosecution.  He stated very 
strongly that he would not plan or recommend any target that could potentially be seen by 
                                                 
46 Because the Department of Defense has not officially released information concerning this event, the 
officer cited here requested his name remain undisclosed. 
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others, even outside his chain of command, as being disproportionate to necessity.  While 
this officer’s sense of morality is strong, the problem with this decision is that it takes 
away the obligation of senior decision-makers to make the decision since they are 
responsible. 
The circumstances and constraints described above were important to the 
alignment of principal-agent motivations.  However, the following section will show that 
beliefs and interests were at least as important to moral outcomes. 
 
Beliefs and Interests 
Unarguably, beliefs and interests affected principal-agent motivation alignment 
tremendously during the conduct of this war.  These ranged from ambition and desire to 
be seen as a war leader, personal beliefs in the effectiveness of air power, the interest in 
seeing a particular service component “having a good war,” and the belief that the Serbs 
would fold and accept NATO terms after very limited strikes.  Clashes between 
individuals’ beliefs and interests led to serious misalignment of principal-agent 
motivations and to shirking, both beneficial and harmful to the moral outcome of 
operations in Yugoslavia. 
One important belief that led to misalignment of motivations was the notion that 
the Milosevic government would capitulate after only a few days of bombardment.  
General Clark says in his book that he believed Milosevic would cave in to Western 
demands to accept a settlement with Kosovar Albanians because he did not want to be 
bombed.47  Furthermore, the AFDC case study researchers found that all the planners and 
subordinate commanders stated that because of General Clark’s belief that Milosevic 
                                                 
47 Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War, New York: Public Affairs, pg. 119. 
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would capitulate after a mere show of bombing, the initial plan was only to target several 
radio relays in Kosovo.48  Finally, General Clark was convinced by the officers who 
advised him and by the knowledge of his relationship with Milosevic, that Milosevic 
would welcome a small show of force against limited targets in order to then capitulate 
while holding on to power.49 
Other leaders and planners did not accept these premises, and that led to 
disagreements in the planning for operations.  General Short, the commander of the air 
campaign, often disagreed with Clark.  Air Force Magazine commented that “Had he 
been free to structure the air effort as he wanted, Short would have arranged for the 
leaders in Belgrade to wake up after the first night ... to a city that was smoking. No 
power to the refrigerator and ... no way to get to work." 50  Short believed that in very 
short order, Milosevic's staunchest supporters would have been demanding that he justify 
the benefits of ethnic cleansing, given the cost to their capital.  In his mind, this would 
not have been disproportionate since the attacks would have been devastating but short-
term resulting in a change of government and potentially rapid repair of damaged 
infrastructure.   
Short certainly cannot be shown to have desired an immoral strategy, per se, 
based on his preferred course of action.  He believed that the harm done to non-
combatants would have been lower overall by a short, intense campaign against the 
capital city.  He felt the necessity of ending the war quickly outweighed the level of 
potential non-combatant harm such a strategy would bring.  However, under such a 
                                                 
48 AFDC Case Study.  
49 Bethel, personal interview.  See also Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War, pg 170. 
50 John A. Tirpak, “Washington Watch: Short’s View of the Air Ca mpaign,” Air Force Magazine, 
September 99, on-line, www.afa.org., accessed 13 April, 2000. 
 183 
desired course of action, leaders could not make a proportionality-necessity decision 
because there is no way to measure the necessity of individual targets apart from the 
entire list, which would then allow destruction on a much larger scale than desired by the 
administration.  In that respect, it would not have resulted in moral decisions. 
Clearly, these differing approaches would lead to vastly different levels of non-
combatant casualties. Which strategy would win out in the end?  Both.  When the Serbs 
did not capitulate after a week of bombardment, the intensity was increased.  Clark 
demanded and received more aircraft and more targets until bombing Belgrade was a 
daily occurrence.  The New Republic reported how Clark went his own direction: 
With NATO's credibility on the line and Kosovar lives in jeopardy, 
Clark prepared to transform diplomacy backed by the threat of force into 
diplomacy backed by its use.  But Clark's plans were vastly different from 
those favored by his Pentagon colleagues, who advocated the Powell 
Doctrine's dictate of overwhelming force in pursuit of a specific goal.  
Instead, Clark merged military and diplomatic action into a hybrid--as the 
bombing intensified, so did NATO's demands, moving from a return to 
negotiations to halting the ensuing ethnic cleansing to a final settlement of 
Kosovo's political status. It was an inc remental war with incremental 
objectives, brazenly flouting the Powell Doctrine.51 
 
The difference in Clark and Short’s interpretations of how long it would take the 
Serbs to capitulate was not where their differences ended.  Short believed that a strong, 
focused bombing campaign (doctrine called for a rapid campaign at lowest cost to 
achieve objectives) against the Serbian leadership would result in the shortest route to 
Serbian compliance and thus save the most lives.  Clark believed that attacking Serbian 
                                                 
51 Spencer Ackerman, “Falsely Accused,” The New Republic (Vol. 229, No 14, 6 October 2003), pp. 11-13. 
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forces in Kosovo was the best way to end Serb attacks against Albanians.  Their 
disagreements were both vocal and well known both in theater and back in the US.52 
Perhaps no single event better showed the difference in core beliefs and interests 
between Clark and Short and how that difference translated to misaligned motivations 
and moral outcome in the conflict than Clark’s very public rebuke of Short over a 
worldwide video teleconference during the conflict.  Clark told Short that he wanted a 
number of B-52 bombers placed on call in a perpetual orbit over the Adriatic Sea for the 
purpose of being ready to strike mobile targets in Kosovo when directed.  Short opined 
that the senior leaders needed to bring a “greater level of reality” into the discussion and 
that such an order would remove those B-52s from effective targeting.  Clark snapped 
back “Right.  I’m being lectured on reality by an Airman.”53  He said this over an open 
video teleconference link to forces all over Europe and in the US, effectively cutting 
Short’s authority with his own forces.    
The fact that they so vehemently disagreed on the direction the war was to take 
led to significant discussion among the warfighters which targets to bomb if ordered to do 
so.  One pilot opined to me during the war that any aircrew member who does not attack 
any target he is given should be tried for insubordination, while another U.S. officer, 
flying as an instructor in another country’s contingent, freely said that he and his 
wingmen would drop bombs in the open and claim threat reaction or weather as the 
                                                 
52 Disagreements between the generals were played out often in the daily video tele-conferences that linked 
all U.S. players on both sides of the Atlantic.  Numerous senior officers that sat in on the daily VTCs took 
notes and spoke to the author of the vocal disagreements in motivation and desired direction of the war.  
Two officers from different locations and different staffs specifically made their daily notes from these 
VTCs available to the author for research.  Both were very similar and detailed identical quotes from both 
generals. 
53 Multiple interviews by author with NATO Chief of Targets, COAC planning officers, and Chief of 
Intelligence at the CAOC. 
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excuse for not attacking the given target if they thought non-combatants would be 
harmed disproportionately to the benefit it would bring to ending the war.54 
In a complete reversal of Desert Storm, pilots who dropped their bombs out in the 
open, away from their designated targets, were never called to task by their peers.  One 
key member of the NATO planning staff at Vicenza, Italy, stated that “this happened all 
the time, and the most amazing thing is that nobody in the fighter squadrons called them 
‘wussies’,”55 which would indicate an expectation in times past to see them as such.  In 
this case, the peer expectations and ambiguous objectives formed a totally different 
context within which our planners and executors worked from 1991.  These 
circumstances, beliefs, and interests certainly affected whether there was a moral 
outcome of operations.  The lowest level agents, namely the aircrew themselves, made 
proportionality necessity decisions they felt were not being made at higher levels.   
Such a low-level decision does not, however, invalidate the need for aligned 
motivations.  These aircrew might believe a target to be unnecessary, and thus any attack 
on it to be disproportionate, but senior leaders normally have more information available 
and are responsible for making that proportionality-necessity decision.  If their 
motivations were aligned and the agents believed their motivations as to the objectives 
were aligned with their senior principals, they would likely not be as quick to make this 
decision apart from their principals. 
                                                 
54 Personal correspondence by author with several aircrew members from various deployed units during 
Allied Force while author was member of the Air Force Doctrine Center.  Discussions occurred during 
April and May 1999. 
55 Air Force officers in multiple interviews in Montgomery, Alabama, and Washington, D.C. (the 
Pentagon). Officers asked that their identity remain anonymous for purposes of this research.  Interviews 
were carried out in June 2002, as well as during Operation Allied Force when the author worked on the 
staff of the Air Force Doctrine Center.  
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Given the reluctance to wage an intense bombardment campaign, how did non-
combatant casualties become such an issue during this war?  That was partially a result of 
processes, namely the movement from one phase of air operations to the next, and from 
motivations based on media coverage.  However, it was also a result of different 
motivations based on interests and beliefs.  
 Besides disagreeing with his subordinates, General Clark also had differences 
with his principals, General Hugh Shelton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen.  He 
believed as a military commander, and as a geographical Commander in Chief, that he 
knew the situation better than did his principals. He met with Milosevic often leading up 
to the war and knew him from the Dayton Accords in 1995.  The principals, he believed, 
did not “fully appreciate the overall NATO problem in the region.”56  He even described 
his relationship with Cohen as “rocky.”57   
 Part of the reason for this rocky relationship was that many in the principal-agent 
chain of command were opposed to the conflict, and were as uncomfortable with 
engaging Yugoslavia as they were with Serb actions in Kosovo.  Clark discusses the 
opposition he received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in pushing the administration to take 
forceful action, with the generals arguing against Clark that conflict in Kosovo was not in 
the national interest to commit such a large force as Clark argued for.58  But even his air 
component commander, Lt. Gen. Mike Short says that there is no question that the U.S. 
was pushed into the conflict without a clear end state.59 
                                                 
56 Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War, pg. 172. 
57 Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War, pg. 133. 
58 Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War, pg. 163. 
59 Short, End-of-Tour report, pg. 36. 
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 Clark’s relationship with Cohen and Shelton was further strained because they felt 
he was asserting too much influence through his role as SACEUR contrary to certain 
positions of the United States Government.  When it became clear that he was on the 
opposite side of key issues from his principals, such as the limited nature of the war and 
harm to civilians, Clark appeared more frequently in the media and tried to use back 
channels to the White House and State Department.  At that point, he was delivered a 
message from Secretary Cohen via General Shelton.  The message was harsh and blunt: 
“Get your [expletive deleted] face off TV.”60 
At the close of the war, Clark ordered British General Michael Jackson to engage 
the Russians and prevent them from landing at the Pristina Airport before NATO forces 
could secure the location.  Jackson refused and told him “I am not going to start World 
War III for you.”61 And when Clark then ordered Admiral Ellis to use the Apache 
helicopters deployed to Albania to do what Jackson would not, Ellis refused.  Asked 
about Wesley Clark after they had both retired, Shelton commented “I've known Wes for 
a long time. I will tell you the reason he came out of Europe early had to do with integrity 
and character issues, things that are very near and dear to my heart.”62  While these 
anecdotes do not in themselves show that moral targeting decisions were not made, they 
do materially support the notion that principal agent relations were so strained within the 
military chain of command that it was difficult to align motivations towards a particular 
end. 
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So how did these beliefs and interests affect proportionality-necessity decisions?  
As previously mentioned, there was not a proportionality-necessity decision made for 
each target or objective at the beginning of this war.  There was, however, a standing 
directive not to exceed 25 non-combatant casualties.  Yet even that standard was not 
adhered to early in the war.  The NATO Chief of Targets said “we were so overtasked 
with numbers of targets that the targets became anonymous numbers.”63  Targeteers 
would try to justify lower numbers of expected casualties by adjusting their assumptions 
of building occupancy to lower the numbers below 25 simply because they were too 
inundated to perform detailed analysis.  
One example should illustrate the lack of proportionality in targeting to meet 
stated ends.  In the first week of the bombing, rather than rise up against their government 
as General Clark expected they would, a Serb mob in Belgrade looted the McDonalds 
and several other American businesses.  Clark then told his staff “Well, we’ll make sure 
they can’t get to McDonalds tomorrow,” and ordered bridges over the Danube between 
Belgrade and Novi Sad dropped as a reprisal without consideration for military 
necessity. 64  The war was in the opposite direction of these targets and they had nothing 
to do with slowing down Serb aggression in Kosovo.  Furthermore, this would clearly be 
a case of shirking direction from the national civilian leadership and the strategy of 
limited targeting. 
On the eve of the Orthodox Easter, Clark held a meeting with his Deputy 
SACEUR (a British Four-Star General), his Chief of Staff (A German Four-Star 
General), as well as his chiefs of intelligence, operations, plans, and targets.  He wanted a 
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particular television station destroyed that night so that Serbian television could not 
broadcast any propaganda.  However, the Chief of Staff asked Clark if he realized that 
the following day was Easter.  The German officer reminded Clark that the target was 
very near the patriarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church and St. Sava Cathedral, which 
people would be walking into at the time of the attack.  Clark replied “Good.  Maybe that 
will give them something to look at on the way to church.”65  The attack was ordered and 
carried out.   
Although there were no press reports of non-combatant casualties from that 
attack, they were anticipated by the General’s own words, yet without any discussion of 
proportionality or necessity. Furthermore, an attack this close to the prime religious site 
in the capital should have merited a deeper discussion. It was after this attack that 
national leaders in Washington, Bonn, Paris and London took a more personal interest in 
the target approval process.  
Finally, when U.S. forces attacked an Albanian operating post in a publicized 
incident of “friendly fire,” the internal investigation revealed that General Clark had 
personally ordered the attack.  Early in the war, General Clark gave his personal cell-
phone number to select leaders in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) so that they could 
contact him in the event the Air Component did not support their requests.  In this 
particular instance, the Air Component staff knew the requested target was a rival KLA 
element, rather than Serb paramilitaries, and refused the request for air support.  
However, General Clark ordered the bombing.  After this incident, he agreed to turn over 
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all real-time targeting requests to the targeting cell at his Air Component headquarters in 
Italy.66 
As incidents such as the one just described increased in frequency, NATO leaders 
began speaking more forcefully.  Secretary Cohen told a news conference “And I'd like to 
be clear here. We are attacking the military infrastructure that President Milosevic and his 
forces are using to repress and kill innocent people. NATO forces are not attacking the 
people of Yugoslavia. They are attacking the military forces that are responsible for the 
killing and the carnage in Kosovo.”67  To ensure that this comment and the comments of 
the daily press briefers in Belgium were not turned around on the allies, several NATO 
national leaders decided to take the targeting decisions into their own hands. 
Because target selection became an issue, so did the process by which targets 
came to be approved.  Civilian leadership inserted itself into a targeting process that had 
previously been accepted as the military’s responsibility.  When casualties among non-
combatants began to rise, civilian leaders asked what was being hit and why.  When those 
civilian leaders were not satisfied that target necessity was properly balanced against 
proportionality of non-combatant casualties, they exercised their authority over the 
military.  Jaques Chirac, Tony Blair, and Bill Clinton all determined to “review targets 
that might cause high casualties or affect a large number of civilians.”68   
For most of the second half of the war, especially after the bombing of the 
Chinese Embassy, all targets in Belgrade were reviewed at the White House to ensure a 
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proportionality-necessity balance.  The bombing of the Chinese embassy was not in itself 
an issue of morality in terms of my model, since the embassy was misidentified by a 
Washington-based targeteer and not intentionally targeted for what it was.  However, the 
intended target, an acquisitions center, was placed on the target list in the attempt at 
building the 2,000 target list previously discussed in this chapter without clear necessity.   
After the Chinese Embassy attack and decision by national leaders to oversee the 
targeting process, the targeting decisions became moral.  Up until that point, this decision 
was either not made or was made without sound justification of target necessity.  While 
aggregate numbers of non-combatants harmed in any attack does not indicate the lack of 
proportionality-necessity decision, examining some publicized instances of such harm 
can help researchers determine how those decisions might have been made and should be 
made in the future.  It would be appropriate here to support such a claim with several 
examples of targets where necessity did not outweigh the expected or foreseen non-
combatant casualties.69   
Nis (6 May) – NATO targeted the airfield and a radio relay tower on this day.  
One of the bombs intended for the tower fell short and hit a populated area.  Most likely 
the laser guidance package was attenuated by moisture in present clouds and caused the 
bomb to explode prior to the intended target.  According to a NATO targeteer, the tower 
had just been added to the target list, and although not necessary to achieve strategic 
objectives, it was necessary to give the large numbers of aircraft brought in for the 
operation viable targets to attack.70 
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70 Major Bill Busch, NATO Targeteer during Allied Force, interview by author, 1 Mar 00. 
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Surdulica Old Peoples’ Home (30 May) – NATO says this was an attack against 
a Yugoslav barracks/command post which “shared a perimeter” with the sanatorium.  
NATO knew that the barracks was empty and had been targeted previously and nearly 
destroyed several days before.71 The military necessity of attacking this target, known to 
be empty, multiple times, so close to a retirement home, throws the proportionality scale 
completely out of balance.   
Novi Pazar (31 May) – A missile/bomb hit an apartment block reportedly killing 
at least 11 people and injuring more than 20 others.  The targets were a publishing house, 
printing presses and a regional television and radio headquarters.  However, there was a  
hospital and bus station close by the intended target.  At his daily press briefing the day 
following this attack, NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea said one of the bombs went 60 
meters (nearly 200 ft) long. 72  Although 19 of the 20 bombs hit their intended targets, one 
must question whether those targets were so important to the war’s outcome to 
necessitate 20 bombs in a residential area so close to apartment blocks, a bus station and 
a hospital.   
Leskovac Barracks - In another case, NATO repeatedly bombed a barracks in 
Leskovac that was empty 6 months before the bombing started.  While a military target, 
the risk to aircrew far outweighed any benefit from repeatedly bombing an empty 
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targeting during the war. 
72 “NATO’s Bombing Blunders”, BBC News, on-line, 1 Jun 99, pg. 7. 
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building.  The attacks left few windows on any homes in the city and disrupted medical 
care at the nearby hospital for the duration of the conflict. 73  
Aside from these instances, it was well know that Serbian regular army armored 
forces, which moved into Kosovo to conduct the worst atrocities after the first night of 
Allied Force, were garrisoned outside Kosovo and parked in cantonments when NATO 
flew the initial sorties into Serbia.74  Had NATO flown against those forces the first 
night, rather than attack targets in Belgrade, allied air forces might have achieved all 
three stated objectives in far less time while minimizing (likely eliminating) any 
collateral damage and leaving Serbia’s infrastructure intact.  However, the U.S. initially 
ignored those forces in favor of infrastructure such as bridges and factories.  The result 
was that the Serbian forces that were vulnerable the first two nights of the war dispersed 
throughout Kosovo and largely survived intact during the campaign while conducting 
operations themselves against the Albanian population in the province. 
Destroying bridges in Novi Sad, hundreds of miles north of Kosovo had no 
impact on forces already in the province.  When asked by Human Rights Watch to justify 
bombing those bridges, NATO said that the result was “that the citizens of Novi Sad were 
inconvenienced by the loss of the easiest routes to Belgrade”. 75  Again, morality requires 
that those targets be necessary.  Inconveniencing the people of Novi Sad was not one of 
the stated objectives. 
                                                 
73 Bethel interview; Busch interview; also interviews of Jelena Milivojevic, resident of Leskovac, 
Yugoslavia, during Allied Force, conducted by Jovanka Ruby (author’s mother), 17 April, 1999 and 8 May, 
1999. 
74 “Operation Allied Force: An Initial Doctrinal Assessment.”  Also a reading of multiple press briefings 
from the initial days of the war on the NATO internet site shows clearly that, while Serb paramilitaries 
were in Kosovo long before Allied Force commenced, Yugoslav regular army heavy units pushed into the 
province after the bombing started. 
75 NATO Memorandum to Human Rights Watch. 
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Far beyond solely hurting the people of Yugoslavia, destroying bridges on the 
Danube and along the main north-south line of communication in the region adversely 
affected commerce and trade in all of central and Eastern Europe.  The Danube was a 
major route for transport of goods between the Black Sea and Central Europe, and that 
link was closed until the Danube could be cleared.  The port of Thessaloniki, Greece, 
once the major port for goods to enter Central Europe, has been seriously impacted since 
the roads through Yugoslavia are impassable due to dropped bridges.76  Until the bridges 
are repaired, goods will have to go through Italy and around through Austria to the east 
instead of up through Yugoslavia as in the past. 
  
IV.  Conclusion 
 
Doctrine calls for the U.S. to be open with what the objectives are, or not attack 
that which does not lead to a rapid end to the war.  If non-aligned principal-agent 
motivations preclude doing the former for fear of how it will play out on CNN, then 
perhaps the actions are wrong.  The Washington Post reported that “NATO commanders 
were never sure exactly what it would take to break the will of Milosevic.”77  The desire 
to make life for the Serbian people unbearable enough to overthrow Milosevic certainly 
led to a strategy that diverted significant resources away from attacking fielded forces, 
and wasted fuel and put aircrews in harm’s way to achieve immeasurable results on an 
objective that was not stated by our civilian leadership.  Undermining enemy morale is a 
very difficult objective to measure, making it nearly impossible to compute any political-
                                                 
76 Lt Col Stylianos Karadimos, Hellenic Air Force.  “Rebuilding the Balkans After the War in Yugoslavia .”  
Athens: Greek Air War College, January 2000, pg. 2.  Translated by Lt Col Ioannis Kondarakis, Hellenic 
Air Force. 
77 Priest, “Bombing by Committee.” 
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military benefit of particular targets, and therefore nearly impossible to make a moral 
tradeoff decision. 
Long-term effects of this type of operation are yet unknown.  Even though the 
opposition was unable to unite, a majority of Yugoslav people had a single foe before the 
war: Milosevic.  After the war, because of collateral damage to their country after 78 
days of bombardment, Yugoslavs had two enemies: Milosevic and NATO.  Another 
long-term impact must be the ability to learn lessons from past actions.  Yet the official 
DoD Lessons Learned for Allied Force failed to mention anywhere within its pages non-
combatant casualties and how to reduce them.78 
Barry Posen posits a theory that in order to maintain his nationalist credentials, 
Milosevic could not relinquish Serbia’s claims to Kosovo, and therefore he developed a 
strategy to fight until he could gain an acceptable settlement.  Posen argues that 
Milosevic knew that if he could absorb the bombing, NATO’s restraints on collateral 
damage would break down and exceed the level acceptable to the European Left.79  Prior 
to Posen putting forth this argument, the Air Force Doctrine Center not only agreed, but 
also went a step farther. 
A punishment strategy is built around the expectation of 
psychological impact designed to coerce the adversary.  However, such a 
strategy is dangerous because it cedes the initiative to the adversary, in 
that the adversary determines when (and if) he has been punished enough 
to yield.  If the adversary chooses “no” (as in North Vietnam during 
Rolling Thunder or in London during the Blitz), then the strategy fails.  
Short of Milosevic surrendering, we had no way to determine when our 
objectives would be achieved.80 
 
                                                 
78 Department of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report, Report to Congress, 31 
January 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000). 
79 Barry Posen, “The War For Kosovo,” International Security (Vol. 24, No. 4, Spring 2000), pp. 39-85. 
80 AFDC.  Operation Allied Force: An Initial Doctrinal Assessment. 
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By ceding initiative to the adversary and by not having a clear and measurable 
objective, it becomes nearly impossible to make a proportionality-necessity decision.  
Both variables, doctrine and principal-agent motivation seriously impacted the 
proportionality-necessity decisions.  Throughout the planning process, the decision was 
not made.  However, the targeting decision was eventually withdrawn from theater 
military commanders and made by the President (in consultation with his advisors) 
during the course of the conflict.  At that time, outcomes of the attacks passed the test of 
my model because the level of accepted non-combatant casualties was weighed by 
competent national leadership.   
It is very important to point out that had General Clark actually made a 
proportionality-necessity decision, whatever his calculus was should have passed my test 
for competent senior authority to make that decision.  However, the motivations of his 
agents did not necessarily match his personal motivations, essentially and eventually 
resulting in the removal of the decision from his purview.  When the President and 
SecDef made the decision, their motivations did, in fact, align with the motivations of 
those executing the operations.   
The final AFDC Allied Force report, as well as the GAO report to Congress, notes 
that had doctrine been followed, the necessity of targets would have been able to be 
determined.  Sound doctrine existed prior to this operation.  As mentioned, the AFDC 
officers sent to Europe to review the planning process in October 1998 were responsible 
for getting the skeleton of the command structure changed to reflect what doctrine 
recommended.  However, the targeting process was not followed as recommended by 
doctrine.  Had it been followed, the overall strategy would likely not have changed, 
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however the linkage of target necessity to objectives would have been clear and 
proportionality decisions would have been easier to make by the principals. 
Furthermore, I have shown that there were multiple factors leading to 
misalignment of principal-agent motivations which prevented effective proportionality-
necessity decisions.  In the face of opposition from multiple staff members and senior 
leaders, General Clark had that decision removed from his purview and made at the 
national level.  Had the senior U.S. military leaders in Europe followed the 
recommendations of the case study they requested prior to the war, arguably the issues of 
non-combatant casualties would have been easier to weigh against objectives, making a 
proportionality-necessity decision easier to make. 
In the Desert Storm case study, I showed that there was not a viable doctrine and 
there were misaligned principal-agent motivations.  There was not a proportionality-
necessity decision made for targets in Desert Storm.  In the eight years between Desert 
Storm and Allied Force, doctrine was written, propagated and understood.  However, it 
was not followed in Allied Force.  Furthermore, principal-agent motivations were not 
aligned.  But mid-way through Allied Force, when U.S. national- level principals took the 
targeting authority from the military, and when leaders iteratively agreed on terms of war 
termination, the proportionality-necessity decision was made.  In the final case study, I 
will show that in the War on Terror, doctrine was followed and principal-agent 
motivations were aligned and proportionality-necessity decisions were made. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
War On Terror – Afghanistan And Iraq: 
Deliberately Aligning Motivations and Following Doctrine to Make Moral Decisions  
 
 
I can assure you that those villains will recognize, will discover in 
appropriate time in the future how stupid they are and how they are 
pretending things which have never taken place. – Iraqi Information 
Minister 
 
 
I. Introduction 
On September 11th 2001, the United States realized it was engaged in a war that 
had raged for years, usually against American assets overseas.  But with the attack on the 
United States carried out by foreign terrorists from within the United States, the U.S. 
government would no longer consider the problem to be merely one of law enforcement 
or distant from American cities.  The Global War on Terrorism (or GWOT as it is called 
in the DoD) would be waged by the U.S. with or without assistance from other countries. 
And unlike Desert Storm and Allied Force, this war would be fought in more than one 
location, against regular fielded forces, and irregular militias, both out in the open and in 
urban environments.  If there were opportunities for non-combatant casualties in previous 
wars, this conflict would certainly test the proportionality-necessity balance. 
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The evening of the terrorist attacks on the US, President George W. Bush told his 
senior national security staff the same thing he told the American public in a televised 
address:  “We have made the decision to punish whoever harbors terrorists, not just the 
perpetrators.”1  Thus began a process of planning and executing a war against both 
terrorists and the countries from which they operate.  George Tenet, Director of Central 
Intelligence, told the group that the CIA had been tracking Al Qaeda for years, and that if 
they were serious about going after the organization, that they had a “60 country 
problem.”  At that point Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked the hard questions.  
He inquired whether any targets would be off the table, and whether U.S. allies might be 
considered for targeting.  He suggested that if the U.S. was serious about this threat and 
fighting it as a war, the tools of war would have to go beyond merely military forces, to 
include diplomatic, financial, legal, and informational instruments of power.2 
Such a conflict would offer nearly limitless possible consequences from the 
potentially limitless combinations of options available to planners and decision-makers.  
In this case study, I do not attempt to discern whether the decisions that were made made 
were right for the U.S. nor will I attempt to discern the international relations 
implications for decisions made by states in this war.  I follow the same outlines 
presented in the previous case studies on Desert Storm and Allied Force.  I discuss the 
doctrine in place at the time of the planning and execution of the war and the extent to 
                                                 
1 Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, “America's Chaotic Road To War: Bush's Global Strategy Began to Take 
Shape in First Frantic Hours After Attack,” Washington Post, 27 January 2002, pg. A1.  Woodward and 
Balz were granted interviews with President Bush, all of his national security team, and their personal notes 
for a series of in-depth articles.  The result was an eight-day series of historical articles detailing all aspects 
of the decision-making process from the morning of the attacks and through the following week. 
2 Balz and Woodward, “America's Chaotic Road To War: Bush's Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in 
First Frantic Hours After Attack.” 
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which it was followed.  I then delve into the principal and agent motivations to discern 
whether or not they were aligned. 
Unlike Desert Storm and Allied Force, this case covers a broader war in which, at 
the time of this writing, two major campaigns have taken place both sequentially and 
simultaneously.  For this case study, I consider U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
It is important to note that both operations are ongoing and are not completed.  For that 
reason, this war will not have been researched to the same extent as the previous two 
cases.  Necessarily, the type and amount of information will be more limited than in 
previous cases.   
However, the information contained herein should not be considered less 
significant.  Though fewer in number, the sources are strong, especia lly the planning 
participants that I interviewed.  Examples of these participants are the Chief of Target 
Development at U.S. Central Command (the Unified Command with responsibility for 
prosecuting the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq), the director of Intelligence at Air Force 
Special Operations Command, a member of the Strategy Planning Council in the 
Pentagon, members of Checkmate, the Air Force contingency planners in the Pentagon, 
as well as field grade officers at the Air Operations Center in the Persian Gulf region and 
forward controllers on the ground in Iraq during the fight for Baghdad.  In addition to 
these primary sources, I refer to several briefings presented to various commanders and 
policy-makers in the DoD.   
While some may question my presenting this case before the ongoing operations 
are completed, I believe it would have been irresponsible to ignore available data merely 
to wait for these conflicts to conclude.  Most importantly, the volume of available data is 
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not as important as the qua lity of data.  In this dissertation, I bounded my interest 
primarily in the pre-planned targeting decisions.  For the War on Terror case, I have 
sound sources that describe these decisions very credibly. 
It is also important to note that during this war, with multiple campaigns and a 
much longer time frame than the previous two cases, the U.S. military has had the 
opportunity to learn and adjust to a greater extent than during the previous two wars 
studied.  Furthermore, the military component of this war is only one component of a 
broad government-wide war.  Seeking-out and destroying terrorists and their havens 
abroad would be carried out alongside prevention measures in the U.S. and financial and 
intelligence operations at home and abroad.  Necessarily, the scope of this chapter is 
limited to the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Once again, the decision to 
wage these campaigns was a historical fact.  Other researchers will analyze those 
decisions.  This chapter will consider the moral tradeoffs made in implementing those 
decisions. 
In the Desert Storm case, I found that sound joint doctrine did not exist, and that 
had it existed, it may not have been followed because principal-agent motivations were 
not aligned.  In Allied Force, there was sound doctrine for planning and executing 
operations, but misaligned principal-agent motivations prevented that doctrine from being 
followed.  In neither of those cases was a consistent balance made between necessity of 
targets and objectives against the expected and foreseen non-combatant casualties.   
In the GWOT case study, I show that sound joint doctrine for planning and 
executing operations existed and was followed.  Furthermore, principal and agent 
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motivations were aligned.  With both of these variables present, the proportionality-
necessity decision was consistently made. 
 
II. State of U.S. Military Doctrine for the War on Terror 
When the GWOT began with the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, three 
of the four major joint doctrine documents had been revised or updated since Allied 
Force.  Joint Pub 13, the UNAAF 4, and Joint Pub 3-05 were revised and republished 
shortly prior to the war with Joint Pub 3-0 having a date of 10 September 2001.  The 
other major joint doctrine document, Joint Pub 5-0 was deemed current and did not need 
updating by the Joint Staff and services.  
While not major in scope, some changes and additions to the doctrine publications 
are noteworthy.  The new UNAAF, for example, mentions that new technology and 
informational awareness enabled commanders all the way to the President and Secretary 
of Defense to quickly grasp the situation, and in some cases make command decisions 
that were not possible in conflicts past.6  The document also includes new exhortations to 
commanders and staffs to ensure that clear commander’s intent and clear directions for 
coordination are issued so that all subordinates know what the commander wants, even if 
situations change during operations.7  Since these aspects of command seemed to be 
missing during Allied Force, it was appropriate for the Joint Staff to more forcefully 
reiterate these aspects of doctrine in the new publication.  
                                                 
3 Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Washington, D.C.: Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 November 2000.   
4 Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 10 July 2001. 
5 Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 10 September 2001. 
6 UNAAF , 2001, pg. III-13. 
7 UNAAF , 2001, pp. III-14 – III-15. 
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Joint Pub 1 reminds planners, commanders, and the services that primary among 
the roles of U.S. military power is the “visible ability to act rapidly and decisively in 
regions of U.S. interest, in combat or non-combat operations.”8  This role would be tested 
in the coming campaigns of the war on terror.  Gradually moving forces to a theater and 
building them up over long periods of time would not be acceptable in this war. 
 
Doctrinal Processes 
After the decision was made to conduct the war, the doctrinal process of planning 
the War on Terror was carried out in what I would consider a near “textbook” example of 
joint planning.  In a series of meetings with his entire cabinet and smaller war cabinet, the 
President built a consensus on the course of action and refined the goals and objectives to 
present to the military.  This section will detail that process and how it fell within the 
framework of joint and service doctrine. 
In final form, what the White House came to call the Bush Doctrine was put this 
way: "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and 
those who harbor them."9  That statement, by definition, broadened the scope of this war.  
However, Bush would not allow anyone to push him into a quick, but ineffective strike 
that merely made a show of retaliation.  Woodward and Balz report that on 12 
September, Bush spoke with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and that “Blair told Bush 
he had to made a choice between rapid action and effective action.  And effective action 
would require preparation and planning.  Bush agreed.  For the second time, he said he 
                                                 
8 Joint Pub 1 , 2000, pg. III-1.  
9 Balz and Woodward, “America's Chaotic Road To War: Bush's Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in 
First Frantic Hours After Attack.” 
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didn't want to fire missiles at targets that did not matter.”10  From the beginning, at the 
very highest levels of national leadership, necessity was considered as a vital component 
of planning. 
Later that same morning, the President met with his core national security 
advisors, what would come to be known as his “war cabinet.”  After several pointed 
questions about narrowing the focus and objectives of this coming war, the President 
made it clear that he wanted a long-term plan to win the war against terrorism, and not a 
quick-strike that would make the public and national leadership feel good, but that would 
accomplish nothing.  But just as important as defining the scope and boundaries of the 
war and the objectives, was the necessity, in the minds of the senior national leadership, 
to push the military to fundamentally change its thinking from previous wars.  They 
would have to think about how to fight a conventional war against an unconventional 
opponent half-way around the world.11 
That was a very important point for the doctrinal process of planning for the 
coming operations.  There was no deliberate plan on the books for this conflict (see 
Chapter 4).  The entire process would be conducted under the doctrinal rules for crisis 
action planning.  However, the national leadership was determined that although the plan 
would be developed under CAP processes, it would proceed at a measured pace, to 
ensure it was done right, not just fast.  This important point made it possible for military 
planners to take the time needed to ensure all aspects of operations, to include the moral 
aspects, were considered, and discussed. 
                                                 
10 Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, “'We Will Rally The World': Bush and His Advisers Set Objectives, but 
Struggled With How to Achieve Them,” Washington Post, 28 January 2002, pg. A1. 
11 Woodward and Balz, “ ‘We Will Rally The World’: Bush and His Advisers Set Objectives, but Struggled 
With How to Achieve Them.” 
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The planners had to start with a clean slate.  Woodward, Balz, and Himmelman 
report that Joint Chiefs Chairman, General Hugh Shelton was pessimistic about the 
commencement of immediate military options.  The only approved plans for Al Qaeda 
were contingency plans for cruise missiles strikes against Al Qaeda training camps.  
Rumsfeld made it clear that the military had to develop a new paradigm of war fighting if 
the administration wanted to go after states that supported and sheltered bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda.  “We've never done that before,” Rumsfeld said.12 
So when General Shelton returned to the Pentagon from the White Hosue, he was 
intent to carry out the President’s direction to return to him with options for going after 
bin Laden and the Taliban.  He told Shelton to get with his planners and develop a plan 
that would “hit them hard. We're going to hurt them bad so that everyone in the world 
sees, don't deal with bin Laden. I don't want to put a million-dollar missile on a five-
dollar tent.”13   
On Saturday the 15th of September, the President met with his closest advisors at 
Camp David to agree on the course of the war.  At this meeting, unlike August 1990, 
there was not a developed deliberate plan that the CINC could pull off the shelf to present 
for approval to the cabinet.  He told the President that if he wanted immediate action, 
cruise missiles would be the only option, but that such an option would be hollow and not 
achieve any results.  The only strategy capable of taking down the Al Qaeda network and 
their supporters in the Taliban would involve precision attacks from the air, in 
conjunction with conventional and special forces on the ground working in union with an 
alliance of forces opposed to the Taliban regime.  The key to the war would be 
                                                 
12 Dan Balz, Bob Woodward and Jeff Himmelman, “Afghan Campaign's Blueprint Emerges,” Washington 
Post, 29 January 2002, pg. A1. 
13 Balz, Woodward and Himmelman, “Afghan Campaign's Blueprint Emerges.” 
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coordinating a plan between the military and CIA in a short time so that the campaign 
could begin as quickly as possible.14 
The President directed the Chairman to proceed as briefed.  Shelton then turned to 
the same Air Force organization in the Pentagon that developed the initial plan for Desert 
Storm, Checkmate.  That Checkmate was given a role to play was not necessarily 
surprising.  Although outside the doctrinal staff structure at CENTCOM, the organization 
had become known throughout DoD for its capable and experienced staff of handpicked 
officers with broad backgrounds.   
While doctrine called for the combatant commander’s staff to develop plans, what 
the President wanted first was more high- level, theoretical suggestions, not detailed 
plans.  That is what they would provide, allowing CENTCOM to do the primary 
planning.  The first thing the director of Checkmate and his staff did was to distill the 
President’s objectives.  They knew that to be successful, the first campaign would have to 
have clear, concise, and measurable objectives.  But the planners did not feel that they 
received that level of direction from the administration.  The administration countered by 
saying that if the military needed something clearer, Checkmate should help define those 
objectives formally.15 
While the military had become accustomed to receiving vague direction for 
military operations, the reflexive response from Checkmate was to say “That is not our 
job.”  But instead, the director got his officers together and they reviewed all the 
statements made by the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of 
                                                 
14 Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, “At Camp David, Advise and Dissent: Bush, Aides Grapple With War 
Plan,” Washington Post, 31 January 2002, pg. A1. 
15 Colonel Tom Hyde, Chief of Checkmate, HQ USAF/XOOC, personal interview by author, 14 May 2002, 
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 
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State, and National Security Advisor during the first week after the attacks on the U.S.  
The Checkmate officers condensed the remarks into concise military objectives and 
passed those back up the chain of command through the SecDef.  Those objectives were 
approved the next weekend by the President.16 
These were then transmitted to CENTCOM as the basis for planning the 
campaign, which would be called Operation Enduring Freedom. 17  The planners at 
CENTCOM and at the Pentagon worked on a doctrinal timetable in the process described 
in Chapter 4 to develop a contingency plan that would be approved by the Secretary of 
Defense.  When the Joint Chiefs Chairman told the President that it would take at least 
four days and more likely a week to establish the air bridge necessary to move forces and 
equipment to Central Asia and the Middle East for operations against Afghanistan, 
Rumsfeld grew ever more frustrated.18  He wanted small units moved into theater 
immediately, ready for operations and able to sustain themselves for short periods of 
time.  This thinking ran counter to the norm developed since Desert Storm of building up 
overwhelming force and then conducting decisive operations.   
Rumsfeld’s exhortation did not contradict anything in doctrine.  He specifically 
asked the military to accept greater risk and he was clearly authorized to make that 
decision.  However, that decision to accept greater risk in no way changes the 
requirement to have clear objectives and to target people and facilities that will achieve 
them with non-combatant casualties proportional to the necessity of those objectives and 
targets.  The result was a contingency plan formulated through the doctrinal process of 
                                                 
16 Colonel Tom Hyde, interview by author. 
17 Interview with staff officers in HQ USAF/XOOC, Checkmate, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 16-17 
Oct 2002.   
18 Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, “Combating Terrorism: ‘It Starts Today’,” Washington Post, 1 February 
2002, pg. A1. 
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crisis action planning, a plan approved by the President and Secretary of Defense and 
carried out by the regional combatant Commander-in-Chief, General Tommy Franks.  
According to doctrine for crisis action planning, the President had approved a course that 
called for a combination of cruise missile and manned bomber attacks in coordination 
with military forces on the ground.19  That would be the plan the world saw carried out in 
Afghanistan.   
In Afghanistan, the preplanned targets that were considered for the first several 
days of the war were all weighed for proportionality and necessity and approved by the 
CINC, General Franks, at the lowest level.  But that was only for about 20% of the targets 
due to the nature of the threats and the targets as they moved about the Afghan 
countryside.20  During the entire operation, four of every five targets struck by air power 
assets were considered “flex” or time-sensitive targets.21  For those targets, aircrews took 
off without knowing their targets in advance and without detailed (and in many cases 
any) target study.  They would either be given their coordinates and a target description 
so that they could visually identify the target and program the coordinates into GPS-aided 
munitions, or they would be given the name and location of a special operations 
controller on the ground and frequency for their laser guided bombs to be compatible 
with the frequency of the designator used by the special operations forces.     
The nature of targeting and technology in the GWOT had evolved so far since 
Desert Storm that, as mentioned in the paragraphs above, 80% of the aircrew took off and 
                                                 
19 Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, “A Presidency Defined in One Speech,” Washington Post, 2 February 
2002, pg. A1. 
20 Chief, Target Development, U.S. Central Command (officer’s name masked).  Personal correspondence 
with author 6 November 2003. 
21 Rebecca Grant, “An Air War Like No Other,” Air Force Magazine (November 2002), pg., 30.  Flex 
targets are those that are changed after the aircrew has taken off and is en-route to the target area.  Time-
sensitive targets are those that are of such a fleeting nature or importance that they require assets to be 
taken off other pre-planned targets and flowed against the new time-sensitive target. 
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flew into Afghanistan without any preplanned targets.  That means that their targets were 
detected by intelligence personnel and passed to planning officers in the Combined Air 
Operations Center for recommendation to the CAOC director and Air Component 
Commander.  As one Colonel in the Pentagon noted “The targeteers and field grade 
planners are the ones bringing the issues up to the CINC for decisions.  So the senior 
leaders make the moral decisions, but on the advice of their field grade planners.”22 
However, as these targets were found by the new intelligence sensors such as the 
Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, many of the individuals identified were moving and 
were often in and amongst other people, both combatant and non-combatant.  Rebecca 
Grant notes that during the campaign in Afghanistan there was often frustration at the 
need for a high- level proportionality decision. 
The need for target approval by Franks and levels above him some-
times slowed the campaign. According to a report in the Washington Post, 
CENTCOM often denied requests from the CAOC to strike newly 
identified targets. This reportedly provoked one officer to declare, with 
heavy sarcasm, “It’s kind of ridiculous when you get a live feed from a 
Predator and the intel guys say “We need independent verification.”23 
 
However, with the fleeting nature of the targets and with available weapons 
systems on hand, often the targeting decision could not always be requested all the way to 
the CINC in Florida or the SecDef or President in Washington.  The result is that 
discretion was afforded to lower level leaders.  This does not then technically satisfy the 
definition of a moral decision according to my model, however, these time-sensitive 
decisions are also outside the bounds I set for pre-planned targets.  The lower level 
commanders had to make a battlefield decision about a potentially important target 
                                                 
22 Colonel Tom Hyde, interview with author. 
23 Grant, pg. 34. 
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escaping attack and weigh that possibility against the knowledge he had available at the 
time. That information, gathered in haste, and necessarily in scope limited to the area the 
sensors can see, is not complete.  So there remains the possibility of greater consequences 
to the national interest than the local commander should be responsible for. 
For example, there were widespread media reports about U.S. forces bombing a 
wedding party on 1 July 2002 in Afghanistan.  The U.S. claimed that its forces were 
under aimed, specifically targeted anti-aircraft fire from a walled compound.  The local 
Afghanis claimed it was celebratory fire from a wedding party. The result was numerous 
wedding party guests killed or wounded.24  In this case, the lower-level decision-makers 
were also the operators on patrol in their aircraft. With the belief that their lives were on 
the line, they returned fire. But even had they requested permission from the CINC or 
President (which is unrealistic to expect in such a situation), the information they would 
have passed up the chain to justify their request would have been the same as what they 
took into account to return fire on the compound. 
For any target the intelligence analysts felt was a Taliban leader, the CINC 
himself retained targeting authority.  For other time-sensitive targets, the decision was 
delegated to commanders in theater.25  Had the CINC actually been consulted for 
approval of these time-sensitive targets, he may well have determined the necessity was 
such that the expected non-combatant casualties were acceptable to achieve objectives, 
but we do not know if he made those decisions.  At the lower level of decision-making, 
the commanders making the call on proportionality versus necessity may have taken 
morality into account, but they likely had to make the decision in a time-sensitive 
                                                 
24 Luke Harding, “No U.S. Apology Over Wedding Bombing,” The Guardian, 3 July 2002, accessed online 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,748300,00.html.   
25 Chief, Target Development, CENTCOM. 
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environment without the benefit of further analysis.  This is the difficult nature of 
decision-making at that level and one that falls outside the bounds of this study.  It is, 
however, an important next step in researching this topic.  Without the benefit of time to 
discuss moral issues surrounding targets and without perfect information, the lower the 
level of command, and the closer to the battle, the calculus changes the proportionality-
necessity decision. 
When it came time to shift the focus of the GWOT towards Iraq, the doctrinal 
planning process was much different than for Afghanistan.  There was a standing 
deliberate plan on the books that was periodically updated since before Desert Storm.  
CENTCOM planners had been working on refining it since the days immediately after 
the September 11th attacks.  While crisis action planning was used, the planners were 
updating a very current plan and had a base from which to begin, rather than starting with 
a blank page as they had done in 2001 for Afghanistan.  Still, several updates had to be 
made, such as changes to the final force size, selection of units participating, and their 
coordinated flow into ports and airfields.  The fact that all forces had to flow in from 
Kuwait, rather than using Saudi Arabia and Turkey made difficult work for planners as 
well.   
The important doctrinal point about the campaign for the Global War on Terror 
was that there was a doctrinal process in place for both the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns 
and they were followed.  A Joint Targeting Coordination Board composed of CENTCOM 
staff planners was established for both operations and it worked out prioritization and 
deconfliction of targets between service and functional combatant components.  This 
targeting board also was a key element in the establishment of military necessity for each 
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objective and target.  This information was passed through the CINC to the Secretary of 
Defense. The lowest level at which the proportionality necessity decision was made was 
by the CINC.  If the CINC questioned whether a target was worth the expected non-
combatant casualties, he sent the decision to the Secretary of Defense or President.26  
One of the most important points in my research follows. At no time in the 
planning process for either operation did anyone lower the level of expected non-
combatant casualties to make a target acceptable to the senior leadership.  Unlike in 
Allied Force, there was no blanket number for casualties that applied to all targets.  For 
Afghanistan and Iraq, each target was calculated individually to determine a collateral 
damage estimate based on a particular weapon selected to achieve a specific effect.27   
If collateral damage estimate was considered to be too high for the significance of 
the target, the target was not attacked.  If the estimate was high, but the target was 
necessary to the attainment of objectives, then rather than lowering the number of 
predicted non-combatant casualties, the targeteers and planners were directed to go back 
and re-plan the attack with different weapons or different attack headings and parameters 
to change the effects of the weapons and thus lower the estimate of expected casualties.  
According to the Chief of Target Development for CENTCOM, this process of adjusting 
attack parameters was not only extremely detailed, but occurred for most targets.28 
The automated tool with which the targeteers and planners determined the 
collateral damage estimates was a computer program called Bugsplat.  The Baltimore Sun 
reported on Bugsplat and the role it plays in operations. 
                                                 
26 Chief, Target Development, CENTCOM. 
27 Chief, Target Development, CENTCOM. 
28 Chief, Target Development, CENTCOM. 
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Another computer tool is known as "Bugsplat," a program that can 
show targeters the precise blast pattern from a specific bomb and how it 
would affect nearby buildings. The blob- like blast patterns on the screen 
resemble smashed bugs. By seeing the resulting destruction, military 
officers can fine-tune their attacks and select a smaller bomb that would 
destroy the target but result in fewer deaths and preserve neighboring 
civilian areas.29 
 
Bugsplat never told planners how many people would be harmed.   The program 
simply showed the effects that should result from that particular weapon against that 
particular target delivered from a particular platform at a particular parameter.  This 
allowed the planners the opportunity to change the type of weapon, or delivery 
parameters to change the effects of the weapons, all to reduce the harm to 
noncombatants.30 
Bugsplat was not available to planners during Desert Storm and Allied Force.  Its 
development shows the importance of the moral dimension of targeting to senior leaders 
and the desire to procure technologies to assist in making moral decisions.  Colonel Tom 
Hyde said of this fact “As we understand technology, we take on a burden of using it in a 
certain way. Just looking at the weapons we buy and the planning tools we use shows that 
we take morality into account.”31 
 This process of adjusting attack weapons and parameters took the majority of the 
planners’ time and effort prior to and during the war.  However, none of the planners 
interviewed for this chapter, or their co-workers, lamented in any way that this became a 
major effort of the war.  To a person, they all seemed proud of the intellectual challenge 
to achieve the national objectives balanced against the need to minimize non-combatant 
                                                 
29 Tom Bowman, “U.S. Aims to Curtail Civilian Casualties,” Baltimore Sun, 5 March 2003, pg. A1.  
30 Chief, Target Development, CENTCOM.  
31 Colonel Tom Hyde, interview with author.  
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casualties.32  However, that intellectual challenge was not the desired end.  What resulted 
from this process of refinement of attack parameters was precise destruction of targets 
and objectives with so little damage to surrounding buildings that many officers find it 
hard to believe that such large weapons were dropped on those targets.   
According to a post-war briefing developed by the Air Force’s Air Support 
Operations Center attached to the U.S. Army V Corps, and according to the CENTCOM 
Chief of Target Development, the Air Force controllers used the daily commander’s 
intent and targeting guidance to determine a proportionality-necessity decision for time-
sensitive targets that were of a fleeting nature that could not be approved by the senior 
national leaders.  These fleeting targets could be relocated or melt into the population 
before calls could be made to receive permission from senior leaders.  To ensure the 
lowest possible level of harm to non-combatants, the controllers directed their fighter 
aircraft to change the impact angles of their weapons, or the depth at which the weapons 
bury before exploding, or varying the size of weapons to limit the size of the explosion. 33  
Thus, the very process undertaken by planners at higher headquarters for preplanned 
targets was also followed by controllers in the heat of battle and while under fire. The 
following picture from Baghdad, taken by an Air Force officer that controlled and 
directed fighters to their urban targets visually demonstrates this capability. 
                                                 
32 One senior officer in Checkmate asked during an interview “We’d buy these tools and take these norms 
into account even if nobody ever found out.” 14 May 2002. 
33 Senior USAF controlle r (name masked) in the V Corps Air Support Operations Center, personal 
interview with author 6 July 2003. Also, Chief, Target Development, CENTCOM.   
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 In this picture taken from a U.S. military convoy driving through Baghdad, an 
Iraqi tank can be seen after being destroyed by an air strike.  Notice that apart from fire 
scorching the adjacent buildings were scarcely damaged.  Windows remain in tact after a 
laser-guided bomb hit the tank. 
 
Figure 7.1, Destroyed Tank in Baghdad34 
                                                 
34 Image courtesy officers assigned to the Air Support Operations Center co-located with the U.S. Army V 
Corps during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
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In this section, I showed that doctrinal processes to achieve stated national 
objectives existed and were followed against Afghanistan and Iraq.  In the next section, I 
will consider doctrinal structures and their impact on achieving moral ends. 
 
Doctrinal Structures   
In the War on Terrorism, the Secretary of Defense became so frustrated with the 
plans proposed to him as dictated by the doctrinal process that he seemed to have 
circumvented established structures.  Rumsfeld was known to have directed specific 
organizations within the Army and Air Staffs to work together to develop strategies that 
would achieve the national objectives with fewer forces and in less time than those 
strategies offered him by the combatant command staff.  As mentioned above, 
Checkmate assisted in the delineation of national objectives.  Rumsfeld also ordered the 
“Skunkworks,” the Strategy Division within the Directorate of Plans on the Air Staff, to 
work with their counterpart on the Army Staff to develop what he originally requested 
from the CENTCOM Staff but did not receive.35  One potential issue with this ad hoc 
arrangement outside the established structure is that it can result in variations in the moral 
outcomes of the operations being planned.  However, that moral variation is not a 
necessary outcome. 
While the Secretary of Defense has the authority to establish a separate structure 
to receive information that he does not believe he can get through his established 
structure, the Skunkworks officers do not necessarily have the information avenues 
                                                 
35 Interview with staff officers in HQ USAF/XOXS, the Strategy Division of the Air Staff’s Directorate of 
Plans (“The Skunkworks”), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 16 Oct 2002.  As members of this ad hoc joint 
planning organization, they must work with the very people the Secretary of Defense is directing them to 
work around. 
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available to them that are available to those in the established structures.  They must ask 
for information from, and coordinate with, the very bureaucratic structures they are 
tasked to go around.   
In the case of strategy development for the War on Terror, Pentagon officers in on 
the Army and Air Staffs worked closely with the planners at CENTCOM to develop a 
consensus and achieve “buy in” from all the key players.  Thus, by the time the 
operations were executed, there was no friction between the doctrinal structures (such as 
the chain of command between CENTCOM and the President) and those organizations 
outside that structure (such as Checkmate and the Skunkworks). 
On the other hand, there were very vehement and very public disagreements 
between various administration structures, such as the Pentagon and the CIA.  Warren 
Strobel and Jonathan Landay outline the differences between the CIA and Pentagon over 
the causus belli for conducting a campaign against Iraq as part of the War on Terror.36  
That dispute between the Pentagon and CIA was very likely real and deep.  However it is 
beyond the scope of this research project.  I focus on the targeting decisions once the 
commitment to go to war is made by national leaders.  Furthermore, that dispute did not 
affect the motivations of the principals and agents within the chain of command for this 
operation.  Whether the principals and agents agreed with one side or the other in this 
dispute did not materially affect the moral outcome of operations for two reasons.  First, 
the CIA remains outside the doctrinal planning and execution structure.  Second, this 
dispute between the agencies was about the decision to enter into war, and not with the 
conduct of the war once the decision was made to fight. 
                                                 
36 Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay, “Pentagon, CIA In Bitter Dispute On Iraq,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, 28 October 2002, pg. A1. 
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Unlike the previous two conflicts studied, there were not significant structural 
issues within doctrine that affected the moral targeting decisions of this conflict. It was 
primarily the processes, specifically the fact that processes existed and were followed, 
that led to a proportionality-necessity decision.  Having covered the first variable that I 
contend affects moral outcomes, I will now turn to principal-agent motivations to 
determine their impact on moral conduct of operations. 
 
III. Principal-Agent Motivations in the GWOT 
In the Desert Storm and Allied Force chapters I explained how circumstances, 
constraints and beliefs and interests contributed to forming individual motivations.  These 
motivations of the principals and their agents were not always aligned in those 
operations, and the result was that, even had there been doctrine to follow, the 
misalignment of motivations precluded moral outcomes of operations.  In the War on 
Terror, however, my research indicates that where there were differences in opinion on 
certain subjects, the base motivations of the principals and agents aligned.   
The fact that the War on Terror followed direct and costly attacks against the 
United States proper very likely affected the alignment of motivations of the individuals.  
In the face of a threat to the US, rather than a threat to another country, or some U.S. 
economic interest, such as oil, or some vague interest such as human rights, it is entirely 
understandable that individuals’ motivations aligned, even if their base factors forming 
those motivations varied.  In the following sections, I discuss those factors affecting 
individuals’ principal and agent motivations. 
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Circumstances 
 There is a tremendous unifying effect when a country is attacked.  The September 
11th attacks brought out a very strong unity of purpose among the key principals and 
agents within the hierarchy that would lead, plan, and execute the coming war.  When the 
House and Senate gathered their available members on the afternoon of September 11th 
to sing God Bless America on the Capitol steps, despite warnings by authorities of the 
threat, the world saw unity regardless of political party.  The national leaders recognized 
this unity and worked to build a plan upon it. 
The context within which planning began for the War on Terror was not one in 
which there could be a doubt about what type of conflict the nation was in.  There was no 
doubt that the U.S. was in a war.  While so many did not like the idea of waging war 
against an undefined entity such as global terrorism, or even a defined organization, such 
as al Qaeda, people generally understood that the U.S. was at war, and agreed that the 
war was necessary.  The first issue that could potentially misalign principal and agent 
motivations was the difference of opinion between the principals and agents of the nature 
of the conflict and the nature of the response.  There was, however, no difference 
between the President and his subordinates.   
General Hugh Shelton, three weeks shy of retirement as Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff at the time of the attacks, spoke for the entire U.S. military when he told 
Woodward and Balz that he “was relieved as he rather quickly realized Bush was not 
looking for an easy or obvious response, not demanding military options on his desk by 
the next day.”  Bush himself said “he knew the military would resist committing forces to 
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an ill-defined mission.”37 So in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the US, 
circumstances actually helped align principal-agent motivations, rather than show a gap.  
 
Constraints 
Perhaps the greatest constraint on planners and commanders was the 
understanding that targeting would have to take into account the effects of any known or 
suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  The planners understood that after the 
regime change was effected, there would still be the issue of finding and potentially 
cleaning up any WMD that had been released.  Unlike Desert Storm where certain WMD 
facilities were specifically targeted, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, there was an 
opposite goal.  “We have this ongoing debate about what to do with WMD in Iraq.  The 
debate was that maybe we should leave it alone until after the regime change.  Know 
where they are to avoid hitting them rather than targeting them.”38 
This issue of WMD and targeting was certainly an important issue with respect to 
proportionality and necessity.  Aside from the debate of whether the weapons actually 
existed, the planners used powerful tools to show expected plumes and spillage based on 
weather condition, types of chemicals, and the weapons modeled against.  These tools 
helped decision-makers determine a balance of necessity and proportionality 
As sure as the President was that the military would balk at ill-defined missions, 
he and the rest of his advisors, especially Donald Rumsfeld, believed it necessary to push 
the Department of Defense to think boldly and accept greater risk.  Unlike past conflicts 
since Desert Storm where the perception and reality of constraints on the military were to 
                                                 
37 Woodward and Balz, “We Will Rally The World,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A46879-2002Jan27&notFound=true.  
38 Colonel Tom Hyde, interview with author.  
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minimize risk to U.S. service members, the national leadership directed the U.S. military 
to accept greater risk in planning operations in the War on Terror.   
The President himself said “They [the U.S. military] had yet to be challenged to 
think on how to fight a guerrilla war using conventional means.  They had come out from 
an era of strike from afar – you know, cruise missiles into the thing.”39 The military had 
become accustomed to planning for punitive strikes or missions where force protection 
became the mission, rather than achieving any objectives.  No longer would that be 
acceptable.  The President further told his inner circle “We've got to think outside the 
box. . . . We can't think outside the Constitution, but outside the box.”40 
For the Commander in Chief of Central Command, General Tommy Franks, the 
acceptance of risk was necessary.  Once he was certain that the leadership would accept 
risk, he accepted the challenge but with this caveat: “A risk, but not a gamble.”41  But that 
risk was understood by all to mean risk to U.S. forces to achieve objectives, not increased 
risk to non-combatants in order to minimize risk to U.S. combatants, as was the case in 
Allied Force.  That was completely understood by all for the campaign in Afghanistan.  
However, when it came to Iraq, there was less initial agreement. 
In early 2002, General Franks went to Crawford, Texas, to update the President 
on the progress of the campaign in Afghanistan.  During that discussion, the talk turned 
to Iraq.  General Franks showed the President the deliberate plan, the one “on the shelf” 
for Iraq that had been built after Desert storm and periodically updated since.  It called 
for an even greater sized force than the one that won Desert Storm.  The general told the 
                                                 
39 Woodward and Balz, “We Will Rally The World.” 
40 Woodward and Balz, “We Will Rally The World.” 
41 Evan Thomas, Martha Brant, John Barry, and Tamara Lipper, “The Education of Tommy Franks,” 
Newsweek  (Vol. 141, No. 20, 19 May 2003), pg. 24. 
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President that that plan would not be presented.  Franks promised a drastically pared 
down plan for overthrowing the regime.  However, over the next year, Franks’ staff 
planners would wrangle with the Joint Staff planners over the final strategy.  While Army 
planners in the Pentagon were wary of employing small-sized forces, Franks won out as 
the CINC.42   
However, the important point for the purpose of this study is that despite initial 
differences in opinion over which direction the strategy should take, the constraints on 
the principals and agents did not cause misalignment of motivations.  Neither side “won” 
in this difference of opinion.  The leadership could have commanded obedience, but that 
is not what happened.  The principals and agents in the various locations, through a 
deliberative and collegial process, worked out any differences to achieve a truly joint plan 
that satisfied everyone. 
 
Beliefs and Interests 
If Allied Force showed how seriously underlying beliefs and interests could affect 
alignment of principal-agent motivations and thus moral decisions, the Global War on 
Terror shows how the opposite can also be true.  In the previous case studies, the 
principals and agents were not able to overcome their differences in beliefs and interests.  
The key players in the War on Terror, however, worked through any differences they 
might have had to achieve a unity of purpose and a moral decision-making process.   
One example of deliberate discussions to determine moral standards for decision-
making came from the Chief of Checkmate in the Pentagon: 
                                                 
42 Fred Barnes, “The Commander,” The Weekly Standard  (Vol. 8, No. 37, 2 June 2003), pg., 23. 
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This administration had serious discussions about what is right and 
what is wrong and who will accept responsibility…I made assumptions 
about moral decisions and briefed them up the chain to my general officer.  
Once he agreed, the responsibility became his, but it also did not relieve 
me of my continued responsibility to raise issues.43 
 
On the other hand, there was one belief and interest that had to be overcome by both 
principals and agents to fashion campaigns with moral outcomes.  Newsweek reported 
that despite direction from the President and Secretary of Defense to accept greater risk, 
military planners were wary to do so:  
The military brass has remained wary that civilians will not back 
them up if the body bags start coming home. As Franks put it, “You lose 
some people and the witch hunts start.” Rumsfeld and Franks discussed 
the Pentagon's “culture of risk aversion... for about two years,” Franks 
recalled. Franks agreed with Rumsfeld: the problem was real and deeply 
rooted.44 
 
Once again, as can be seen at the end of this passage, a single theme appeared to 
have overcome these differences in beliefs and interests.  That was deliberate discussions 
to align motivations.   
Over frequent meetings in Washington and even at the President’s Texas ranch, 
Rumsfeld and Bush convinced the CINC that the national leadership was behind the him 
and the military and would not shy away at the first sign of casualties.  Unlike 
speculation by many pundits on television, Rumsfeld and Franks did not disagree to the 
point where Franks was ordered to employ assets in certain manners.  It was all Franks 
plan that was followed in both Afghanistan and Iraq.45   
                                                 
43 Colonel Tom Hyde, interview with author. 
44 Thomas, et al. 
45 Barnes, pg. 22. 
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Likewise, Franks built a truly joint atmosphere with his own subordinate 
component commanders and their staffs.  Rather than jostle over primacy of whose 
service would get the primary role in operations, there was true collegiality and a desire 
to get it done right rather than advance service interests.46  “He was obsessed with not 
letting the Army be elevated,” reported on of Franks’s aides.  And more importantly, this 
stance did not distance him from his own army commanders.47 
The campaigns fought so far in the War on Terror have been unlike any in the 
past two decades.  Rather than unclear objectives and interservice rivalries, camera-
seeking military leaders and objections from the forces, this war is being fought 
doctrinally and with principal and agent motivations in alignment.  While there have been 
non-combatant casualties, all the foreseen harm to innocents has been weighed against 
necessity by at least the combatant commander- in-chief, if not the Secretary of Defense 
or President.  Still there have been some critics that highlight what they consider 
excessive noncombatant casualties.   
The Associated Press published a report that 3,240 civilians died in Iraq during 
the month of U.S. and coalition major combat operations.  The study searched hospital 
records throughout Iraq to determine that number, but it is not qualified in any way.  The 
article notes researchers looked to see the profession of the deceased in hospital records.  
If not soldier, then the death was tallied as civilian.  Yet the article also noted that many 
deaths came from Iraqi weaponry placed in public buildings such as schools.  It also 
                                                 
46 Thomas, et al. pg. 38. 
47 Barnes, pg. 25. 
 225 
noted the numerous Iraqi combatants that dressed as Bedouins or women to hide their 
combatant status.48 
Likewise the Project on Defense Alternatives published “Operation Enduring 
Freedom: Why A Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties,” to publicize 
noncombatant casualties in Afghanistan.  This report estimates between 1000-1300 
civilian casualties in Afghanistan. 49  However, like the AP report on Iraq, this report 
looks at aggregate numbers, which can easily bias the Just War criteria through sheer 
numbers.  The report mentions that many of these civilians were family members of the 
targeted al Qaeda or Taliban leaders.  These casualties were specifically weighed for 
necessity by the CINC during that operation and thus pass the test according to my 
model.  Again, there were no claims in these reports that the targets were not necessary, 
only that many civilians were killed. 
The problem with these articles is that they report a number of casualties without 
breaking them down into the context of the individual attacks, which is what Just War 
theory and my own model require.  There is no set number of casualties after which a 
conflict is considered immoral.  In fact, the proportionality-necessity decision is likely to 
be subjective according to the many of the factors that make up principal-agent 
motivation alignment.  Those that are not in leadership decisions with responsibility for 
the decisions, especially those from other countries, may certainly argue that the 
decisions made by U.S. leaders were disproportionate.  But those same people that 
                                                 
48 Niko Price, “AP Tallies 3,240 Civilian Deaths in Iraq,” Associated Press, 10 June 2003, last accessed at 
DuluthNewsTribune.com, http://www.duluthsuperior.com/mld/duluthsuperior/news/6056411.htm, 14 
November 2003. 
49 Carl Conetta, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties,” 
Project for Defense Alternatives, 24 January 2002, accessed on-line at 
http://www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html#6, 14 November 2003. 
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question the decisions are not responsible and thus necessarily will have differing 
motivations.  What makes individual decisions moral or not, according to my model, is 
the proportionality-necessity decision made for each target or objective. 
Defense analyst William Arkin critiques the DoD for claiming that the level of 
non-combatant casualties are extremely low without providing a metric on how to 
measure low.  He notes that while the military is indeed taking measures to reduce non-
combatant casualties, until the DoD studies claims of non-combatant casualties in detail, 
there is no way to show that the government takes this issue seriously. 50  However, U.S. 
Central Command did investigate incidents of alleged non-combatant casualties caused 
by the U.S. during the conflict.   
Through 29 March 2002, CENTCOM determined that coalition aircraft had 
dropped 21,737 bombs and that until that date, there were ten incidents which warranted 
review by the CINC.  Of those, two involved non-combatant casualties.  One incident 
was the bombing of a Red Cross facility that was used by Taliban forces.  This facility 
was not on a list of facilities provided by the ICRC that coalition forces had placed off 
limits.  The second incident was one in which an attack was made on senior Taliban 
officials in a convoy in which thee adult females and three children were killed along 
with the Taliban leaders.51  Still, Arkin’s point should be considered.  If there is not a 
systematic review of non-combatant casualties made during and after a conflict, it might 
not be possible to know if the moral tradeoff that was made prior to and during the war 
worked out with respect to proportionality and necessity.   
 
                                                 
50 William Arkin, “Not Good Enough Mr. Rumsfeld,” Washington Post online edition, 
www.WashingtonPost.com,  25 February 2002. 
51 Headquarters CENTCOM News Release, RELEASE NUMBER 02-03-09, 29 March 2002.  
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IV.  Conclusion 
The day after the September 11 attacks, the President met with Congressional 
leaders in the White House.  These attacks, the President told them, signaled the start of a 
long-term conflict.   
“This is not an isolated incident,” he said. “This is war.” The public 
might lose focus, he added. A month from now Americans will be 
watching football and the World Series. But the government would have 
to carry out the war indefinitely. 52 
 
So it goes to this day.  This war is ongoing and will likely not be completed for at least 
several more years.  Unlike the conflicts I studied in the previous two cases, this war does 
not have a clear end in sight with the hopes for a successful resolution.  But it can still 
easily be studied within the framework of the model I presented in Chapter 3.  Although 
it was fought under a new paradigm of conventional war against unconventional enemies, 
the variables of doctrine and principal-agent motivation alignment were still necessary to 
ensure moral outcomes were attained.  
President Bush stated several times in public speeches or press conferences that 
the U.S. would protect non-combatants.  In one example he stated “we will do everything 
we can, as I mentioned -- and I mean this -- to protect innocent life.”53  In another speech 
he said “I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every 
effort to spare innocent civilians from harm.”54  Whether these concerns for 
proportionality were born of a true moral interest or desire for a more utilitarian 
effectiveness is not material to this model.  The fact that the President outlined the U.S. 
                                                 
52 Woodward and Balz, “We Will Rally The World.” 
53 George W. Bush, Press conference, The White House, Washington, D.C., 8:01 p.m. EST, March 6, 2003, 
Federal News Service, Inc., www.fednews.com.  
54 George W. Bush, “President Bush Address to the Nation: Beginning of the War Against Iraq,” 10:15 
p.m. EST, March 19, 2003, Federal News Service, Inc., www.fednews.com. 
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position on non-combatant harm combined with a doctrinal targeting process, to include 
the tools to determine a collateral damage estimate, and motivations about objectives in 
alignment, the proportionality-necessity decisions were made. 
In fact, the CENTCOM Chief of Target Development said that certain targets 
were not approved for attack until planners could figure out a way to lower the collateral 
damage estimate for that specific target. 
“In the spinup to OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom], I know that the 
high CDE [Collateral Damage Estimates} target set (i.e. all the leadership 
targets, some comms targets located in downtown Baghdad) was 
constantly being worked, reworked, briefed and rebriefed by COMCENT 
[Commander CENTCOM] to the SECDEF.  The actual briefings didn't 
begin till late summer of 02, but were being rewickered up until OIF 
kicked off.  I was involved in reworking several of the briefing slides 
around the Jan-Feb 03 timeframe.  What I can tell you is that from the 
original list of high CDE targets, some were mitigated down to low CDE 
using different munitions, and others remained high, which ultimately 
went to the President for approval.  LOAC issues, specifically 
proportionality and necessity, were primary considerations when looking 
at the high CDE targets - - in fact, one of the briefing slides for the 
SECDEF and President which didn't change at all were the LOAC 
considerations and proportionality/necessity criteria in the analysis of the 
high CDE targets.”55  
 
In this conflict, both of the variables from the model were present.  Sound 
doctrine was available and was followed.  The motivations of the agents were the same as 
the motivations of the principals.  While the overall level of non-combatant casualties 
were low in the previous two case studies (in Allied force, the total non-combatant 
casualties were likely lower than in the War on Terror), they were not low because of 
specific decisions weighing proportionality of affected non-combatants against the 
                                                 
55 Chief Target Development, HQ U.S. CENTCOM, personal correspondence with author 24 February 
2004. 
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necessity of targets.  In the War on Terror, however, the lowest leve l at which that 
decision was made was by the Combatant Commander in Chief.   
In this war, new and powerful tools to determine collateral damage estimates were 
not only available, but used for every planned target.  The military used innovative new 
methods of attack specifically to prevent non-combatant casualties.  Few military 
members with experience in weaponeering and weapons delivery would have thought it 
possible to deliver 2000 pound bombs on a building without even shattering windows in 
the adjacent structures.   
In previous wars, these capabilities could have existed, but were not developed.  
They were developed for this war specifically to minimize non-combatant casualties.  
The fact that principal and agent motivations aligned made these capabilities a reality.  
The fact that a doctrinal process and structures existed for these proportionality-necessity 
decisions to be made ensured moral outcomes. 
Nicholas Wheeler argued that although the al Qaeda and Taliban leaders were 
responsible for many civilian casualties by exposing them to U.S. attacks, the U.S. is 
ultimately responsible for the moral conduct of the war.56  In this chapter, I showed that 
U.S. leaders never denied or shied from that responsibility.  The leaders knew some non-
combatant casualties would be likely, but they made those decisions knowing the 
expected level of casualties and weighed that against the necessity of each target.  The 
U.S. national leaders did exactly what Wheeler said they could not avoid. 
However, as the U.S. moved from the preliminary campaign in Afghanistan, 
where U.S. forces targeted terrorists where there were few, if any, non-combatants in the 
                                                 
56 Nicholas Wheeler, “Dying for 'Enduring Freedom': Accepting Responsibility for Civilian Casualties in 
the War against Terrorism,” International Relations (Vol. 16, No. 2, August 2002), pg. 205. 
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mountains, to sustained operations throughout Afghanistan and to an environment in Iraq 
where non-combatants were more preva lent the closer U.S. forces came to Baghdad, my 
model cannot necessarily predict moral decisions due to the nature of time-sensitive 
operations.  The process for approving time-sensitive targets took place at the Combined 
Air Operations Center in the Persian Gulf headquarters of the air component of the joint 
task force.  Based on the CINC’s daily guidance and commander’s intent, the air 
component commander made the proportionality-necessity decision if the target was of 
such a fleeting nature that there was no time to discuss the issue with the CINC.  If the 
situation on the ground was such that there was time to raise the issue to a higher level, 
then the CINC made the decision.   
For example, when pilots believe they are under fire, they are likely to return fire.  
If they request permission up the chain of command, they may be told to return fire if 
they have not been shot down by the time the approval comes back to them.  On the other 
hand, perhaps senior leaders would have more information and may simply tell the pilots 
to move away from the ground fire.  So this issue of decisions when under fire is far 
different from the environment under which my model assumes moral targeting decisions 
can be assured. 
The important point to make with respect to doctrinal processes is that this war 
was different from the previous two cases and made it easier for the moral decisions to be 
made.  First, very few of these targets in Afghanistan, fleeting or pre-planned, presented 
themselves in urban areas where there was a likelihood of non-combatant casualties.  In 
the situations where aircraft and special operations forces worked in tandem to attack Al 
Qaeda and Taliban forces in the open, there was no chance of harm to non-combatants.  
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There was no real coalition with which to coordinate, leaving all targeting decisions to 
U.S. commanders and national leaders.  
Furthermore, the strategy was not coercive with vague objectives, but one of 
finding and targeting specific facilities and individuals and forces.  If those forces hid in 
cities or in aid convoys or other such locations where non-combatant casualties were 
foreseeable, then the decision was raised at least to the level of the CINC when practical 
in time to do so.57  In this respect, the definition of moral decisions according to my 
model becomes cloudy or even breaks down.  If time is not available, such as when 
ground forces are engaged in a firefight with the enemy, then the proportionality-
necessity decision is likely not going to be elevated to the CINC or higher.   
The commanders of the forces engaged will be making their decisions to best 
protect their force while achieving some objective.  That decision process as laid out in 
the doctrine discussion is then made by someone whose entire set of motivations are 
changed due to the combat situation he is in.  That does not necessarily mean he will 
make a less moral proportionality-necessity balance, but he will not have the opportunity 
to raise the issue to a decision-maker that might be willing to sacrifice more U.S. forces 
to protect enemy non-combatants than the commander of those forces is himself. 
                                                 
57 Chief, Target Development, U.S. Central Command.   
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Chapter Eight 
 
Morality In War – Conclusions And Implications  
 
There is a Clausewitzian component of friction in morality in war 
wherein you think that everything that is going well in war is moral.  If 
you think the situation is slipping away and you might lose, then it is very 
easy to be immoral. 1 
 
 
 
I. Summary of Findings 
 
Jesuit Scholar John Ford, in arguing against obliteration bombing during WWII, 
wrote “It is enough to show that there are large numbers of people even in the conditions 
of modern warfare who are clearly to be classed as innocent noncombatants.”  He goes on 
to say that “it is a fairly common fallacy in legal and moral argumentation to conclude 
that all is lost because there is a field of uncertainty to which carefully formulated moral 
principles cannot be applied with precision.”2  Ford touches on two major themes dealing 
with morality in warfare, one of which, protection of noncombatants, I consider 
extensively in this project.  The other, uncertainty in applying these principles, I leave for 
further research and to other scholars.  I will touch on both in this conclusion. 
In this dissertation, I presented a model to ensure moral decisions in war.  I took a 
seemingly ethereal end, namely moral norms that are the ultimate, but undefined goal of 
ethics and morality literature, and defined what constitutes a just targeting decision in 
war.  I defined as moral those decisions by the senior decision-makers wherein they 
determined a specific proportionality-necessity balance for each target or objective.  I 
                                                 
1 Chief, Doctrine Branch (Officer’s name withheld), Strategy Division, Directorate of Plans, HQ 
USAF/XOXS, Washington, D.C. Interview with author, 14 May 2002. 
2 John Ford, “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” In War and Morality, Richard A. Wasserstrom, Ed., 
Belmont, Ca: Wadsworth Press, 1970, pg.19. 
 233 
operationalized a theory of bureaucratic politics, namely the principal-agent model of 
political control over the bureaucracy, by viewing the processes of planning and 
executing military operations through several factors affecting alignment of principal-
agent motivations.  Finally, I tested the model against the three most recent major U.S. 
military operations: Desert Storm, Allied Force, and the Global War on Terror.   
I found that moral decision-making in these wars (as defined by the 
proportionality-necessity balance) indeed varied with the change in the independent 
variables - following constraining doctrine and alignment of principal-agent motivation - 
as posited in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1).  
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The case studies show that in Desert Storm, there did not exist doctrinal processes 
that would naturally lead planners to develop operational strategies to achieve national 
political objectives.  Absent a doctrinal guide for the processes by which to plan, and 
structures in which to conduct this war planning, there was no way to ensure that the 
military targeted only those Iraqi elements necessary to achieve the national objectives.  
Furthermore, Desert Storm showed us how, absent doctrine, misaligned principal and 
agent motivations influenced the morality of decisions made during the war.   
The person who arguably exerted the most influence on the strategy of the war, 
Colonel John Warden, was a person not in the doctrinal chain of command, and one who 
had motivations far different than his seniors.  Thus principal-agent motivations did not 
align.  And even after he was officially taken out of the planning effort, he continued to 
exert influence on the planners in Saudi Arabia throughout the war.  But this outcome 
cannot be seen requiring blame on that one actor.  It must be also seen as an absence of 
oversight from the principals who did not exercise the proper responsibility to ensure 
decisions they desired were made and carried out. 
In Chapter 2, I related how Eliot Cohen argues against a “normal theory of civil-
military relations” whereby civilian leaders give clear direction to the military and then 
step out of the way to let the military carry out that direction as best it can.  Yet this 
“normal” model was certainly how American leaders performed during this conflict.  
What was seriously lacking in Desert Storm was oversight by the principals over the 
agents and feedback from the agents to the principals.  When General Buster Glosson 
briefed senior principals in Washington on some of the proposed targets likely to cause 
non-combatant casualties, none of the principals objected.  This could be seen by some as 
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an effort by civilian principals to get out of the way and let the military do what it does 
best.  But like Cohen warned, simply having planned and fought simulated wars during 
exercises all their careers did not ensure the leaders would get it right come a real war.  
So there should have been oversight, as required by the principal-agent model. 
Another way to view the conduct of Desert Storm was as a breakdown of civil-
military relations because, as Desch argued can happen in these situations, the will of the 
military prevailed over the will of the civilian principals.  It is possible to accept this 
point of view if one accepts that the direction the military was taking in the fight in Iraq 
was different from what the civilian leadership desired.  Certainly, if the civilian 
leadership wanted merely to expel the Iraqi military from Kuwait, there was a serious 
civil-military relations gap with the military designing and executing a plan to topple the 
Iraqi regime.  
However, although I found that principal and agent motivations did not always 
align, I did not find anywhere in my research any indication that these differences in 
motivation would have been strong enough to overcome a doctrinal process had that 
process existed and been followed.  McCubbins, Noll and Weingast told us that there will 
be non-compliance, and that either procedural control or oversight is necessary to limit 
it.3  But there was neither in the Desert Storm case.  Because there was a lack of oversight 
by senior principals, and because key agents did not think there was anything wrong with 
the targeting strategy, there was no dialogue to clear anything up.  There was not a 
                                                 
3 See Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast  “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (Vol. 3, 1987) pp. 243-277, and “The 
Politics of Bureaucratic Structure,” in Can the Government Govern? , John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, 
eds., Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1989.  
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perceived need for any such dialogue as neither the principals or agents realized there 
was a misalignment of motivations, let alone that such a misalignment was detrimental.   
Had there been a doctrinal process in place that linked the national objectives to a 
military strategy and plan, a process that was coordinated through the CENTCOM Staff 
and briefed to the Secretary of Defense for approval, I contend that a proportionality-
necessity calculus would likely have been developed for all targets and objectives.  It is 
certain that the key principals and agents were interested in limiting not just non-
combatant casualties, but total casualties - U.S. and Iraqi, combatant and non-combatant  
-throughout the war.  
However, without doctrine, and with misaligned motivations, no proportionality 
decisions were made at senior levels.  Even though the Al Firdos Bunker incident led to 
the decision to cease bombing in downtown Baghdad, that decision was made without 
regard to the necessity of any targets in that city.  If one accepts that no targets were 
important enough to strike in Baghdad after that incident, then one would have to ask 
why they were important enough to attack the day before that incident.  It is clear that 
target necessity was not weighed against proportionally acceptable non-combatant 
casualties. Thus, despite the low numbers of claimed civilian casualties in Iraq, the 
targeting decisions cannot be said to have been moral within the framework of my model. 
In Operation Allied Force, the prevailing concept of good civil-military relations, 
as expounded in Chapter 2, certainly was not borne out in that the military prevailed over 
the will of the civilian leadership. The will of the senior military officer involved in the 
operation prevailed over the will of the national civilian leadership.  This occurred 
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despite the fact that clear doctrine for the planning and conduct of joint military 
operations existed.   
On the other hand, one can say that the will of the civilian leadership ultimately 
prevailed over the general when the responsibility for target approval was moved to the 
White House.  The President had approved the initial pre-planned target list, but those 
targets were attacked repeatedly, even after they were destroyed, along with other targets 
the senior principals did not approve.  Once the White House decided to approve all the 
daily targets to be attacked mid-way through the conflict, the military provided an 
estimate of the number of non-combatant casualties in each attack along with the 
necessity of each target.   
At that point, the targeting decisions became moral according to my model for 
targets being attacked for the first time.  The process of targeting was conducted 
according to doctrinally-established procedures and the principal-agent motivations 
became aligned resulting in a proportionality-necessity decision being made at the level 
above the combatant commander- in-chief.  But for every occasion in which targets were 
re-attacked multiple times merely to send sorties out to put pressure on the Serbian 
leadership, those proportionality necessity decisions were not made at all, let alone above 
the theater commander.   
According to my model, the feedback channel worked well prior to and during the 
conflict, with numerous instances of subordinate agents airing their discomfort with the 
conduct of the war in terms of proportionality and necessity.  Clearly, principal and agent 
motivations were misaligned with the bottleneck coming at the senior leadership level 
within the military.  The national civilian leadership wanted to minimize noncombatant 
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casualties, as did the agents below the level of the senior military commanders.  The 
feedback links between the planners and executors and the senior leaders above the CINC 
worked to inform the national leadership about the concerns of those executing the 
campaign. 
Still, even after the White House withheld target authority from the theater 
commander, the doctrine variable only was satisfied because the president could 
determine the necessity of each target to achieve whatever objective he himself 
understood.  Never during the preliminary planning for this conflict were those objectives 
made clear by the national leadership principals to the agents, despite requests for 
clarification from planners and a study by the Air Force Doctrine Center citing inability 
to develop a coherent strategy without clear and measurable objectives.   
I contend that the combination of doctrine not being followed and misaligned 
principal-agent motivations led to the targeting decisions being not moral.  Constraining 
doctrine did exist for this operation.  Had it been followed with clear objectives in place, 
clear lines of command, and a targeting process that selected targets based solely on 
objectives from the very beginning, the doctrinal process may well have forced senior 
leaders to confront the differences in their principal-agent motivations.  But the U.S. 
military was able to learn from their actions over Yugoslavia and incorporate their 
lessons into the planning process for the next war. 
In the final case study of this dissertation, America’s Global War on Terror, I 
researched both the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns to determine if targeting decisions were 
moral.  In each of these campaigns, both the independent variables were present, as was 
the dependent variable.  Doctrine existed and was followed and principal-agent 
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motivations were aligned.  The result was a clear and positive proportionality-necessity 
decision for each pre-planned target or objective in both campaigns.  This decision was 
made by the CINC, or if he did not feel comfortable making it, by the Secretary of 
Defense or President.  Most notably, two processes were observed which were not 
followed in either of the previous cases.   
First, as was the case prior to Allied Force, the military planners were not initially 
given clear and measurable national objectives from which to develop strategies for 
combat employment.  However, officers in Checkmate outlined the national objectives 
based on statements made by senior administration officials in public speeches and 
private consultations.  They turned this draft over to the White House and the President 
approved those objectives.  So the potential break in the first step in doctrinal planning 
was overcome through feedback by planners to the senior principals. 
Second, despite perceived differences in the core beliefs and interests that form 
principal-agent motivations, through feedback from agents and oversight by principals, 
those differences were purposefully worked out and those motivations were aligned prior 
to commencement of operations.  When senior military officers were concerned that they 
would not be supported for developing a plan that required greater risk to both military 
and non-combatants as directed by the principals, they used their feedback channels to let 
the principals know their concerns instead of shirking or sabotaging the orders.   
Principals likewise used their oversight channels to reassure the agents and 
continue to monitor them for compliance.  This was an iterative process that continued 
even after alignment of motivations.  When a noncombatant casualty estimate for a given 
target was higher than acceptable for the necessity of the target, rather than lowering the 
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acceptability level of casualties or reworking the estimate of predicted casualties to 
achieve a lower number, planners changed weapons, fuses, delivery platforms or attack 
parameters to achieve objectives within acceptable levels of noncombatant casualties. 
The simple 2x2 matrix I proposed in Chapter 3 thus looks like this after 
researching the three case studies: 
No Constraining Doctrine and Principal-Agent 
Motivations Not Aligned è  Not Moral Decisions 
 
Operation Desert Storm 
 
No Constraining Doctrine and Aligned Principal -
Agent Motivations è  Not Moral Decisions 
 
Not Tested 
Constraining Doctrine but Principal-Agent 
Motivations Not Aligned è  Not Moral Decisions 
 
Operation Allied Force 
 
Constraining Doctrine and Aligned Principal-
Agent Motivations è  Moral Decisions 
 
War On Terror  
 
My research in these three case studies shows that both of the independent 
variables are necessary, but that neither is sufficient absent the other.  This is borne out 
by the hypotheses, the first two of which satisfy the doctrine variable. My first hypothesis 
is that moral targeting decisions in U.S. military operations are more likely when national 
civilian leaders specify objectives for the military to achieve.  This occurred in the Desert 
Storm and War on Terror Cases, but not in the Allied Force case.  Even with clearly 
defined objectives, misaligned motivations can undo moral ends. 
My second hypothesis is that moral targeting decisions in U.S. military operations 
are more likely when joint doctrine and service doctrines constrain officers to develop 
strategies to achieve specified objectives.  This hypothesis was confirmed only in the 
final case study.  In the first case study, without constraining doctrine, an arguably 
brilliant plan was conceived, but it went well beyond the stated objectives.  And with 
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misaligned motivations, even a brilliant plan cannot be guaranteed to be moral absent a 
doctrinal process that links a strategy to objectives. 
My third hypothesis is that moral targeting decisions in U.S. military operations 
are more likely when military planners’ and executors’ (agents) motivations are aligned 
with those of national leaders (principals).  In the Desert Storm case this was not the case, 
nor was it the case through most of Allied Force.  Yet in Allied Force, despite the fact 
that the moral motivations of planners and executors seemed to match those of the senior-
most principals, the senior military officers’ motivations differed and there were not clear 
objectives by which to determine target necessity.  So even when the President took 
control of target approval, nobody knew the criteria by which proportionality should have 
been, or in fact was, measured against necessity.  Only in the War on Terror were 
principal and agent motivations aligned, and only in that case did they align out of a 
deliberate attempt to work through and resolve differences. 
It is important to remember that this model accounts for pre-planned targets 
normally attacked from the air, but it also would work for pre-planned strikes by ground 
or special operations forces.  If, however, the model was not bounded to missions flown 
against pre-planned targets it would begin to break down due to the dynamic nature of 
time-sensitive targeting and ground combat.  In those situations, there is not likely to be 
time available for on-scene commanders to raise issues of proportionality and necessity to 
the CINC, SecDef or President.  Such a situation does not necessarily mean that the 
decisions made by the unit commanders will not be moral, but the reality of such 
situations is that senior leaders cannot make all the decisions for all forces engaged in all 
places.   
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The daily commander’s intent and overall campaign objectives should provide a 
guide for officers whose motivations are aligned with their seniors to make the proper 
proportionality-necessity balance.  However, commanders in tactical situations are less 
likely to have the detailed information available to planners and decis ion-makers when 
they consider pre-planned targets prior to a conflict.  As such the engaged commander’s 
or pilot’s interest in preserving himself and his unit may well be greater than his interest 
in assessing the number of non-combatants at a location that he is attacking in order to 
assess a proportionality balance.  Thus until further research models decision-making at 
this level, my model for pre-planned targeting decisions must be accepted as a first step. 
 
II. Alternative Explanations of Findings 
In any study of this scope and potential importance to decision-making in war, it 
is necessary to posit potential alternative explanations to the findings of the presented 
research.  In the case of this dissertation, I present three potential alternative explanations 
for my findings.  The first is that the context of each case is truly different and that 
measurement of the dependent variable is not a valid measurement. The second 
alternative is a technological one.  Precision weapons technology makes it possible to 
achieve more “sanitary” results in combat operations.  Furthermore in an era of instant 
communications, it is easier for senior principals to oversee and micro-manage combat 
operations, and thus ensure moral decisions are being made and carried out.  A third 
potential alternative explanation is that the officer corps is internalizing moral norms, 
which accounts for moral decisions being made as time goes by.  I will consider each of 
these alternatives in turn. 
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It could be argued that the nature of the three conflicts studied in the previous 
chapters was different, and therefore the international context allowed for a different 
acceptability level of what is considered proportional to necessity.  It is true that the level 
of national interest in each of the three case studies was different.  In Desert Storm, the 
U.S. had not been attacked, and early on, there was an internal debate within the U.S. 
government over whether to respond at all to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  The threat to 
Western access to Persian Gulf natural resources, especially oil and natural gas, coupled 
with the precedent that would be set for the U.S. accepting unprovoked conquest of 
countries after the fall of communism led the U.S. to determine that a national interest 
was indeed threatened and that military action was necessary.   
Given a threat to U.S. interests, especially once a decision is made to commit U.S. 
forces to ground combat operations, it is natural to accept a certain level of non-
combatant casualties as necessary, even if that number is not discussed in specific terms.  
The argument here would be that the national leadership was cognizant of the image of 
Arab innocents harmed by American bombs and therefore gave the military broad but 
direct guidance to minimize collateral damage.  Any evidence that the military followed 
that guidance could be taken as evidence that specific variables such as doctrine and 
aligned principal-agent motivations were not as important as the guidance given and the 
military’s willingness to follow orders. 
In the case of Allied Force, there was clearly no U.S. national interest threatened 
apart from the charge that the U.S. stood by and did nothing while innocents were 
repressed in Europe.  But that argument could not alone threaten U.S. interests since 
people were repressed the world over and the Europeans who had the most to lose by 
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inaction were not moved to act without U.S. leadership.  General Wesley Clark could not 
convince his principals that Serbia presented the threat he believed it to be.4  Given the 
lack of vital interest at stake and the level of media scrutiny towards the war, one could 
argue that it was natural for the administration to closely monitor targets to ensure 
disproportionate collateral damage did not result from operations. 
And finally the context of the War on Terror was far different from the previous 
two conflicts studied herein.  There was a direct attack on the U.S. and its people with the 
threat and promise of more attacks to follow.  While it was extremely unlikely that the 
U.S. government would be overthrown, it was possible that a serious attack on national 
leadership and national and global financial markets could throw the U.S. political and 
economic engines into chaos precipitating a global crisis. So with a far greater threat to 
national interests, it is reasonable to expect a different calculus for proportionality and 
necessity. Furthermore, the nature of the countries in which the war took place was such 
that it was easier to discriminate fielded forces from non-combatants in open desert 
terrain than one would expect in urban or wooded terrain. 
However, in the case of the War on Terror, the level of discrimination of non-
combatants was not only shown to be greater than in the either of the other two cases, but 
was deliberately carried out beyond any vague orders or guidelines.  In that sense the War 
on Terror case is counterintuitive in that the one case that should have seen a greater 
acceptability of non-combatant casualties was the one in which the most care was taken 
to avoid them.  Furthermore, while in the War on Terror targets were dispersed outside of 
                                                 
4 In his personal papers, Clark discussed what he perceived the Administration’s attitude to be towards the 
Serbian threat.  "That's the flavor of it. 'It's not like this is a really serious problem.' It's like, 'Hey, let's jerk 
this guy's [Milosevic's] chain.' [Then,] 'Okay, we can't stand [it] anymore, it's too embarrassing politically,' 
" Clark said, adding: "I don't take it that way. I take it as a very serious threat to European security."  See R. 
Jeffrey Smith, “Clark Papers Talk Politics and War,” Washington Post, 7 February 2004, pg. A01.  
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cities, so was the Serbian Army in Kosovo. Yet in the War on Terror, the decision was 
made to target specific forces and leadership targets while in Allied Force the target list 
went well beyond those two target categories.  So the international and domestic political 
context can most certainly factor into the proportionality-necessity decision, as was 
described in the section operationalizing the variables.  However, the context is not 
enough in itself to account for the variance in moral decision-making in war. 
A second alternative explanation for the findings of this paper is that technology 
allows for greater discrimination with precision weapons technology and 
communications that allow senior decision-makers to micro-manage operations to ensure 
compliance with moral decisions.  In a classic example of the trend towards the belief 
that precision engagement will lower non-combatant casualty rates, Dwight Ryobler 
writes that the U.S. was poised in Afghanistan to minimize collateral damage due to 
technological advances such as satellite-enhanced weapons that are delivered to specific 
coordinates.5   
However, Dunlap argues that countries that have put too much faith in new 
technologies have been responsible for a greater destructiveness in war.  He contends that 
while precision weapons may be to some a fulfillment of a “humane” way to wage war, 
adversaries have learned how to confound our precision weapons and place important 
targets in and amongst non-combatants to bring that element of warfare back into the 
picture. He argues that precision munitions and their high cost raise other moral questions 
themselves.  Must a commander use precision munitions to the exclusion of unguided 
                                                 
5 Dwight A. Roblyer, Lt. Col., USAF, “Beyond Precision: Issues of Morality and Decision Making in 
Minimizing Collateral Casualties,” Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 28 April 2003.  Accessed at 
https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay2003/affellows/roblyer.pdf.  
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weapons?  To what end must the U.S. procure expensive precision munitions at the 
expense of other domestic programs?6 
In the cases studied herein, it would be difficult to show that precision munitions 
lessened non-combatant casualties.  The Al Firdos bunker discussed in the Desert Storm 
case was hit with a precision munition.  Furthermore, numerous targets cited in the Allied 
Force case were also attacked with precision munitions.  Even precision munitions go 
precisely only where people tell them to go.  The weapons cannot discern who to kill and 
who to leave alone.  So the effects of the weapons are what is important to the discussion 
of proportionality.  Even precisely delivered weapons can yield extremely lethal results.  
And because national leaders can communicate directly with the operators does not mean 
that they will always do so or will have the interest or time to ensure compliance.  So 
technology, while important in lessening the potential for non-combatant casualties, does 
not ensure moral decisions will be made. 
Another element of the technology issue pertaining to moral decision-making is 
that with present-day communications and intelligence surveillance, it is possible to find 
and identify targets more quickly than ever before.  Furthermore, senior leaders half a 
world away are now able to direct forces and make critical decisions in real time.  
However, we also find that there is a chain of command for a reason. One of the tenets of 
air and space power found in Air Force doctrine is centralized control and decentralized 
execution.  This ensures that decisions do not have to bottleneck up a chain of command 
to be made by a single person.  But the scope of decisions that commanders make are 
supposed to be commensurate with their rank and position.   
                                                 
6 See Charles Dunlap, “Technology and War: Moral Dilemmas on the Battlefield,” in Ethics and the Future 
of Conflict, Anthony F. Lang, Jr, Albert C. Pierce, and Joel H. Rosenthal, eds., Upper Saddle River, N.J., 
Prentice Hall, 2004, pp. 126-150. 
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With technology today it is possible for tactical decisions to have strategic 
implications, especially when it comes to targeting individuals and locations without all 
the available information.  A fighter pilot who thinks he is seeing ground fire directed at 
him and assumes it to be the enemy can instead bomb coalition forces if he does not 
know that they are friendly and that they are firing horizontally instead vertically into the 
air.  Such an incident could break apart a coalition and have broader effects than the 
casualties the incident incurred. 
A third alternative explanation to the findings in this dissertation is that officers 
are internalizing moral norms over time and that that internalization accounts for the 
increased awareness of non-combatant casualties and the desire to minimize harm to 
innocents.  It is certainly true, as evidenced by information presented in Chapter 4, that 
the military annually teaches the laws of armed conflict to all personnel and emphasizes 
moral issues in officers’ professional military education.   
Without a detailed quantitative analysis of the potential internalization of norms, 
it is not possible to show any empirical effect of such a theory.  However there is 
anecdotal evidence that morality is an issue which officers think important.  With the 
assistance of the primary research librarian at the Air University Library in Montgomery, 
Alabama, I found that from 1965 to 2001, 122 articles relating to ethics or morality in 
warfare issues were published in defense journals worldwide.  Of these, 61 were written 
by U.S. military officers.7  Furthermore, a simple search by the key work “moral” showed 
fifty nine other research papers on this topic, written by Air Force officers and graduates 
                                                 
7 Thanks to Ms. Diana Simpson, Air University Library, for her assistance in researching from The Air 
University Library Index to Military Periodicals.  
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of Air Force Professional Military Education schools, were published to the World Wide 
Web on the Air University Library on-line database.8 
So without empirical research on moral internalization, it is evident that the 
subject of morality is at least discussed between officers and written about in research 
papers by them.  But this does not necessarily equate to moral decisions in war.  Were 
this the case, then there would have to be some evidence that this moral internalization of 
norms is systematic across the officer corps and influences decisions at all levels and in 
all circumstances.  However, this is not what happens in conflicts.  As shown in the War 
on Terror case, the more tactical the decision, the lower the level of decision-making, the 
closer one is to the battle, the more difficult it is to make a balanced proportionality-
necessity decision.  When forces are engaged in combat operations, the calculus for 
proportionality and necessity seems to change from what it was in the planning phase 
prior to the conflict.   
Colonel Tom Hyde, the Director of Checkmate in the Pentagon during the Afghan 
campaign said: 
The Air Force institutionally expects me to take moral norms into 
account.  It is second nature.  If you give me time to think about it, I’ll 
have a better chance to make that consideration, but if I don’t have time, 
as in combat situations, I have to rely on embeddedness to take over.9 
 
Even if decisions are raised to the combatant commander via technological 
advances, with U.S. forces in contact, it seems that the proportionality-necessity balance 
is different than it is in the pre-conflict calm.  Colonel Hyde said that he relies on moral 
embeddedness when he does not have time to think about his decisions in detail.  But 
                                                 
8 Air University Library on-line database, https://research.au.af.mil/showstudent.aspx?type=Student.  
9 Colonel Tom Hyde.  Interview with author. 
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how can one measure moral embeddedness?  While the battlefield tactical commander 
may have internalized moral norms, no evidence shows that he is willing to put his forces 
at greater risk under fire to protect non-combatants.    This does not mean that such 
evidence does not exist, however, it is beyond the scope of this research project and was 
not found during my research of my three cases. 
 
III. Implications and Avenues for Further Research 
 
Having determined the relationship of the variables doctrine and bureaucratic 
motivations to moral targeting decisions in the form of proportionality-necessity 
decisions, the work of researchers is far from complete.  The classic and contemporary 
Just War Doctrine literature provides a foundation for what is and is not acceptable in 
war, but it does not offer a methodology of achieving that end and leaves open that what 
a country decides is its necessity is always the ultimate moral determinant.  Civil-military 
relations literature helps us understand the relationship between soldiers and the state, but 
it is not consistent on key theoretical principles, such as the differences between policy, 
doctrine and strategy, and when oversight is necessary and effective.   
This second point, oversight, may turn out to be the most important aspect of 
future research for morality and warfare.  My research provides an alternative way of 
considering relations aside from who prevails when there is disagreement.  I showed that 
it is possible to make this question moot through deliberation and alignment of 
motivations between civilian leaders and military subordinates.  
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Finally, the bureaucratic politics literature provides us with a framework to view 
relationships between principals and agents, which I extended to the realm of military 
operations.  This dissertation complements recent principal-agent literature by supporting 
the notions that agents will shirk without strong oversight when their motivations are not 
aligned with their principals, and when procedural constraints are not in place.  Most 
important, I showed that through detailed procedures (doctrine) and aligned motivations, 
principal and agent tensions are not a necessary end. 
In this dissertation, I merely showed how moral decisions can be made in war and 
what stands in the way of making those moral decisions.  This dissertation has not in any 
way closed the door to the study of morality in war.  To the contrary, my research opens 
or highlights several avenues for further scholarly study.  Four that I will briefly discuss 
are the issues surrounding individual responsibility, the process of determining military 
necessity, whether combat operations are becoming more moral over time and what 
would make that trend occur, and finally the benefits a state might derive from waging a 
moral war. 
The first avenue of research this study might lead towards is this issue of 
individual responsibility for decisions made in war.  Future researchers might determine 
if individuals were investigated for the decisions they made.  It would be important to 
know if those that failed to take into account proportionality and necessity were ever 
prosecuted under the UCMJ.  If not, then the threat of punishment under U.S. law is not 
credible.  If the threat is truly credible, then there should be evidence to show that either 
all the targeting decisions are moral, or else officers and senior civilians are held 
accountable for decisions that are not moral. If officers and senior principals are not 
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being held to account for their decisions, then researchers might undertake to determine 
why and whether this potential lack of accountability has an effect on international 
relations. 
The second potential research topic that should spring from this study is how 
national leaders determine necessity and proportionality values.  In my research, I had to 
define moral decisions in order to be able to determine variance from that definition.  But 
future researchers may want to look at that specific process in detail to determine whether 
or not proportionality and necessity are discussed by senior principals.  Perhaps a norm 
can develop over time that does not rely on each national leader’s personal determination 
of what constitutes acceptable non-combatant casualties.  
According to my model and definition for a moral decision, as long as the CINC, 
Secretary of Defense, or President makes a proportionality-necessity decision, the 
decision is considered moral. But what calculus do these leaders use for making the 
determination that one target is so necessary that it is worth the lives of seventeen 
noncombatants, but another is worth sixty-seven.  Is there a calculus at all?  If there is 
not, can another researcher determine moral conduct without such consideration? 
The Chief of the Doctrine Branch within the Strategy Division of the Air Force’s 
Plans Directorate at the Pentagon (the Skunkworks) said it is impossible to determine 
necessity and proportionality when national leaders cannot even agree on objectives.  
“There is no nexus, no integration between military leaders and civilian leaders with 
respect to national objectives in war.  The Bush administration is no different than the 
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Clinton administration in this respect.  They both asked us to tell them what they should 
direct us to do.”10   
Bill Arkin refers specifically to this issue and the moral calculus when he asks for 
some quantification of what it means to fight the most moral war possible.11  I am not 
comfortable with the idea of quantifying morality by placing a number of noncombatants 
casualties above which is considered immoral.  For that would remove the difficult issue 
of decision and focus attention on some number.   
Others may feel more comfortable with a quantifiable number to remove the 
seeming arbitrariness of morality being what each national leader says is necessary.  Carl 
Conetta argues that the US has killed up to 6,000 non-combatant casualties in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq.12  His monograph brings up the issue of raw numbers and moral 
equivalence.  He argues for the notion that the U.S. cannot kill more people in the War on 
Terror than were killed in the U.S. in September 2001, rather than the issue I highlight in 
this dissertation, namely developing a process to ensure moral targeting decisions.   
When looking at the sources for the numbers in Conetta’s report and how they 
were determined, I find that the casualty estimate could be even higher than reported, but 
it could also be significantly lower.  But determining the number of total casualties, while 
interesting and important in itself, does not serve in explaining my model.  What it does 
is show that there may be a difference between what is an acceptable number of non-
combatants for any given target and the aggregate total killed at the end of a conflict.  
                                                 
10 Chief, Doctrine Branch (Officer’s name withheld), Strategy Division, Directorate of Plans, HQ 
USAF/XOXS, Washington, D.C. Interview with author, 14 May 2002.  
11 William Arkin, “Not Good Enough Mr. Rumsfeld,” Washington Post online edition, 
www.WashingtonPost.com,  25 February 2002. 
12 Carl Conetta, “Disappearing the Dead: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Idea of a "New Warfare",” Project on 
Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #9, 18 February 2004, online at 
http://www.comw.org/pda/0402rm9exsum.html .  
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Hypothetically, if we were to take all of the targets on a target list for Conflict X and 
make individual proportionality-necessity decisions for them, we might find that while 
each target had some acceptable casualty number, the aggregate total would be too high 
for decision-makers to stomach. 
Future research should delve into the linkages between specific targets and the 
causal chain that the military planners use to determine that target’s necessity to achieve 
the objective set out by the national leadership. This line of research would specifically 
support the leadership’s decision on the balance between protecting non-combatants and 
targeting those elements of the enemy state that will lead to attaining objectives.  It would 
also provide theoretical and empirical support to the notion that achieving objectives 
short of total war is possible without massive casualties.   
There is a large body of writing and research on aerial warfare and targeting.  
From Gulio Douhet13, through John Warden, to the research papers produced annually at 
the Air University in Alabama14, officers, strategists, and civilian thinkers have written 
works that attempt to provide templates for targeting enemy states.  From punishment and 
coercion, to nodal analysis and the industrial web theory15, to unrestrained war, authors 
tell planners how to devise strategies to take countries down.  But few mention limits on 
targeting based on moral grounds and few mention limits on the grounds of limited 
                                                 
13 Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air, New York: Coward -McCann, 1984.  See also 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/great/douhet.htm#boo for an Air University Library bibliography on 
Douhet.  
14 For a listing of Air University research papers published to the World-Wide Web see 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/firstsearch/papers.htm.  Type the word “target” into the search window to see 
papers regarding targeting enemy states.  
15 In the 1930s, officers at the Air Corps Tactical School developed a theory of airpower called the 
Industrial Web Theory.  They theorized that it was possible to destroy a country’s war making ability 
through bombardment of strategic industries.  This became the template for the strategic bombing 
campaign in Europe during WWII.  See 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/database/research/ay1998/saas/west_sd.htm for a paper that compares Warden’s 
theory to the Industrial Web.   
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political objectives.  Somewhere, there is a research program waiting to bridge these 
writings to Just War Doctrine. 
Perhaps as a result of this line of future research, national leaders, as well as 
military commanders will find themselves constrained over time to plan attacks on only 
those elements in an enemy country which will materially achieve stated national 
objectives with a proportiona lity-necessity calculus.  Then a good faith estimate of 
noncombatant casualties can be made before the conflict, taking into account the fog of 
war that invariably accompanies conflict.  Furthermore, the conflict might be bounded 
before it even begins so that only those necessary targets are planned for attack and 
others are not added merely because they represent some military activity as happened in 
Allied Force.  
On the other hand, the bureaucratic politics literature leads us to understand 
another alternative to the question of what factors go into determining proportionality and 
necessity.  Perhaps future research will find that necessity changes based on the 
leadership’s placement on the left-right continuum.  What a far left Democratic 
administration finds necessary may be found through research to be different from what a 
far right Republican administration would find necessary.   
Another branch of research related to this question of determining proportionality 
and necessity is the amount of expertise the principals and agents have with respect to 
this particular issue.  The relationship between the three key principals, which my 
definition says must make the proportionality-necessity decision, will necessarily change 
from administration to administration.  Oversight of the agents changes based on the 
principals’ expectation of agents’ expertise, as well as of agents’ expectation to comply 
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with direction. 16  Depending on the level of experience of the principals and the level of 
experience the principals understand the agents to have, the level of oversight may 
change.  Another determinant would be the level at which the principals think the agents 
appreciate the political salience of the proportionality-necessity issue with respect to the 
domestic political landscape, which would naturally affect alignment of principal and 
agent motivations. 
A third avenue of research that would complement this dissertation is determining 
whether military operations are becoming more moral over time.  This would not 
necessarily be as supportive of the literature on warfare or security studies as it would be 
of social science in general.  It would be a point of reference for studying civil-military 
relations and any gap that exists between the cultures of the civilian world and the 
military officer corps.  To take this on, a researcher would need to establish a baseline of 
how he or she defines a level of morality, probably beginning with a detailed study of 
whether proportionality and necessity were taken into account and how those issues 
weighed on decision-making would be a good start.   
One branch of this project could be to study officers that have participated in 
multiple operations over time.  He or she could try to quantitatively determine if moral 
norms have affected officers and their decisions from one conflict to the next and whether 
their moral calculus has changed.  If so, this would be a military example of Wood’s and 
Waterman’s notion of a “slow tonal change” in bureaucracy over time.17 
                                                 
16 Kathleen Bawn,  “Political Control Versus Exp ertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative 
Procedures,” American Political Science Review (Vol. 89, 1995) pp. 62-73. 
17 See Dan Wood, B. and Richard W. Waterman “The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy,” 
American Political Science Review (Vol. 85, 1991), pp. 801-828, and “The Dynamics of Political-
Bureaucratic Adaptation,” American Journal of Political Science, (Vol. 37, 1993) pp. 497-528. 
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Closely related to this issue could be a study of what factors affect officers in 
taking moral norms into account.  Is the ongoing process of professionalization of the 
officer corps producing leaders who take moral issues into account?  If so, then this 
finding would support not only civil-military theorists such as Huntington, but also 
bureaucratic politics researchers like Brehm and Gates.  
If researchers conclude that professionalization makes for a more moral fighting 
force, it would be important to know whether this was a deliberate end desired by the 
civilian leadership, or is this an unintended, but beneficial consequence.  Or perhaps 
researchers might find, as Dr. Joe Gordon posits, that officers merely follow moral norms 
out of a utilitarian desire to not get hauled in front of a tribunal?  He argues against 
Colonel Hyde’s notion of moral internalization.  “It is not a moral issue at all, but purely 
utilitarian because today the media is always there to see what decisions people make.”18  
The notion of officers making the moral decision and why they would do so is 
often a counterintuitive argument and would offer multiple avenues of research.  A future 
researcher might posit that the U.S. acts out of a certain desire to uphold standards it sets 
for itself.  If that were the case, he would have to show that there is a consistent standard, 
that it is measurable, and that the standard drove decisions with respect to morality.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this dissertation leads to the question of 
why national leaders would find it necessary, or even desirable to wage wars with the 
                                                 
18 Dr Joseph Gordon a former Professor of National Security Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence 
College in Washington D.C., is a defense analyst working for the Department of Defense in the Pentagon.  
Interview with author, 14 May, 2002, Washington, D.C.  Donald MacCuish and Tom Ruby also make this 
utilitarian choice argument in “The International Criminal Court (ICC): Could American Military Officers 
be tried in the Hague?” Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Georgetown University Institute for the 
Study of Diplomacy, Case 270, 2003. 
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goal of a victorious, and moral outcome (regardless how one specifically defines a moral 
outcome).  The potential for research on this issue alone is tremendous.  
 I posited at the beginning of this dissertation that I believe it is in the country’s 
best interest to fight moral wars.  Yet others point out that the U.S. has carried out what 
would be considered at best questionable operations since WWII without international 
recrimination.  One key officer interviewed at the Pentagon coined what he called “The 
Dresden Syndrome” to illustrate this point.  He posits that even when the U.S. is winning, 
its officers do not want to back off until the opponent admits defeat.  He says the 
American thinking is: 
We could still lose this war yet, so lets show them they’re really 
defeated – Dresden, Tokyo, Highway of Death in Kuwait, Mount Pastric 
Salient in Kosovo, Tora Bora in Afghanistan.  Planners become 
desensitized to casualties when this happens.19   
 
So does the “Dresden Syndrome” result in any difference in relations after a war than 
would have resulted without such operations?  That is a topic for future research. 
Others might attempt to determine whether there is another international relations 
benefit to waging conflict under Just War norms, such as better relations with third party 
states.  Researchers could attempt to determine if conflicts fought under moral norms led 
to more lasting peace between the parties than those fought without moral restrictions.  
Perhaps a researcher will find that relations after an unconstrained total war are not 
empirically different than after fighting a morally-constrained war, which could then lead 
the U.S. to develop strategies to wage very fast and potentially brutal wars without regard 
for proportionality.  Still other scholars may determine that moral norms have changed 
                                                 
19 Chief, Doctrine Branch (Officer’s name withheld), Strategy Division, Directorate of Plans, HQ 
USAF/XOXS, Washington, D.C. Interview with author, 14 May 2002. 
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over time, making it impossible to provide a fair causal comparison of previous conflicts 
against modern, morally-constrained war. 
This third potential avenue of research would be very important for our national 
civilian and military leaders.  It could tell them whether there really is a national interest, 
apart from some cultural or religious desire, to limit harm to non-combatants.  For if it 
were found that international relations did not suffer despite a low level of morality, then 
perhaps different strategies would be employed to win wars more quickly without regard 
to non-combatant casualties.   
On the other hand, if it comes about that researchers find cases of states suffering 
internationally due to the way other countries perceive their actions, then such findings 
might alter the realist outlook on war and international affairs to make the desires of other 
states or international institutions a stronger variable in determining state interests.  If 
states see a compelling interest to achieve some objective through military instruments of 
power that will incur a high toll in non-combatant harm, and other states do not agree and 
threaten some sort of sanction, then the interest the state wants to achieve through war 
must be weighed against the interest to conform internationally in a realist or utilitarian 
balance. 
 
IV.  Concluding Thoughts 
 
McCubbins, Noll and Weingast told us that ex-ante legislative solutions to correct 
bureaucratic shirking do not work.  In the case of the military waging war, that is even 
more true.  Firing, and even trying in courts of law, those who wage immoral wars cannot 
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reverse the outcome after the fact.  So they suggest procedural constraints, which in the 
military means constraining doctrine.20 The military, through the direction of congress in 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, set about to develop that doctrine which is now both detailed 
and well understood.  But doctrine alone is not enough. 
Banks and Weingast tell us that oversight is important, and that the best kind of 
oversight is the “fire-alarm” type that alerts superiors after a problem has occurred.21  In 
the case of the military, the fire alarm might be the media highlighting disproportionate 
non-combatant casualties.  However, that type of monitoring is not appropriate for the 
military in war because principals can’t go back to undo disproportionate harm to non-
combatants or the potential resultant international implications.   
And Brehm and Gates remind us that while constant monitoring is the most 
effective way to ensure that agents follow principals’ directions, it is very costly.  22  Thus 
other measures such as professionalization of the officer corps can help to reduce the 
need for, and costs of, monitoring. The U.S. does, in fact, work to continuously 
professionalize its officer corps.  But that is not sufficient to ensure moral norms. 
Regardless the professionalization of the officer corps, regardless the fire alarms 
in place, regardless the level of doctrine, the stakes are so high for the U.S. when it is at 
war that U.S. national leaders cannot rely on these for oversight over the military.  
National political leaders must suffer the costs of monitoring in terms of time and money 
                                                 
20  See Matthew McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Structure and Process, Politics and 
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,” Virginia Law Review (Vol. 
75, 1989), pp. 431-498. 
21 Jeffrey Banks and Barry R. Weingast, “Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric 
Information,” American Journal of Political Science (Vol. 36, No. 2, May 1992), pp. 509-524. 
22 See John Brehm, and Scott Gates, “Donut Shops and Speed Traps: Evaluating Models of Supervision of 
Police Behavior,” American Journal of Political Science (Vol. 27, No. 2, 1993), pp. 555-581. 
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to provide not only detailed direction, but also constant oversight to ensure moral 
decisions are made and carried out.   
Should national political decision-makers decide to wage a moral war, it is not as 
easy a merely saying “go do it.”  They must overcome the truths of bureaucratic politics.  
Bureaucrats perceive influence as emanating from various principals with a shared type 
of perceived influence.  That means the planners and executors of military strategies 
respond not only to their own personal motivations, but to multiple principals as well.  
Furthermore, some key people are principals in one relationship and agents in another, 
yet all within a single framework of decision-making, planning and execution of military 
operations.23  So to ensure moral decisions are made, national leaders have to cut through 
these multiple relationships that layer vertically, but also spread horizontally.  They must 
make their directions understood, and if necessary replace the officers in the chain of 
command with others who will agree with their positions and who will carry out their 
orders. 
There is a moral way to wage war.  To do so, the U.S. must follow constraining 
military doctrine as well as ensure that the motivations of the principal decision-makers 
align with the motivations of the agent war-fighters.  Such actions will not guarantee any 
limited level of violence, but it will justify what violence is waged.  They will ensure a 
conscious decision about the necessity of targets is weighed against the acceptable risk to 
non-combatants.  
                                                 
23 This military application of planning and executing combat operations fits neatly onto findings by 
Richard W. Waterman and Kenneth Meier, “Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion,” Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory (Vol. 8, No. 2, April 1988), pp. 173-202, and Richard W. Waterman, 
Amelia Rouse and Robert Wright, “The Venues of Influence: a New Theory of Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (Vol. 8 No. 1, January 1988), pp. 13-
39.  
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Appendix 
List Of Acronyms  
 
ACSC – Air Command and Staff College 
ACTORD – Activation Order 
AIRSOUTH – Allied Air Forces Southern Europe 
AFDC – Air Force Doctrine Center 
AFDD – Air Force Doctrine Document 
AFSOUTH – Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO) 
ATO – Air Tasking Order 
CADRE – College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education 
CAF – Combat Air Forces 
CAOC – Combined Air Operations Center 
CAP – Crisis Action Planning 
CENTAF – Central Command Air Forces 
CENTCOM – United States Central Command 
CDE – Collateral Damage Assessment 
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
CINC – Commander- in-Chief 
CINCEUR – Commander in Chief, United States European Command 
CINCSOUTH – Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO) 
CJCS – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CNN – Cable News Network 
CONOPLAN – Contingency Operations Plan 
DoD – Department of Defense 
DMPI – Desired Mean Point of Impact 
DV – Dependent Variable 
EUCOM – United States European Command 
GAO – Government Accounting Office 
Gen - General 
GPS – Global Positioning System 
GWAPS – Gulf War Airpower Survey 
GWOT – Global War On Terror 
ICC – International Criminal Court 
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
IV – Independent Variable 
JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JFACC – Joint Force Air Component Commander 
JFC – Joint Force Commander 
JP – Joint Publication 
JPEC – Joint Planning and Execution Community  
JSPS – Joint Strategic Planning System 
JTCB – Joint Targeting Coordination Board 
JTF – Joint Task Force 
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KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army 
LOAC – Law of Armed Conflict 
Lt Col – Lieutenant Colonel 
Lt Gen – Lieutenant General 
NAC – North Atlantic Council 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCA – National Command Authorities 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization 
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom 
OPORD – Operations Order 
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PME – Professional Military Education 
PVO – Private Volunteer Organization 
ROE – Rules of Engagement 
SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
SecDef – Secretary of Defense 
TFW – Tactical Fighter Wing 
UCMJ – Uniform Code of Military Justice 
UN – United Nations 
UNAAF – Unified Action Armed Forces 
USAF – United States Air Force 
USAFE – United States Air Forces in Europe 
VTC – Video Tele-Conference 
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WW II – World War II 
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